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ABSTRACT 
Human Rights, as the nomenclature suggests are 
inalienable and inherent in all human beings by virtue of their 
human beings. These are claims, which should be available to 
every human being. Human Rights, in one form or the other, 
have existed virtually in every culture and civilization, 
religion and philosophical tradition. But what is new about 
these rights is their institutionlisation, largely due to the 
efforts of the United Nations. The United Nations has created 
awareness among all human beings about their basic and 
inalienable rights. Everyday we are reminded of their 
importance—be it police atrocities, arbitrary laws, victim of 
Bhopal gas tragedy, victim of Gujarat tragedy or any other 
such calamity. The hopes and aspirations of the people move 
around human rights. The enactment of laws, under ordinary 
circumstances, striking at the roots of human rights, can 
hardly create an atmosphere congenial to the development of 
these rights. Seen in this perspective, the enactment of the 
Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Act, 1985 has kept aside 
all the international human rights norms and Constitutional 
safeguards of the rights of the citizens. One can understand 
the indispensability of such laws in emergency situation but 
the continuation under normal times is a bad omen for 
democracy and the Rule of Law. Apparently, the assassination 
of Indira Gandhi and its aftermath, rise of terrorism in Punjab 
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and a series of bomb blasts in Delhi and other places, have 
prompted the Government of India to came out with this 
extraordinary piece of legislation. It was thought that the 
ordinary law, hoodwinked by the laws of evidence, is not 
sufficient to meet the grave situation. But this is not the whole 
truth- The National Security Act was already in existence but 
it was thought a more stringent law was required for reasons, 
known to the authorities. Despite opposition the law was 
finally enacted. 
The study mainly concentrates around TADA in the 
human rights perspective. The first chapter traces the genesis 
of human rights and the role played by different agencies in 
giving a concrete shape to the concept of human rights. With 
the adoption of the UDHR by the United Nations, human 
rights assumed universal significance as it set certain common 
international standards for the achievement of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, which are to be observed by the 
Member States. 
The second chapter of the thesis is a survey of the 
Preventive Detention Laws in India. The Constitution of India, 
surprisingly, provides for preventive detention in the chapter 
on Fundamental Rights. The purpose of these laws was to save 
the country from disruptive activities. To meet these 
challenges, the Preventive Detention Act was enacted in 1950 
for a period of two year's amidst acrimonious debate in 
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Parliament. The move was to curb the communists' menace, as 
the Government claimed. The Act was unsuccessfully 
challenged in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. However, J. 
FazI AH in his dissenting judgement asserted that the word 
"personal liberty" in Article 21 refers to all aspects of liberty 
provided in Article 19 of the Constitution. The dissenting 
judgement, however, was accepted later by the Supreme Court 
in Maneka Gandhi. Not satisfied with preventive detention the 
Maintenance of Internal Security Act was enacted in 1971 to 
curb black marketing and smuggling and provided special 
provisions for the foreigners. It was also unsuccessfully 
challenged in Hardhan Saha v. State of West Bengal. The 
biggest blow to the rights and liberties of citizens came from 
the emergency declared in 1975 and what was worse was that 
even the Supreme Court in Shiva Kant Shukla upheld the 
actions resorted to by the government during the emergency. 
In 1980 the Government enacted the National Security Act. Its 
objective is to detain such persons like black marketers, 
smugglers, and those who fan fare communal ill-will causing 
unrest and disruption in the country. But the Act was seldom 
directed at these elements and on the contrary, its provisions 
were used to settle political scores and unsettle trade union 
and human rights movements. The very first detainees under 
the Act were A.K. Roy, M.P. and K.S. Chatterjee, MLA, who 
were active trade union leaders. The judiciary also could not 
be of much help, on the contrary the Supreme Court upheld its 
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Constitutional validity in A.K. Roy v. Union of India. 
However, the only consolation was that the apex court issued a 
number of directions with a view to safeguarding the interests 
of the detainees. No body can dispute the utility of preventive 
Detention laws, if they are used for the purposes for which 
they are enacted; the real difficulty arises with regard to their 
implementation, which is totally not free from political 
overtones. Even a cursory glance at the preventive detention 
laws reveals they always tend to limit the scope of judicial 
review besides making in-roads into the rights of people. 
The third chapter provides an insight into the Lok Sabha 
debates on TADA at the time of its enactment and extensions 
till 1995. It was only in 1993 that an amendment was 
incorporated in the Act providing safeguards to the detainees; 
the maximum period of remand during the course of 
investigation was reduced to 180 days from one year. This 
undoubtedly provided relief to thousands of detainees. On all 
occasions of the extension the Act, the Government 
emphasized its indispensability to meet the growing terrorist 
activities - the use of transistor bombs, bomb blast in Bombay 
and Calcutta, problem posed by Naxalites and LTTE and 
specific problem States like Punjab, Kashmir and Assam, 
where peace and security was often disturbed by the alleged 
militants. The general feeling in the country - the elite, media, 
was that there was no need of this kind of Act as there are 
ample provisions to deal with the terrorist and disruptive 
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activities under the ordinary law of land. What is lacking is 
the will to act and act swiftly. The Act far from uprooting 
militancy has helped the Government in assuming more 
arbitrary powers under the garb of combating terrorism. 
Needless to say that the provisions of the Act contravene 
international human rights standards, especially the right to 
freedom of expression, right to fair trail etc. In some 
instances, the Act failed to meet the national human right 
standards too and, fall short of fundamental rights guaranteed 
under the Constitution of India. The doctrine of presumption 
of innocence was wholly ignored. Especially Designated Court 
were constituted to try cases of TADA instead of the regular 
law courts. Appeals from these courts were confined to the 
Supreme Court only. The provision was the direct 
contravention of the Article 14 of ICCPR, which provides that 
if domestic law provides more than one instance to appeal, the 
convicted person must have access to each one of them. The 
most controversial provision of the Act was that the 
confession made by an accused before the police officer is 
admissible as evidence, which contravenes the laws of 
Evidence. 
The fourth chapter seeks to explore the role of judiciary 
in protecting the rights of the persons detained under TADA. 
The judgement of the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh v. State 
of Punjab, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra 
and Sunjay Dutt v. State through C.B.I. Bombay (II) have been 
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discussed and analysed. The Supreme Court upheld the 
Constitutional validity of the TADA but at the same time it 
confirmed the abuse of the Act by the Police. However, to 
prevent the abuse, the Court held that the word 'abet ' in 
Section 2 (l)(a)(i) should be read as including a 'guilty mind'. 
The minority judgement in Kartar Singh admitted that the 
unreliable evidence in the form of "confessions", were 
allegedly extracted by the police through illegal methods and 
must not admitted as evidence. Thus, Section 15 (1) of the Act 
was unfair, unjust and unreasonable, offending Article 14 and 
21 of the Indian Constitution. The Court also issued guidelines 
in regard to recording of confessions under Section 15 of the 
Act. On the provisions of the right to appeal, the Court indeed 
recognized that the Supreme Court is beyond the reach of an 
average man. Inspite of recognizing this, the Court upheld the 
validity of the Section 19 of the Act. The judgement reveals 
that the judges accepted the loopholes of the Act but they are 
not in position to declare the Act as null and void. In Hitendra 
Vishnu Thakur and others, the Act was challenged on the basis 
of the 1993 Amendment in Section 20(4)(b) which modifies 
the bail provisions. The Court held that the Designated Court 
could not deny the accused's indefeasible right to be released 
on bail on account of the default of prosecution to file challan 
within the prescribed period. The Court was also obliged to 
inform the accused of his right to seek release, but there was 
no obligation on the part of the court to order his release on 
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its own. In the above case the petitioner also challenged the 
definition of ' terrorism'. The Cc i r t expressed that it is not 
possible to give a precise definition of "terrorism". The Court 
went on to hold that the crime committed by a terrorist and an 
ordinary criminal often overlap and it is difficult to draw a 
line between the two. Justice Anand observed that "every 
terrorist may be a criminal but every criminal cannot be given 
the label of a terrorist only to set in motion the more stringent 
provisions of TADA." In Sanjay Dutt, the attitude of the 
judiciary was different from the other cases of TADA. Section 
5 of the Act was challenged before the Court and the Court 
held that mere possession of unauthorized arms and 
ammunition in a notified area does not link one to the terrorist 
activity, the word possession means possession with the 
requisite mental element i.e. 'conscious possession' . Both in 
Kartar Singh and Sanjay Dutt, the Court did recognize the 
futility of the Act but could not declare it as invalid. It is 
these issues, which constitute the focus of study in the fourth 
chapter. 
The use, misuse and abuse of the Act is the theme of the 
fifth chapter. The Act and its implementation reminds one of 
the colonial days when the much hated Rowlett Act (1919) was 
enacted to crush political opposition. The congress, which 
protested against the Act during the British period, did not 
hesitate to enact a similar law in independent India. The 
present National Democratic Government out-smarted the 
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congress in enacting an even more stringent law, the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act. Under both the laws, police 
vandalism increased, minorities were harassed as the Minister 
for internal security himself admitted. The Union Home 
Minister Buta Singh in 1987 and P. Chidambarm in 1989 also 
criticized the implementation of TADA and assured that it will 
be used only in special circumstances. Despite these 
assurances, the police had a gala time in detaining all and 
sundry not excluding blind persons, mentally retarded person, 
children, old aged persons and even prostitutes. Its use in 
Gujarat was maximum, which had neither the history of 
terrorism nor was classified as a problem state. Innocent 
people were booked under TADA for communal violence 
without sufficient evidence. It was alleged that 1600 people 
were booked in the two months during the communal violence. 
The indiscriminate use of TADA has made the remedy worst 
than the malady. Many a time judiciary has come down 
heavily on the police for having failed to provide sufficient 
evidence against the detainees in the specified time. In most of 
the cases, the police booked ordinary criminals under the Act 
in order to keep them in custody for a long period. The very 
fact that 80,000 (from unofficial sources) and 76,000 (from 
official sources) detained under the Act during the last ten 
years, with hardly 1 percent rate of conviction speak of the 
high handedness of the detaining authority. The Act was 
hardly used for the purposes for it was enacted. What is more 
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surprising is that at the time when TADA lapsed in 1995, 4528 
were languishing in jails out of which 6% of the cases were 
dropped, 90% were under investigation, 5% were challenged 
and the trial were completed in about 6% cases. Despite the 
stringent provisions of the Act and the wide powers that it 
conferred on the police, the Act failed to check the terrorist 
activities, which was ultimately replaced by POTA. I have 
tried to establish that the present safeguards are inadequate to 
protect the rights of citizens. Therefore, to save the country 
from the terrorist 's activities and also for the protection of the 
rights of the citizens some improvements like power of the 
Designated Court to award compensation for wrongful 
detentions, frequent review of detention laws, and action 
against the police if they act malafide, are necessary. This may 
help in putting some premium on the misuse of powers by the 
detaining authority. 
The work is based on primary as well as secondary 
sources. The work also under takes an analysis of the major 
decisions of the Supreme Court in the context of fundamental 
rights and the international human rights standards. An 
attempt was also made to interview the persons detained under 
the Act, but without much success. 
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(preface 
I had to be very alert while penning down the Preface of my 
thesis ''"^uman (RigHts ^orms and the Laws of (Detention: J\ case study of 
Tji(DA" because this topic had been a challenging one, in view of 
the scanty material on the subject. The indiscriminate use of 
detention laws in India specially the TADA and now the POTA, 
has evoked lot of controversy as these laws hit at the human rights 
directly. The absence of well-documented work on TADA has also 
prompted me to take up this project. Criminals deserve to be 
punished and, if their crimes warrant it, with severity. But even 
harshness has its limits, which are dictated by conceptions of 
justice, fair play and respect for human life, dignity and rights. 
And so long as effective alternatives to such laws exist, there will 
always be doubts about its use as an instrument of state policy. 
Seen in this perspective, the thesis is a modest attempt to explore 
the various ramifications of the detention laws with special 
reference to TADA. The introduction to the thesis traces the origin 
of human rights. The western writers often trace the origin of 
human rights to the much-publicized Magna Carta, which was, 
infact, a contract with the barons and which had nothing to do with 
the rights of the people as such. In my opinion, the holy Qur'an is 
the first attempt arriving as the consolidation of human rights. The 
contribution of Christianity, Buddhism and other religions and the 
Roman law in the development of human rights cannot, however, 
be ignored. It is not the intention of the candidate to undermine the 
role played by these religions. The Glorious revolution, American 
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Revolution and the French revolution, guided by the teachings by 
Rousseau, have equally contributed to the emergence of rights— 
liberty, equality and fraternity. The contribution of the League of 
Nations was no less significant. With the creation of the United 
Nations, the issue of human rights, in a sense was institutionalized. 
The UDHR and the two covenants on human rights made these 
rights universal, and provided the necessary framework for States 
to incorporate them in their Constitutions and respective national 
laws to make them more universal. India also could not remain 
unaffected by these currents. The Constitution of India aims at 
upholding these rights, which are basic to all human beings. But at 
the same time, state expediency and compulsions of time also 
prompted the Government of India to enact special laws to deal 
with situations striking at the very existence of the nation — 
smuggling, trans-border terrorism, and rise of insurgency etc. It is 
precisely to meet these challenges that various detention laws were 
enacted from time to ti me. But in the process, misuse and abuse of 
these laws have often been a regular phenomenon. The highest 
blow to the liberty of citizens came from the emergency declared 
in 1975 and what was worse was that even the Supreme Court in 
A.D.M. Jabalpur upheld the actions resorted to by the government 
during the emergency. The decision of the Court sealed all hopes 
of revival of human rights till the Supreme Court came out with a 
liberal and progressive interpretation of Article 21 in Maneka 
Gandhi. Since then, a series of decisions of the apex Court aiming 
at upholding the liberty has marked a new chapter as far as rights 
are concerned. These issues constitute the focus of study in the 
second chapter. 
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The third chapter provides an insight into the debates of the 
Lok Sabha on TADA. A very modest attempt has been made to 
analyse the various points of view expressed by the members in the 
House. An examination of the provisions of the TADA in the light 
of the UDHR and the two international covenants has also been 
undertaken. The fourth chapter deals with the role of Judiciary in 
selected cases of Kartar Singh, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and 
Sanjay Datt. Other cases could not be taken up for want of space. 
The Courts, however, could not do much, as the Act leaves very 
little scope for the Judiciary to flex its muscles. 
The subsequent chapter highlights the misuse and abuse of 
the TADA provisions especially by the police. The poor rate of 
convictions is a pointer towards the partisan attitude of the police 
in booking up people under the Act, which failed to stand the 
scrutiny of the courts. 
The conclusion of the thesis highlights the necessity of 
proceeding under these laws with restraint and caution. What was 
more pathetic about TADA was that it was applied even in those 
States like Gujarat, which were not classified by the Government 
as 'problem states ' . Nobody can deny the importance of such laws 
when the very sovereignty and security of the State is in danger 
but there is a paramount need to apply these laws after proper 
investigation and verification, else the future of human rights in 
India would be in great peril. 

INTRODUCTION 
The world even after 54 years of the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by the United Nations is 
faced with gross violations of human rights. Far from eliminating 
the age-old practices of discrimination, it has led to new kinds of 
perversions posing a serious challenge to the entire mankind. The 
new threats to human freedom and dignity, which are the 
offshoot of the modern and technocratic society, have not been 
dealt with in all seriousness. This makes a reappraisal of the 
entire concept of Human Rights to suit to the new mornings. 
The representative of twenty-six nations that were fighting 
against the Axis powers first used the concept of 'human rights ' 
in the Declaration of United Nations on 1 January 1942. But in 
the view of Norberto Bobbia, the concept of Human Right is not 
new. Human rights are historical rights, which emerged gradually 
from the battles that human beings fight for their own 
emancipation and the transformation of living conditions. ' While 
Akrun Kaplan Rozier and many others have tried to find out the 
sources and justification of human rights in religion. According 
to them, Islam has some aspects of human rights.^ It is traced 
from the Holy Qur'an. Islam provides a ray of hope by answering 
all dilemmas, which the mankind faces in the way of the 
enforcement of Human Rights. The Qur'an has laid down some 
universal fundamental rights for humanity as a whole, which are 
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to be observed and respected under all circumstances, whether in 
the time of peace or war. It explicitly provides: 
"O believers, be you securers of justice, witness 
for God. Let not detestation for a people move you not 
to be equitable; be equitable—that is nearer to God 
fearing."^ 
The Human Rights, which Islam gives to human beings, can 
be classified in two categories. 
(1) The basic Human Rights which Islam lays down 
for a man as human being, 
(2) The rights, which Islam gives to different classes 
of people in accordance with the peculiar situations, status 
and position. 
Right to protection of Life: -
According to the Qur'an, human life is sacrosanct. There 
are several verses, which affirm the inviolability of human life 
except for just cause. The Qur'an says; ".. . . Whose killed a soul 
not for retaliation for a soul slain, nor for corruption done in the 
land, shall be as if he had slain mankind altogether; and who so 
gave life to it, shall be as if he had given life to mankind 
altogether.""* 
"Nor take life which God has made sacred except for just 
cause."^ 
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"Do not kill a soul which Allah has made sacred except 
through the due process of law." 
"The first among the basic right which Islam grants is the 
right to life and respect for human life." The Qur'an regards 
killing of a human being as equivalent to killing of all mankind.^ 
Islam has clearly laid down the cases and the situations where 
human life can be taken away. Destruction of human life 
unwarranted by circumstances spelled out in the Qur'an is 
regarded as the greatest sin after polytheism. Islam confers rights 
on every human irrespective of race, nationality or religion. The 
Prophet (PBUH) is reported to have said, "One who kills a man 
under covenants (A non- Muslim citizen of Islamic State) will 
not smell even the fragrance of Paradise."^ The Prophet (PBUH) 
has also prohibited killing of those persons, of an un-Islamic 
State, which is at war with an Islamic State, who are not involved 
in the war. The Prophet (PBUH) in his address on the occasion of 
farewell of Hajj had said "your lives and properties are forbidden 
to one another till you meet your lord on the day of 
resurrection."^ 
Isl am also provides for the rights of the child in the womb 
of his mother. The Prophet (PBUH) had postponed once the 
capital punishment of a woman, for protection of the right of life 
of the child within her womb. The extent to which this right was 
protected by the state can be seen from the treaties and the 
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ordinances promulgated by Caliphs and their Governors. The 
treaty on the conquest of Azabaijan by the army of Islamic State 
during the Caliphate of Hazarat Umar reads, "Their lives, 
properties and the religious laws are all safe."'^ The treaty made 
by Hazarat Umar on the conquest of Jerusalem, stipulates, that 
"This security extends to there live (non-Muslim), properties, 
churches crosses of all their healthiest and sick. . . ." ' ' 
The Right to privacy is also accorded special status by the 
Qur'an. It provides, "O ye who believe! Enter not the house other 
than your own until, you have asked leave and saluted the 
inmate's thereof. That is better for you, that you may be heedful. 
And if you find no one therein, do not enter there until you are 
given permission. And if it be said to you, 'Go back' , then go 
back; that is purer for you. And Allah knows well what you do." 
It further declares "and spy not each other"'^ thereby 
forbidding undue interference or encroachment on the private 
lives of other persons. The Prophet (PBUH) has gone to the 
extent of instructing his followers that a man should not enter his 
own house suddenly. He should some how or the other inform or 
indicate to the dwellers of the house that he is coming.'"^ The 
state is also prohibited to intervene in the private affairs of 
citizens. The Prophet (PBUH) said, "When a ruler begins to 
search for causes of dissatisfaction among his people he spoils 
them."'^ Thus when Caliph Umar once heard a man singing inside 
a house, he suspected some mischief and started peering into the 
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house where there was a woman and some wine along with a 
man. He started demonstrating them but on being reminded of the 
fact that he was violating their right of privacy, he gave up the 
idea of punishing the man and accepted his fault. He let the man 
free after taking oath from him that he would live a pious life in 
further.'^ It is clear that neither bugging devices can be fixed in 
the private house to trap the conversation-taking place behind the 
closed door nor can the letters be censored while in transit, as is 
done in modern civilized States.'^ 
Islam has laid sound foundations for the civil freedoms, 
asserting that every individual, man or woman, is a free and 
responsible agent, free to handle and decide his or her personal 
affairs, including financial matters, without any undue 
interference or hindrance. Every person, according to Islam, is 
master of himself, with an independent personality. Each person 
has the right to make a will and to get married. He is entitled to 
anything that (he believes) will realize his personal or common 
interests. The Qur 'an is equally explicit on Political freedoms. It 
provides that each individual who is of sound mind has a right to 
participate in determining the policy of his Government, and, 
watching over, and criticizing its executive departments. Islam 
has guaranteed this right and made obligatory sharing in the 
running of the affairs of the Government through consultation. 
The Holy Quran reads: "...And consult with them upon the 
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conduct of affairs."*^ ". . . . And those whose affairs are 
(determined by) consultation among themselves."*^ 
It enjoins what is proper and forbid what is improper.^*^ 
Islam gives the right of freedom of thought and expression to all 
human beings. However such freedom is to be used for 
propagation of virtue, truth and not for spreading evil or 
wickedness. 
The Qur'an proclaims, "let there be no compulsion in 
religion." Muslim can invite non- Muslim to Islam but they 
cannot compel them to embrace Islam. Muslim cannot persuade 
any one to accept Islam by moral, social or political pressure and 
that "there should be no coercion in the matter of faith."^^ Every 
individual has the right to choose his path. No one can be forced 
to follow a particular path. The right to protest which forms the 
basis of democracy is recognized by Islam century before the 
advent of democracy. The Qur'an says: "God dose not love evil 
talk in public unless it is by some one who has been injured 
thereby."^^ The Prophet (PBUH) has regarded the protest against 
a tyrant ruler to be the best form of jihad.^* That the right to 
protest against a tyrant and his arbitrary laws and orders 
contravening the principles of Islamic justified. Abu Bakr in his 
first address as a Caliph said; "Obey me! As long as I obey Allah 
and his Prophet (PBUH) when I disobey him and his Prophet 
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(PBUH) then obey me not.""' The Qur'an also provides 
safeguards against arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. It provides. 
"No bearer of burdens shall be made to bear the burden of 
another." That every man is responsible for his action if other 
man has not shared his actions then he cannot be held responsible 
for it, nor can he be arrested even though he may be clearly 
related to the wrong doer. The relatives of an accused person 
who has been found guilty of an offence cannot be arrested or 
punished for him. This provides the basis for the modern notion 
of the criminal liability of an individual. 
The genesis of human rights can be treated to Islam and the 
Qur'an, which has systematically provided for a code of rights 
and obligations. The purpose being the establishment of justice 
as Qur'an says, "we verily sent our messenger with clear proofs, 
and reveals with them the scripture and balance, that the mankind 
may observe right measures; and revealed iron, where in is 
mighty power and many uses from mankind."^^ Muslims are 
enjoined to establish justices, even if their own interests are in 
danger. 
"O ye who believe! Be ye staunch injustice, witness for 
Allah, even though it is against yourselves or (your) parents or 
(your) kindred, whether the case is of a rich man or a poor man, 
Allah is nearer unto both (then ye are). So follow not passion. 
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lest ye lapse (from truth) and if ye lapse or fall among, then Lo! 
Allah is even enforced that ye do." 
There is no concept of Court fee in Islam as it is function of 
the State to establish, maintain and deliver justice. The modern 
notion of free legal aid is perhaps the offshoot of the Islamic 
concept of justice. Therefore there is no question of anyone being 
deprived of justice on account of his inability to pay the Court 
fees. There is no scope of lawyers being paid by clients in an 
Islamic setup. In an Islamic setup, the Government will pay the 
fees of lawyer. Their work is only to give free legal opinions to 
people. The English doctrine that the "King can do no wrong" is 
seen to Islamic Jurisprudence. 
Historians trace the origin of human rights from Magna 
Carta (1215 A.D.) that granted certain rights. They ignore the 
contribution of Islam in the development of these rights. On 
close examination, it would be seen that Magna Carta was a 
petition urging the King to concede certain rights to the Baroons. 
Its contents neither had the universality of application nor direct 
relevance to common man's basic freedoms. We find some hints 
of human rights in the twelfth century teachings of Thomas 
Aquinas. Human Rights, as it is commonly believed are 
depicted as a new version of natural rights. Macfarlane argues 
that the concept of human rights emerged out of the much earlier 
conception of 'natural right ' , which initially was no more than a 
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derivative element in the medieval Christian doctrine of natural 
law.^^ John Locke developed the concept of the natural rights and 
summed them up as right to life, liberty and property. According 
to him, the natural rights had a metaphysical or moral status 
derived from human nature. The doctrine of natural rights viewed 
man as a self-determining and self directing agent living in an 
environment that offered him ample resources and opportunities 
to pursue his own goals and choose his own actions free from 
interference from others. It placed great emphasis on liberty, 
freedom and independence of man. According to Carl J Friedrich, 
in the doctrine of natural rights, man was believed to have a 
fixed and unalterable nature, to be endowed with reason, which 
gives him certain rights without which he ceased to be a human 
being.^' 
In the ancient times there was no concept of the rights and 
liberty, as it is understood today. Plato, therefore, does not say 
anything directly about the rights. But he provided an idea of 
Justice, Functional Specialization, Communism of wives and 
property. Emancipation of women etc. He also emphasized the 
importance of education. His assertion that the society is always 
'a unity amidst diversity' and the every member of society 
should perform his duties to the best of his capacities can be 
linked in a broad way to the concept of Separation of Powers. He 
emphasized that every member of society should perform the 
functions of which he was best fitted by his aptitude and training. 
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His assertion tiiat "all things are produced more plentifully and 
easily and of better quality when one man does one thing which 
is natural to him and does at the right time and leaves other 
things. He favoured rule of wise and wanted the state to be ruled 
by virtue. He paved the way for the emancipation of women by 
insisting that they should be given necessary education on equal 
terms with men and be permitted to take active part in the affairs 
of the state.^^ 
Aristotle was the first pragmatic thinker whose work and 
conclusions were based upon data, facts, and figures and 
provided a scientific outlook to the study of Politics. He is 
considered as the father of the modern conservatives. He, for the 
first time made a successful bid to reconcile the principle of 
liberty and authority. He rejected the notion of the liberty as 
consisting of living as one likes and asserted that individual's 
salvation lies in constitutional rule. To him, liberty is "subject to 
unselfish and constitutional authority and obedience to right and 
proper law." He said, "The state came into existence for bare 
needs of life and continues in existence for the sake of good 
life." 
According to Thomas Hobbes, the absolute and unlimited 
character of sovereignty follows that the citizen or subjects do 
not enjoy any generous measures of liberty under the Leviathan.^^ 
To him "liberty implies absence of external impediments which 
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impediments may off takes part of man's power to do what he 
would do." He subject to a cold and logical discussion the claims 
made on behalf of individual liberty by the opponents of 
monarchy. The individual has no rights or claims against the 
sovereign ruler to whom he surrendered all his natural rights. The 
only liberty that Hobbes allows the members of the 
Commonwealth can be summed up fewer than two heads. Firstly 
they have the freedom to do what laws of the state do not forbid. 
Secondly, they retain the right to do that, which cannot be 
surrendered under any covenant. The liberty under the first 
category does not amount too much; it does not constitute any 
limitation on the rights or powers of the sovereign. Under the 
second class, Hobbes allows the individual the right to disobey 
the state if he is asked to do anything, which involves danger to 
his life or body. Hobbes hardly recognizes the right to private 
property, the right to freedom of expression, freedom of 
conscience and other rights on which democrats generally lay 
stress. It would however be wrong to infer from this that there is 
and can be no liberty under the Leviathan.^'* There is liberty but 
only such as can be enjoyed under the protection of laws. 
According to Hobbes, the laws do not bar the people from doing 
voluntary action; their aim is to ' direct and keep them in such a 
motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, 
rashness or indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, 
but to keep them in the right way'.^^ Hobbes established the 
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relationship between rights and authority and maintained that 
there could be no rights without the existence of authority. 
Montesquieu's idea on liberty is visible in his Great 
Treatise.^^ To him, the end or the objective of all governments is 
the maintenance of ' l iberty' . He held that drawing up of a bill of 
rights and making it part of the formal constitution of the state 
does not ensure the attainment of liberty by the citizens. Paper 
declaration has little value; what matter is not the letter of the 
law, but the sprit in which it is applied. Rights recognized by the 
constitution are valueless, unless the law is put into action. For 
securing liberty it is not necessary that the laws should 
necessarily be right; what is required is that the citizen should 
know the law, and should be punished only when they violate the 
law. The degree and the nature of liberty enjoyed by the citizens 
might vary with the nature and type of law, but if there were no 
law whatsoever, one would have no security and no liberty; one 
would be adrift on an unsheltered sea. In so far as uniform and 
fixed law is the condition for the enjoyment of liberty. The 
central point of his theory is that liberty signifies subjection to 
law as distinguished from subjection to man.^'' 
The individualist liberal tradition, developed by Hobbes, 
Locke, and other philosophers of the 17"" and 18^^ century, was 
influenced by the theory of natural rights. Liberalism cherished 
the realization of individual liberty, his development and 
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progress through the principle of rule of law, limited government 
and constitutionalism. Towards the end of 18*** century and in the 
19'** century, the idea of natural rights as a source of human 
rights was challenged. Philosophers such as Bentham and Marx 
simply rejected it. 
Bentham attacked the concept of natural law and natural 
rights and asserted that right is the child of law. "Rights, asserts 
Bentham, are the fruits of law and of law alone. There are no 
rights without law—no rights contrary to law—no rights anterior 
to law." Bentham had no love for individual liberty. He argued 
that what men need is security and not liberty. He looked at each 
law as a restraint on individual liberty. He did not think liberty 
important for the happiness of the largest number of people. "The 
chief care of law is security; and the principle of security extends 
to the maintenance of all those expectations which law itself has 
created." Security, one may say, is a necessity for social life and 
for moderate degree of human happiness; equality is rather a 
luxury, which legislation could promote when it does not 
interfere with security. As for liberty, it is not one of the 
principle objects of law, but a branch of security, and a branch 
which law cannot help prunning. In simple words, Bentham laid 
great emphasis on obedience to law because obedience alone 
provides permanence and effectiveness to law, which enable it to 
promote the "greatest happiness of the greatest number," which 
should be the chief aim of all laws.^^ 
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J. S. Mill was the great champion of the individual liberty 
and stood for restricting government interference in the life of 
the individual to the minimum possible extent. He held that 
democracy; public opinion and collectivism were dangerous to 
individual liberty and must be kept within their sphere of 
activity. He believed that if every individual is allowed to 
develop his personality as he whishes, it would enrich the world 
by a variety of characters.^^ This way alone the human being 
shall be able to get the maximum happiness. Mill argued that so 
long the action of an individual concerned him alone and did not 
in any way prejudice the interest of others, he should be free and 
there should not be any limitation on him. However, he permitted 
the state to impose restrictions on the liberty of the individual if 
it resulted in an injury to the interests of other members of the 
community. It will be observed from the above statement of Mill 
that he divides the individual's action into two parts viz. self-
regarding and other-regarding. He permits the individual 
complete freedom with regard to actions falling within the first 
category. But he permits the state or the society to put necessary 
restriction on those actions of an individual, which affects other 
members of the community. Further, even Mill permits the state 
to interfere in the self-regarding actions of an individual in his 
own interest. In doing so. Mill argues, the state actually 
promotes the self-interest of the individual and this action does 
not constitute denial of liberty in any way. This contention of 
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Mill has met with severe condemnation; because once we allow 
the state to interfere in individual's liberty there is no end to it. 
In this regard Mill made the classic statement on individual 
liberty in his essay 'On Liberty'. "The sloe end for which 
mankind is warranted individually and collectively in interfering 
with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-
protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightly 
exercised over any member of a civilized community against his 
will is to prevent harm to others. His own well, either physical or 
moral, is not sufficient warrant. The only part of conduct of any 
one, which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns 
others. In the part, which merely concerns him, his independence 
is, of right, absolute over himself, over his own body and mind 
the individual is sovereign."'*'^ 
The doctrine of natural rights has profoundly influenced the 
English, American and French Revolutions. All these revolutions 
laid the foundation of human rights. The American Declaration of 
Independence, 1776, states "all men are created equal, that their 
creator endows them with certain inalienable rights, among those 
are life, liberty and pursuit of happiness." The US Bill of Rights 
also contains enumerable rights of people. Likewise French 
Revolution gave birth to the Declaration of Rights of Man and 
Citizens in 1789. It echoed the feeling of liberty, equality and 
fraternity, a glimpse of which is found in the Preamble to the 
Constitution of India. It declared certain rights of man as natural. 
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imprescriptible and inalienable. A catalogue of rights has now 
become standard features of the constitutional apparatus of all 
contemporary States. From the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, attention was directed more to the rights of individual, 
than the powers of the State. Bouandel argues that the clash 
between liberalism and socialism in the later part of nineteenth 
and early twentieth century added new dimensions to the 
understanding of human rights."*' Socialist thinkers stressed the 
need to suppress a number of individual rights to achieve higher 
rights for mankind as a whole. Marx recognized that civil and 
political rights are meaningless unless economic and social rights 
(which are called 'the rights of second generation' by the human 
rights activists) are guaranteed. 
The 20th century saw tremendous efforts in the formation 
of new principles and procedures to transfer the protection of 
basic rights of man from the hands of nation-states to a 
supernatural organization. The covenant of the League of Nations 
and the International Labour Organization touched some aspects 
of human rights. In 1929, the Institute of International law. New 
York, prepared a Declaration of Human Rights and Duties. The 
Second World War marked a turning point in the development of 
international concern for human rights with the birth of United 
Nations. The untold atrocities committed on political and ethnic 
minorities by the Axis powers activated the awareness and 
concern for human rights. The crime committed by Hitler and 
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other Axis powers were described as crime against humanity. At 
that point of time, the inter-American conference passed a 
resolution in 1945, seeking establishment of an international 
forum for the furtherance of human rights. Under these 
circumstances, the United Nations prepared the historical 
document, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 
with a purpose, to set a standard of human rights for the future. 
The United Nation made the subsequent documents such as 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
and its Optional protocol in 1966. These documents made the 
human rights more universal. New rights were added to these 
documents to make them people oriented. 
On April 25, 1945 the Charter of United Nations was 
adopted at the San Francisco Conference.the rights expressed in 
different treaties found a place in the U.N. Charter. Prior to 
coming into force of the U.N. Charter, human rights movements 
were confined to abolition of slavery, humanitarian laws of 
warfare, and protection of minorities. These rights however did 
not satisfy the hopes and aspirations of the people, hence the 
need for a Universal Declaration under the auspices of the U.N. 
It was an innovation in the sphere of international peace and 
security that human rights were indispensable. The realization 
was written large that respect for human rights was intimately 
connected with the preservation of international peace and 
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security. The way human rights were trampled upon by the 
totalitarian states during the Second World War, it became 
imperative for the world organization to take stock of the ground 
realities and spell out rights of the people in a comprehensive 
manner. 
In its preamble, the Charter, inter alia, reaffirms its "faith 
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small."'^^ To this end, the Charter enjoins "to 
practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as 
good neighbors" and "to employ international machinery for the 
promotion of the economic and social advancement of people." 
The achievement of international co-operation "in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion." The Charter enjoins that the General Assembly shall 
initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of 
assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. It further calls upon to work for the promotion of 
"universal respect for the observance of these rights and 
freedoms in the sphere of international economic and social co-
operation as a pre-requisite for the creation of conditions of 
stability and well being which are necessary for peaceful and 
friendly relations among nations. The Economic and Social 
Council is empowered to make recommendations for the purpose 
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of promoting respect for, and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all. The council has power to set up a 
commission for the promotion of human rights. 
Since the inception of the Charter, there has been a 
controversy whether the human rights provisions are mere 
platitude or they create some obligations on the part of member 
States to give them practical shape. Irrespective of the 
controversy, the fact remains that these rights are not spelled out 
with clarity.'*^ Despite that the very fact that these provisions 
exist in a multilateral treaty and to which nations often take 
recourse whenever and wherever breach of human rights takes 
place, is in itself an achievement. Articles 55'*'* and 56"*^  of the 
Charter do impose an obligation upon the United Nations to 
promote universal respect for and observance of human rights, 
and on individual members to take joint or individual action in 
co-operation with the United Nations for the achievement of 
Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights.'*^ The 
greatest achievement of the movement of human rights is that 
human rights are no longer confined to the realm of domestic 
jurisdiction; they operate beyond the national canons. 
An Overview of the UDHR: -
The beauty of the Declaration of Human Rights is that it is 
neither addressed to nations nor to member states of the United 
Nations but to every individual, and is not a legal declaration in 
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the sense that it is not a legal instrument having binding force on 
its ratifiers, yet it has a great impact on the nations and has, 
infact, influenced the national Constitutions of several States, 
including India, which have incorporated most of these rights. 
Article 29(2) of the Declaration provides that, "in the exercise of 
his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subjected only for 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose 
of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others, and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order, and the general welfare in a democratic 
society". 
While adopting the Declaration, the General Assembly 
proclaimed that "this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, 
to the end that every individual and every organ of society, 
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by 
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and 
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition 
and observance, both among the peoples of Member States 
themselves and among the peoples of territories under their 
jurisdiction." To sum up, the Declaration of Human Rights has 
not been conceived as law but as a common standard of human 
rights, which everyone, every State, should endeavour to achieve. 
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In its thirty Articles, the Declaration dwells on civil, 
political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Its first two 
Articles are of general nature spelling out the universality of 
human rights. In the category of civil and political rights, are 
listed the traditional rights, such as right to life, liberty and 
security of person;"*^ equality before law and equal protection of 
laws;'*^ freedom of movement within and outside the country; 
right to own property;^" freedom of opinion and expression;^ 
freedom of peaceful assembly and to form associations and 
unions; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; right to 
seek and enjoy asylum.^'* It is further laid down that no one shall 
be held in slavery or servitude;^^ no one shall be subjected to 
torture or cruel treatment or degrading and inhuman behavior and 
punishment.^^ It lays down that no one can be arrested and 
detained arbitrarily.^^ No one shall be exiled arbitrarily.^* No 
interference will be made in one's privacy, family life and 
correspondence.^^ No one will be subjected to attack on his 
honour and reputation.^ Men and women of full age shall have 
the right to marry and to found family,^' right to nationality,^^ 
right to take part in Government of one's country,^^ and equal 
access to employment in public service.^'* 
In the category of economic, social and cultural rights are 
included, right to social security,^^ right to work, right to just and 
favourable conditions of work, right to equal pay for equal work, 
right to fair remuneration, right to form and join trade unions;^^ 
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right to maximum working hours and periodic holdings with pay, 
right to leisure and rest;^' right to adequate standard of living for 
oneself and one's family, including food, clothing and shelter, 
right to medical care and right to special protection and 
assistance to motherhood and childhood; right to education 
(atleast free elementary education),right to equal access to all to 
higher education on the basis of merit;^^ right of participation 
freely in cultural life of the community, and right to enjoyment 
of the art & culture and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits. The Declaration of Human Rights has been 
universally accepted as the charter of minimum international 
standard, which should be respected by all. The European 
Convention on Human Rights of 1950 reflects a clear impact of 
the Declaration. Its impact can also be seen on the Peace Treaty 
of Japan, 1951, international agreement on Free Territory of 
Trieste of 1954. Similarly, it has impact on several constitutions 
of post second war countries.^' The Declaration has also been 
cited in the judicial decisions of several countries and 
international court of justice.^^ 
Undoubtedly, the UDHR is a very important document of 
human rights. But it is not the end. In the opinion of Peter Jones, 
it should not be regarded as the definite statement of human 
rights. He apprehended the existence of human rights, which go 
unrecognized in the UN Declaration. He says, "it is still a rather 
ramshackle document and it should not be treated as the 
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touchstone by which the whole doctrine of human rights is to be 
judged.^^ In the similar vein, Bobbio states that the Universal 
Declaration represented only the initial step in the final stage of 
the universal politicization of human rights. He emphasized the 
proliferation of human rights as a feature of the current phase in 
the development of the theory and practice of these rights. In this 
process, there is a shift of emphasis from the rights of general 
people to the rights of special category on the basis of various 
criteria of differentiation: sex, age and physical condition. This 
prolification through specialization has mainly occurred in the 
field of social rights. 
Overview Of The Covenant On Civil And Political Rights: -
The covenant on Civil and Political Rights incorporates the 
traditional human or fundamental rights conceived and 
proclaimed in the wake of the success of the Industrial 
Revolution. These rights are right to life and liberty,^^ freedom 
from torture, or inhuman and degrading treatment, freedom 
from slavery and slave-trade, servitude and forced labour,^^ right 
to liberty and security of the person, freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and detention,^^ right of detenu to be treated with 
humanity,*^ freedom from imprisonment only on ground of failure 
to fulfill contractual obligation,^' liberty of movement, freedom 
to choose residence and freedom to leave one's country and 
return to it,^^ right to equality before law and courts and 
tribunal, freedom from ex post facto laws,*"* right to recognition 
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as person,^^ right to privacy*^ of home and correspondence, and 
protection from unlawful attack on honour and reputation, right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, right to freedom 
of speech and expression,*^ prohibition by law of any propaganda 
for war, racial discrimination and hatred,^ right to peaceful 
assembly,^' right to freedom of association,^^ right to marry, and 
right to equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses and 
protection to children on dissolution of marriage,^^ right to every 
child to protection by family, society and the State, and to 
acquire nationality,^'* right to opportunity to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, right to vote and right to be elected by 
the secret ballot,^^ right to equality before law and equal 
protection of law,^^ right to minorities for the protection of their 
lives, right of people to self-determination. 
Again, rights recognized under the covenant are not 
absolute, as they cannot be absolute in the social scenario of the 
world. Article 4(1) of the covenant lays down that in the times of 
public emergency, which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which (emergency) is officially proclaimed, the 
State concerned may take "measures derogatory from their 
obligations under the Covenant to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation, provided such measures are not 
inconsistent with other obligations under international law and 
do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion or social origin." Broadly 
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speaking, the Covenant lays down that restrictions should be only 
those specified by the law and necessary to protect national 
security, public order, and public health. 
Overview Of The Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural 
Rights: -
The outstanding feature of the Covenant is that it begins by 
saying that the State parties to the Covenant 'undertake to take 
steps," individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation especially economic and technical, to maximum of its 
available resources^ with a view to progressively achieving the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant by all 
appropriate means, particularly by legislative measures. Each 
article of the Covenant begins with the words, "Each state party 
to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and ensure. . ." The 
Covenant lists following rights such as, right to work freely 
chosen,^ right to enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of 
work,''^ right to form and join trade unions,'°' right to social 
insurance, right to family, right to protection of motherhood 
and childhood,'"^ right to marriage and to have family, '^ right to 
adequate standard of living,'"^ right to health—highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental heal th, '^ right to compulsory 
primary education freely available to all,'^^ right to participate in 
cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.'"^ 
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In the 20*** century, tremendous efforts have been made 
through the formation of new principles and procedures to 
transfer the protection of basic rights of man from the hands of 
nation-states to a supernatural organization. The covenant of 
League of Nations and the International Labour Organization 
touched some aspects of human rights. In 1929, Institute of 
International law. New York, prepared a Declaration of Human 
Rights and Duties. The inter-American conference passed a 
resolution in 1945, seeking establishment of an international 
forum for the furtherance of human rights. 
The evolution of human rights has gone through a 
dialectical process. The first stage is to be found in religion, 
which guaranteed certain rights to their followers and as well as 
for others. The second stage is to be found in philosophical 
works. Lock's 'theory of natural rights' and Rousseau's idea of 
'Man is born free, however, but everywhere he is in chains' and 
other such ideas which ultimately culminated in universal rights. 
The third stage is marked as the transition from theory to 
practice. Through this transition, the assertion of human rights 
acquires concreteness but looses its universality. Rights are then 
protected as only positive rights, but they are only valid within 
the state, which recognizes them. The 1948 Declaration 
commenced the third and last stage in which the assertion of 
human rights is both universal and positive. They are universal in 
the sense that the principles, the Declaration contains no longer 
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concern only the citizens of a particular state, but all human 
beings and positive in the sense that it initiates a process not 
only to recognize but also to protect these rights, even against 
the state which violates them. But the peace with which these 
rights are moving forward is slow and tardy. The very fact that 
the two Covenants were adopted after 18 years of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is a testimony to the lukewarm 
attitude of the international community to the issue of rights. 
But, better later than never, the United Nations did generate 
awareness among people about their inherent rights and 
succeeded in mobilizing the nations to pay attention to the 
misery and sufferings of the people. 
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THE LAWS OF DETENTION IN INDIA: 
AN OVERVIEW 
Introduction: 
Law is a nutshell to justify any action of the person whether 
it is wrong or right. It also gives power to the authority to 
classify the wrong action. During emergency and sometimes even 
during ordinary times every country is subject to laws and 
regulations providing for detention of citizens without trial on the 
subjective satisfaction of the executive authority. The idea behind 
such detention is to safeguard peace, security, and territorial 
sovereignty of the Nation. During the British period, the statutory 
power for such detention was vested in the Governor General-in-
Council. These regulations designed in the wake of war, 
insurgency, revolt and rebellion with a view to intimidating the 
subject people to submission to colonial rule, survived till the 
adoption of the Constitution. It is rather unfortunate that the 
provision of preventive detention was provided in the Chapter of 
fundamental rights. In the Constituent Assembly, Ambedkar said, 
"it has to be recognized that in the present circumstances of the 
country it may be necessary for the executive to detain a person 
who is tempering either with public order or with the Defense 
Service of the Country. In such case I do not think that the 
exigencies of the liberty of the individual shall be placed above 
the interest of State."' 
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The Preventive Detention (PD) is the negation of the right to 
personal liberty. It envisages detention without trial, which is 
against the basic canons of criminal jurisprudence. At a time 
when the liberty of the individuals crosses the limits and 
threatens the very existence of the state and at that point of time 
it fails to control the enjoyment of individual's liberty, then the 
state can resort to preventive detention. However, there was a 
difference in the exercise of the said power; some countries tried 
to handle this measure carefully and cautiously. They adopted it 
casually and only in grave situation affecting the very existence 
of the state. In other countries it became a part of the life of the 
country, like India. 
Now coming to the Indian experience, before independence, 
the British regime in order to establish a strong foothold in India 
resorted to such preventive detention laws for an indefinite period 
by the Defense of India Act 1915 and 1939, the Government of 
India Act 1919, the Rowlett Act 1919 and the Bengal Criminal 
Law (amendment) Act 1925. Under some of these detention Acts 
a person can be detained for six months without informing him of 
the ground of detention. Only if the detention period was to be 
extended beyond six months would the detenu be informed of the 
grounds of his detention and the case be referred to a tribunal. 
This was the serious violation of human rights but at that time 
there were no consensus about the human rights. When India got 
independence and the new Constitution came into force, several 
provincial Acts and Ordinances providing preventive detention 
38 
Uwsof4d:entlon in ln4l^:An Ovetview 
became void because the Constitution of India duly recognize the 
concept of human rights in its preamble and these laws were 
inconsistent with the Part III of the Constitution of India, which 
guaranteed fundamental rights and liberties to the citizens. 
Freedom from arbitrary arrest is a basic human right which is 
usually secured by the provision that any one who is arrested 
must be immediately produced before a judicial magistrate/body 
which can then pronounced on the legality of the arrest, and, in 
appropriate cases, authorize for continued detention^. Article 
22(1) and (2) of the Indian constitution does confer such 
protection^. But unfortunately Article 22, which guarantees 
protection against arrest and detention, laid down the scheme 
under which preventive detention law could be enacted even in 
normal times, Which is violative of the human rights standards 
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Right and the two 
Covenants. This raises the issue whether the concept of human 
rights enshrined in the Indian Constitution has any meaning. An 
ansory glance at the use and misuse of Article reveals beyond any 
doubt that human rights are often violated with impunity and even 
eroded by the political power in the name of national security and 
unity."* 
It is strange that in these days, the governing agency is 
suppressing the concept of human rights by encroaching upon the 
civil liberties of the people. During the operation of internal 
emergency Government use the preventive detention measures on 
wide scale.^ Laws like the Defense of India Act, the Unlawful 
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Activities Act, the National Security Act, the Maintenance of 
Internal Security Act, the Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Act 
(TADA), and various other acts and provisions of Indian Penal 
Code have presented a sordid picture of human rights and a 
dismal mosaic of democratic life in the country. 
The constitution of India in Part III makes provision for 
safeguards against Preventive Detention. Article 22(4) to (7)^ 
deals with these safe guards. It provides for an Advisory Board to 
consider the cases of detention for more than three months. 
Article 22(4)(a) ' deals with constitution of an Advisory Board. It 
says that an Advisory Board shall consists of persons who are, or 
have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, judges of a High 
court. The words 'or are qualified to be appointed as ' may 
provide the opportunity to the Government to appoint their own 
party men or Member of Parliament as the member of Advisory 
board. The lacunae was, however, removed by the Forty fourth 
Amendment Act 1978 and made it mandatory for the board to 
consist of sitting or retired High Court Judges selected by the 
Chief Justice of the appropriate High Court, with a view to 
guarding against the board being packed with government 
henchmen, but this statutory amendment, enacted in 1978, has not 
yet been brought into force^. The detainee has no right to be 
represented by a lawyer before the Board, but if the detaining 
authority is legally represented, the detainee cannot be denied a 
lawyer. The hearing cannot possibly be compared with that in an 
ordinary criminal court, as the detainee has no right to legal 
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representation or to cross-examine the parties on whose 
complaints or statements the order of detention was based." He 
need not always be given an oral hearing, and the Advisory Board 
is not required to pass a speaking order. Though the Constitution 
of India provides for important safeguards under Article 22(4), 
against these extraordinary measures yet the continuous 
emergency in India had resulted in the deprivation of the 
protection against Preventive detention measures. The 
continuation of emergency became a part of the Indian life and 
the protections of article 22(4) and (5) suffered a great set back. 
The last and most sever attack on the provisions of article 22 
came on June 27^^1975, when the President of India imposed a 
blanket ban on its enforcement. The Supreme Court in its 
majority judgment in the Habeas Corpus Case '^  validated these 
measures, where the Court gave its micro fine approach in 
protecting the safeguards available to a detenu. On the one hand, 
recourse of judicial protection was completely shut and on the 
other, the executive and the legislative authorities were given 
clean chit to deal with Preventive detention cases. And it was this 
state of affairs that was mainly responsible for the 'nineteen 
months' suffering to the persons detained under the extraordinary 
measures who were denied not only the basic human rights but 
also basic requirements '"*. And, therefore, unless the emergency 
provisions are amended in this connection the safeguards in the 
article 22 (4) and (5) will always remain ineffective. 
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A brief survey of the working of the Preventive detention 
laws is necessarily a limited one since information about the role 
of Advisory Boards under Preventive detention laws is 
legislatively declared to be confidential'^ and is not revealed and 
most of the detention operation are hush hush. These Preventive 
detention laws are of a quasi-criminal nature and the violation of 
the Human Rights norms. Chief Justice Gjendragodkar in the case 
G. Sdanandan v. State of Kerala '^  Justice Hedge in the case Moti 
Lai V. Sate of Bihar '^ , warned that " the continuous exercise of 
such a power would make the conscience of the authority 
exercising those powers blunt to the basic rights of the citizens 
and would ultimately pose a serious threat to the basic values on 
which the democratic way of life in India was founded." 
Preventive detention Act 1950: 
The Act is violative of Human Rights as stated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights but generally follows the 
provision of the existing laws on the subject; it conforms to the 
Article 22 of the Constitution of India, a section of which defines 
exception to an important fundamental right. On February 26, 
1950, Sardar Patel, the sponsor of the Bill (Preventive Detention), 
described it as the "minimum evil" necessary to safeguard 
democratic institutions in India from the "communist menace"'^. 
The only alternative to the Bill was to get the President's order to 
declare an emergency in India. Such a course would be very bad 
and unnecessary. The Bill was presented in the Parliament 
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because of the fact that "in the west Bengal, 350 detenus had 
applied to the Calcutta High Court for the cancellation of the 
detention orders passed against them and their application was to 
be decided on Monday (27'** Feb. 1950) '^ The intention of the 
Government was, thus, to thwart the communist. 
Under Article 22 of the Constitution of India, there are two 
sets of provisions relating to preventive detention. One set of 
provision authorize the detention of any person for a longer 
period than three months if an Advisory Board certify that there 
was a sufficient cause for the detention. The other set of 
provision authorize parliament to make law under which a person 
might be detained for a longer period than three months without 
obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board. The proposed Bill 
covers both type of cases. Under clause 7 of Article 22, 
Parliament may prescribe the circumstances of detention, the 
maximum period for which a person may be detained and the 
procedure to be followed by Advisory Boards in the course of an 
inquiry^^ During the debate in the Lok Sabha A.P.Jain pointed out 
that, the Bill does not cover the maximum period of detention, 
even in the cases where the Advisory Board recommended 
continuation of the detention. In reply the Attorney General of 
India said that under the Constitution, it was not obligatory to 
provide a maximum period. The maximum period had not been 
provided in the present bill because it would expire on T' April 
1951 '.But unfortunately the Act was amended thrice to give some 
more protection to the persons detained under the Act. In the 
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beginning, the act was renewed every year; thereafter, every two 
years and finally every three years. Sardar Patel, who piloted the 
first Bill with respect to Preventive Detention, conceded that he 
had two sleepless nights before introducing such a Bill in the 
Parliament^^. But the detenu had several sleepless nights after 
enactment of the Bill. 
Objective of the Bill: 
The objective of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 was, to 
prevent persons from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defense 
of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, the security 
of India or a state, the maintenance of public order or the 
maintenance of the supplies and services essential to the 
community^^. Commending on the Bill, Sardar Patel said; our 
fight is not with the communists but with those whose avowed 
object is to create disruption, dislocation, and tamper with 
communication and making it impossible for normal Government 
to function. And that it is difficult to deal with them under the 
provisions of ordinary laws. And to check its misuse the bill 
provides that after a period of six months of the original detention 
period, the Government would review the cases after consultation 
with judicial authority^'*. 
The preventive detention Act 1950 bestows wide power on 
the executive and the possibility of its abuse or misuses are, 
therefore, greater. In case of executive action effecting preventive 
detention on two grounds, the Supreme Court quashed the 
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detention order of Kishori Mohan and Akshoy Konai on the 
ground that in the light of detention on the two disjunctive 
grounds the authority making the order of the detention did not 
apply its mind, which was required by the Act. When the most 
valuable right of personal liberty is at stake, the Legislature 
should carefully and scrupulously enact a law relating to 
preventive detention. 
Role of Advisory Board: 
There were cases when persons were detained on 
insufficient grounds. In Ram Krishana v. State of Delhi the 
Court found that the grounds are vague. In Hari Krishna v. State 
of Maharashtra the detention order were based on irrelevant 
grounds. In Dayanand Modi v. State of Bihar the detention were 
based on non-existent grounds. In Dehu Mahato v. State of West 
Bengai^^ authorities were not satisfied. In Mohammed Akbar v. 
District Magistrate Doda the Court found that authorities did 
not apply their minds. While in G. Sadanandan v. State of kerala^^ 
there were malafide considerations. These cases were, infact, 
considered by the Advisory Boards but only when the Court 
discovered loopholes, they were quashed. In such cases one can 
only presume that the Advisory Board either did not consider 
these cases seriously or the board had acted under pressure. 
45 
Uw5 ofcfetention in Indi^-- An Overview 
Role of Judiciary: 
The constitutional validity of the preventive detention Act 
was challenged in the A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras . The 
Court held that the section 14 of the Act abridged the rights given 
under Article 22(5) and therefore ultravires of the Constitution. It 
was further said that invalidity of this Section did not affect the 
rest of the Act. 
In A.K. Gopalan, the Supreme Court of India was called 
upon to interpret many provisions of part III of the constitution, 
which deals with fundamental rights. The constitution guaranteed 
seven freedoms under Article 19, namely, (a) freedom of speech 
and expression, (b) freedom to assemble peacefully and without 
arms; (c) freedom of association; (d) freedom to move within the 
territory of India; (e) freedom to reside and settle in any part of 
the territory of India (f) freedom to acquire, hold and dispose of 
property; and (g) freedom to carry on any trade, business, 
occupation or profession. Under Article 21 of the constitution, it 
provided that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by law. The 
Constitution, however, provides for preventive detention of 
persons under Article 22(3)(b).^'* These laws of the preventive 
detention authorized the executive to detain a person on mere 
suspicion of wrongdoing. The Constitution did, however provide 
some safeguards against the arbitrary use of power under clause 
(4) to (7) of Article 22.^^ 
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A.K. Gopalan was a communist leader who had been 
detained under the Preventive Detention Act. The validity of 
detention was challenged on the ground that it is violative of 
Article 19, It was further contended that the procedure prescribed 
by the law in question did not conform to the principle of natural 
justice, which provides minimum norms of fair procedure. The 
issue before the Court was, whether detention of a person could 
be challenged only with reference to Article 21 or whether it 
could also be examined with reference to the rights guaranteed 
under Article 19; and whether the procedure established by law 
'implied a fair and just procedure' . The majority of judges held 
that Article 19 and 21 had to be read exclusively. They held that 
the words 'personal liberty' in the Article 21 did not include the 
freedom guaranteed by Article 19. According to them, a person 
who was free could only enjoy freedoms given by Article 19, they 
could not be invoked by some one who had been deprived of his 
liberty by being arrested under a Penal Law or a Law authorizing 
Preventive Detention. Therefore, whenever a person was deprived 
of his liberty, such deprivation had only to stand the test of 
article 21 and need not examined with reference to Article 19. 
The court went on to observe that the words ' procedure 
established by law' meant such procedure as was laid down by 
law. The Court could not examine whether such procedure was 
just or fair. Gopalan's lawyer had challenged the law of 
Preventive Detention on the ground that procedure laid down 
hereunder violated the principle of natural justice. The majority 
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of judges said they could not import those principles within the 
meaning of the words 'procedure established by the law'. The 
Court refused to consider fundamental rights in terms of the spirit 
of the Constitution. However, Justice Fazl Ali gave a dissenting 
judgment. He held that the words 'personal liberty' include all 
those aspects of liberty, which were mentioned in Article 19. One 
reason why the law of preventive detention could not be 
challenged under Article 19, according to the majority view, was 
that if preventive detention could be challenged, then punitive 
detention would also be open to such challenge on the ground that 
their fundamental rights under Article 19 were violated. Rejecting 
this reasoning, Fazl Ali, J. declared, "I agree with one of the 
learned judges of the High Court, Calcutta, in his remark that 'no 
calamitous or untoward result will follow even if the provisions 
of the Penal Code become justifiable' . I am certain that no court 
would interfere with a Penal Code which has been the law of the 
land for nearly a century and the provisions of which are not in 
conflict with the basic principles of any system of law".^^ The 
Judge sarcastically remarked whether the principles that no 
person can be condemned without a hearing by an impartial 
tribunal, which is well recognized in all modern civilized systems 
of the law and which Halsbury puts on par with well recognized 
fundamental rights, cannot be regarded as part of the law of this 
country? Justice Fazl Ali further observed that the principle being 
part of the British system of the law and procedure which we have 
inherited has been observed in this country for a very long time 
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and is also deeply rooted in our ancient history, being the basis of 
the panchayat system from the earliest times, the whole of the 
Criminal Procedure Code is based upon the foundation 
of this principle, and it is difficult to see that it has not become 
the part of the law of the land' and does not figure in our system 
of law,^^ Justice Fazl Ali therefore insisted that procedural due 
process had been a part of Indian law not merely by virtue of 
inheritance from the British legal system, but also because it was 
deeply rooted in the India's Ancient History. This was a 
thoughtful way of stressing the indigenous roots of Human 
Rights. 
The dissenting judgment of Fazl Ali, J. in Gopalan as well 
as in Kesavan^^ served as the guiding principle in the subsequent 
development of Indian Constitutional Law. Justice Subba Rao in 
Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh^^ accepted the dissenting 
view of Justice Fazl Ali, in his dissenting judgment, which gave 
wider meaning to the words 'personal liberty'. Even the majority 
judges in that case had accepted that domiciliary visits on an ex-
convict at irregular times, violated his rights to privacy and since 
the right to privacy was part of the right to personal liberty, such 
visits were unconstitutional. They did not, however, accept that 
the words 'personal liberty' included the freedom guaranteed by 
Article 19(1), although they did hold that the words 'personal 
liberty' comprehended many aspects of liberty other than freedom 
from arrest and detention. The majority did not agree that the 
words 'procedure established by law' had a wider connotation 
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Subba Rao, J. in his dissenting judgment, said that Fazl Ali 's 
dissenting view in Gopalan would have been preferable. 
In Gopalan^\ Kania, J. said that Article 22(7)(b) is 
permissive, it being not obligatory on Parliament to prescribe the 
maximum period and that if this construction resulted in a 
Parliamentary law enabling the detention of a person for an 
indefinite period without trial that unfortunate consequences is 
the result of the words of Article 22(7) itself and the court could 
do nothing about that. 
Ultimately, the Court (Supreme Court) changed its view in 
the 1978 in Menaka Gandhi V. Union of India , where it not only 
decided to read Article 19 and 21 cumulatively, but also read the 
word ' l i fe ' , 'personal liberty' and 'procedure established by law' 
more liberally. The right to life and the right to personal liberty 
now mean almost all basic Human Rights'*^. 
Maintenance Of Internal Security Act—1971: 
The Preventive Detention Act, 1950 which was originally 
enacted for one year, continued to operate for about two decades 
and ceased to have effect on the 31^* December, 1969 and after a 
short span of one and half years the Maintenance Of Internal 
Security Ordinance, 1971 was promulgated which came into force 
on 3"^ June, 1971 and which was followed by the Maintenance Of 
Internal Security Act, 1971 (MISA) which came into force on 2"*^  
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July, 1971 in less than two years time after the lapse of the 
Preventive Detention Act, 1950. 
The reaction of the opposition was sharp. They even 
boycotted the parliament. The CPI leader S. M. Banerjee said that 
it was a "carbon Copy" of much hated Preventive Detention 
legislation; only its provisions were much harsher. It was a sad 
commentary on the Parliamentary democracy of this country that 
even after the massive verdict given by the people to the ruling 
Congress, it wanted to impose " this black Law/ Ordinance." 
Jyotirmoy Bosu (CPI-M) said that the Bill was being brought in 
order that the Congress Party could further its own political 
interests. The congress taking advantage of its power in the 
Center was misusing it and clamping on people obnoxious laws 
that curtailed civil liberties. The ruling party was becoming more 
and more dictatorial. In West Bengal alone, they had detained 
more than 3000 persons'*^. 
The Maintenance of internal security Act was drafted on the 
same lines as compared to the Preventive Detention Act 1950 
except that the new Act contained special provisions for 
foreigners. In certain classes of cases and in certain 
circumstances, the MISA provided for detention of foreigners for 
a period longer than three months but not exceeding two years 
from the date of their detention. For such detention of the 
foreigners, the reference to the Advisory Board could be made at 
any time prior to but in no case latter than three months before 
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the expiration of two years instead of thirty days'**. The maximum 
period of detention will be one year (in case of Indian) but the 
Government concerned has been empowered to revoke or modify 
the detention order at any earlier time'*'. 
Another change brought in the new Act was that for the 
communication of the grounds of detention; disclosure of grounds 
of the order of the detention to the detenu not latter than the five 
days in general and fifteen days in exceptional circumstances was 
fixed. But the lacunae were that the authority was empowered not 
to disclose the grounds if such disclosure goes against the public 
interest . The law also provided the constitution of an Advisory 
Board consisting of three persons of the status of High Court 
Judges. The Government concerned will place before the 
Advisory Board within thirty days from the date of detention, the 
grounds on which the order has been made and representation, if 
any, made by the affected person. The words 'status of the High 
Court Judge' in this clause provided opportunity to accommodate 
their own party men on the Advisory Board. The Boards will 
submit its report to the Government within ten week from the date 
of the detention giving its opinion (majority will prevail) as to 
whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention. The 
right to engage a lawyer was denied to the detenu. Moreover, the 
proceeding of the Advisory Boards will be confidential '^ ^ 
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Judicial Attitudes In Safeguarding Human Rights: 
The constitutional validity of the Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act was challenged before the five judges bench of the 
Supreme Court in Hardhan Saha v. State of West Bengal ^^ . 
Wherein the contention was that the law of the preventive 
detention is unreasonable and therefore, it violates Article 19 and 
Article 21 . That the right to be heard is infringed. Further, the 
Act does not lay down the just procedure for giving effect to the 
Article 22(5). It was further contended that the Act violates 
Article 14 because it permits discrimination. The bench after 
scrutinizing all Sections of the Act rejected all the pleas and was 
held that the Act does not suffer from any constitutional 
infirmity. The law could not be regarded as being unreasonable as 
"the principle of the natural justice in so far as they are 
compilable with detention laws are present. The court considered 
that the Maintenance of Internal Security Act did not offend 
against Article 19. Again, in Khudi Ram Das v. State of West 
Bengal ^', the Court observed that the question of the relationship 
of Article 19 and 22 was 'concluded' and ' a final seal had been 
put on the controversy. It did not examine the validity of the 
Maintenance of Internal Security Act on the ground of Article 19 
because it thought that Hardhan Saha had concluded that issue^^. 
Human Rights Position During Emergency 1975-1977 
In a democratic country, the rights and liberties of an 
individual are as important as the power of the State to regulate 
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them in the interest of the society; and a balance is maintained 
between them with the help of the judiciary. However, the 
maintenance of civil liberties becomes a complex issue in times 
of national emergency. There can be no debate that, in a national 
crisis, national interest has precedence over individual liberty. 
Since civil liberties rest on the continuance of the state as a 
sovereign body, preservation of the state against the threats, 
internal or external, to its existence, has the top most priority and 
cannot be ignored even in the name of civil liberties. On the 
contrary, when a war or internal disorder threatens the state, the 
interest of the individual and of those of society become identical 
and the individual is expected to surrender his liberty to the 
extent it is necessary in the interest Of the state. The basic 
question is, to what extent should the state limit Human Rights 
and the fundamental freedoms which are so basic to existence that 
even the consideration of security of the state cannot be permitted 
to suppress them? 
The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
provides that state may depart from their obligations when an 
emergency threatens the very life of the nation' , but 'only to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation'^^ 
Moreover, the measures taken must not be 'inconsistent with their 
obligations under the 'International Law'. Article 4(2) of the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, provides that 
the Government under its emergency power, must not arbitrarily 
deprive an individual of life; subject him to cruel, inhuman and 
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degrading treatment or punishment; hold him in slavery; imprison 
him for inability to fulfill a contractual obligation; subject to 
retroactive penal laws; and deny him the right of thought, 
conscience and religion. 
In India, the Fundamental Rights of the people have been on 
the occasions, under heavy strain. From Gopalan to Makhan 
Singh^^ and from Golak Nath^^ to Keshavananda Bharti , the 
basic issue has been the place of Fundamental Rights in India's 
Constitution. But in the epoch making case of Shiva Kant 
Shukla^^, popularly known as the Habeas Corpus case, the very 
life and liberties of the nation were sacrificed at the alter of the 
rule of law. At a time when the High Court upheld personal 
liberties against heavy odds, the Supreme Court displayed little 
enthusiasm for it. In this case, the court was called upon to 
consider the validity of detentions made during the emergency of 
1975-1977. The question before it was whether, in view of 
Presidential Order issued under clause (1) of Article 359 of the 
Constitution, a petition under Article 226 before the High Court 
for a writ of Habeas Corpus to enforce the right of 'personal 
liberties' of a person detained under Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act, 1971,was maintainable. The court had to decide the 
question at a time when the entire law of Preventive Detention 
was immunized from judicial review. Not only the courts could 
not to be moved for the protection of Fundamental Rights because 
of a Presidential Order to this effect, but the statute under which 
these detention were made i.e. the Maintenance of Internal 
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Security T^ct-^Wl, also placed in the Ninth Schedule of the 
Indian Constitution which was beyond the reach of Judiciary. 
Several detenus under the Maintenance of Internal Security 
Act 1971, had filed petitions in different High Courts for the 
issue of the writ of Habeas Corpus praying for their release from 
Preventive Detention. Nine High Courts of the country held that 
though the petitioners could not move the court to enforce their 
Fundamental Rights under Article 21^^ it was open to them to 
challenge their detention on the grounds that it was ultravires i.e. 
by showing that the detention order ex-facie was passed by the 
authority not empowered to pass it, or it was in excess of powers 
delegated to the authority, or the power had been exercised in 
breach of the condition prescribed in that behalf by the Detention 
Act, or the order was not in strict conformity with the provisions 
of the said Act despite the Presidential Order dated 27'** June 
1975,issued under Article 359(1). In reaction of the above 
findings of the High Courts, several State Governments and the 
Union Government filed appeals in the Supreme Court. They 
argued that, since the Presidential Order under Article 359, had 
suspended the enforcement of Fundamental Rights enumerated in 
Article 14, 19,21,and 22 the detenu had no locus-standi to move 
any court for the writ. They pleaded that, under Section 16A^ of 
the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, they were not obliged 
to disclose the grounds of detention; therefore the courts could 
not go into the reasons for detention and must accept ex-facie the 
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subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as recorded in 
the detention order. 
The 1978 Reform: 
With the dawn of a new Government headed by the Janata 
Party in 1977, the forty fourth Amendment Act was enacted in 
1978. This Act amended Article 22 and 352. Whilst the 
amendment of Article 352 has been brought into force so that an 
emergency can no longer be declared if there were internal 
disturbances^', But amendment relating to the safeguard against 
the Preventive Detention, under Article 22 have not been brought 
into force for twenty four years despite change of Governments at 
the Union. The Amendment did make the Advisory Board 
independent of the Executive. The new provision makes the Chief 
Justice of the appropriate High Court in constituting the Advisory 
Board mandatory. It shall consist of a chairman and not less than 
two other members. The chairman of an Advisory Board shall be a 
sitting Judge of the appropriate High Court and the other two 
members shall be a sitting or retired judges of any High Court. 
Further, it is provided that a person cannot be detained beyond 
two months. The Amendment also substituted a clause (4), 
reducing the maximum period detention without obtaining the 
opinion of the Advisory Board. The detention of a person for a 
period longer than two months can only be made after obtaining 
the opinion of the Advisory Board and the power conferred on the 
Parliament to provide for a longer period has been taken away.^^ 
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The Amendment thus provide for two categories of the Preventive 
Detention: first, detention for a longer period of two months 
under a law made by a legislature, and second, detention for a 
period longer than two months provided the Advisory Board give 
its opinion in favour of it. It is a safeguard against executive 
encroachment on the working of an Advisory Board. The 
Advisory Board is bound to submit its report before the expiration 
of the said period of the two months. Failure to do so would 
render the detention illegal. In absence of Advisory Board's clear 
opinion, it was held that detention for more than one year was 
without legal sanction and hence illegal ^^ . 
In A.K.Roy v. Union of India, ^ a question was raised as to 
whether Supreme Court could issue the writ of Mandamus to the 
Union Government to bring the Amendment provision in force. 
By a majority of three to two, though disapproved the delay on 
behalf of the Government in not bringing into force the forty 
forth amendment but held that it could do nothing. It said that the 
power to amend constitution is different from that of bringing the 
concerned amendment into force. 
The National Security Act: 1980 
The Maintenance of Internal Security Act 1971 was repealed 
on August 3, 1978 by the Janata Government. And in 1980, when 
the congress (I) came to power at the Center, National Security 
Ordinance was promulgated. Justifying the Bill the then 
Information and Broadcasting Minister, Vasant Sathe, said in the 
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Lok Sabha that the Bill is essential for protecting the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed to the citizen in the Constitution. These 
freedoms, he mentioned, are "freedom from murder and violence, 
communal and caste riots, black marketing and hoarding and 
smuggling."^^ With lot of hue and cry the Lok Sabha passed the 
Bill in the form of the National Security Act, which came into 
force on 27 December 1980.^ The Act provides for the detention 
of a person with a view to preventing him from acting in any 
manner prejudicial to various states objectives including national 
security and public order. Apparently, the Act aims at the black 
marketers and smugglers, persons preaching communal hatred and 
fan faring caste clearages. It was assured that the said Act would 
not be used against the opposition. The then Prime Minister, 
Indira Gandhi announced on October 1, 1980 " the Government 
needs the National Security Act, to deal with the black marketers. 
Smugglers and anti social elements, and that it will affect the 
civil liberties of the law abiding citizens." ^^  The act, however, 
was not used for the purpose for which it was enacted. It is an 
irony that not a single smuggler or a black marketer has been 
hauled under the law. The total number of the detentions made all 
over the country till 1981, under this Act was about 732. The 
figure excludes the persons arrested in the State of North East and 
Punjab. It is surprising that the first to be detained under the Act 
were A.K.Roy, M.P. and K.S.Chateerjee, M.L.A. both active trade 
unionists from Dhanbad belonging to the Marxist Coordination 
Committee. *^ 
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Provision Of National Security Act and International Norms 
of Human Rights: -
To be fair it ought to be pointed out that the provisions of 
the Act are more liberal as compared to the other Preventive 
Detention laws. It provides for detention up to a maximum period 
of twelve months but does not bar the detenu from challenging his 
detention in a court of law on the grounds, amongst other, of 
infringement of his personal liberties and Fundamental Rights. 
The Act limits the powers of the court to review the detention 
orders after the 1984 amendment. The detenu will be conveyed 
the grounds of detention within five days and in exceptional 
circumstances ten days of his detention order. However, the 
arbitrary nature of the Government's power is revealed by the fact 
that the authorities need not disclose the grounds of detention if it 
goes against public interest. 
In the case of a Bombay based Sikkimese lawyer Hem Lall 
Bhandari ^^ the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that the 
statutory constitutional provisions relating to Preventive 
Detention must be strictly complied with. Justice Khalid for 
himself and Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed, "in matters where the 
liberty of the people or citizen is involved, it is necessary for the 
officers to act with outmost expedition and in strict compliance 
with the mandatory provisions of the law. Expeditious action is 
insisted upon as a safeguard against the manipulation (by 
officers)." The Sikkim Government, which had detained Bhandari 
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under the National Security Act, 1980 in Bombay and later in 
Delhi, in September 1986, contended before the Supreme Court 
that since Bhandari was released on bail, the delay on the part of 
the police officers in serving the grounds of detention should be 
condoned. Rejecting this "specious plea" Justice Khalid observed 
that if this contention were carried to its logical conclusions it 
would clothe the authorities with powers to delay communication 
of the grounds of detention indefinitely. He held that to accept 
that contention would be destroy the effection of the mandate of 
Section 8 of the National Security Act. The Section has to be 
interpreted liberally and no relaxation was possible . 
The Act requires the Government to refer all cases to an 
Advisory Board consisting of High Court judges within three 
weeks of the detention; in accordance with the provisions of the 
section 3 of the 44"^ Amendment Act, in spite of the fact that the 
aforesaid section was not brought into force.^^ The detainee shall 
have the right to represent to the Advisory Board against his 
detention. 
The only difference between the earlier preventive laws and 
the present one is that the present law gives the detenu the right 
to go to the court and challenge the validity of his detention. But 
the amendment Act 1984 limits the scope of judicial review of the 
Preventive Detention laws considerably. It thus nullifies the 
effect of numerous decisions of the courts in which the detention 
order have been struck down on the ground that one of the several 
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grounds of detention was found to be vague, non existent or 
unconnected with the grounds of detention supplied to the detenu. 
Human Rights Scenario: -
The Act contains provisions that are incompatible with the 
Rule oi Law and the principles of democracy. The National 
Security Act deviates from rights guaranteed under the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, in particular 
Article 9^^ which provides that any one who is arrested must be 
informed of the reasons for the arrest and charges against him. 
Under section 8(2) of the National Security Act, the authorities 
may not disclose the grounds on which the person has been 
detained.^'* This is also in direct contravention of the Article 
14(3)(a)'^ of the Covenant. 
Working Of the National Security Act: 
In the implementation of this Act, the executive has not 
shown even scanty regard for the criterion laid down by the 
Supreme Court in a dozen judgments about the grounds on which 
a person may be detained to prevent him from committing a 
crime. Here are a few typical cases, which reveals not only that 
persons have been detained on vague and flimsy grounds but also 
that they were detained for legitimate political and democratic 
activity, and for voicing legitimate political and democratic 
demands in a just and peaceful manner. 
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Shankar Guha Nivogi, leader of the Dalli Rajahara Iron Ore 
Mine Workers, was arrested under the National Security Act. The 
grounds of Niyogi's arrest refer to allegation like "instigation 
leading to misbehavior,' gheroing ', "improper abusing of officers 
and staff of Bhilai steel plant", "leading a procession of 3000 
labourers", "detaining of trucks", "holding public meeting". 
Most of the allegations leading to his detention related to events, 
which supposedly occurred as far back as 'a year and a ha l f , well 
before the National Security Ordinance and the National Security 
Act came into effect. Niyogi's real crime was that he was 
organizing the Iron Ore Mine Workers for higher wages and better 
working conditions as well as trying to educate and socially 
transform them . 
In case of Bishnu Das, a college student is charged of being 
"behind the screen in creating a number of law and order situation 
arising out of the political controversy." The charge sheet further 
says, " It is in his habit to mobilize and misguide innocent 
students in the negative direction he is always trying to 
scandalize the Government, the administration —he gives 
statements to the press and hold public meeting with a view to 
serve his own political ends. The fact is that Bishnu Das is a 
popular student leader having been elected President of the 
Jagatsinghpur College Students Union, Orrisa, thrice in 
succession. He was also demanding the Birdi murder case be 
reopened and a judicial inquiry be constituted into the rape and 
murder of Mrs. Chabirani Mahapatra^^. 
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Further, a number of the facts are revealed when we look at 
the chart showing the position of the detentions under the 
National Security Act. Nationwide, more than two thirds of the 
16000 people detained under the National Security Act from 1980 
to 1994, have been released by the order of the State Government 
or the Advisory Boards. At the end of the year 1995, 514 persons 
through out India continued to be detained under the National 
Security Act^*. 
Judicial Response: 
The constitutional validity of National Security Ordinance 
was challenged before the Gauhati High Court in Basi Singh v. 
State of Assam, wherein it was held that no provision of the 
Ordinance is directly or indirectly violative of the provisions of 
the Article 19, 21 and 22 of the constitution . Again, the 
constitutional validity of the National Security Ordinance as well 
as National Security Act was challenged in A.K.Roy v. Union of 
fin 
India , popularly known as the National Security Act case. The 
Supreme Court by 4:1 majority upheld the Constitutional validity 
of both the Ordinance and the Act. The court held that the Act 
was neither vague nor arbitrary in its provisions providing for 
detention of persons on certain grounds, for acting in a manner 
prejudicial to the 'defense of India', 'security of India', 'security 
of the state ' , and 'to the relations with the foreign powers ' . While 
upholding the validity of the National Security Act and the 
Ordinance preceding it, the Court issued a number of directions 
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with a view to safeguarding the interest of the detenues detained 
under the National Security Act. The court directed: 
(1) That immediately after detention the kith and kin 
of the detainee must be informed in writing about 
his detention and his place of detention. 
(2) The detenu must be detained in a place where he 
habitually resides unless exceptional 
circumstances require detention at some other 
place. 
(3) That detenu is entitled to his book and writing 
materials, his own food, visits by friends and 
relatives. 
(4) He must be kept separate from other convicts. 
(5) No treatment of punitive character should be 
meted out to him and should be treated according 
to civilized norms of human dignity. 
Justice Gupta and Justice Tulzapurkar dissented from the 
majority view and issued the writ of Mandamus to the Union 
Government to bring the Amendment into force. It is submitted 
that the majority view on this point is correct. The Government 
must bring the amendment into force within a reasonable time. It 
would appear to be anomalous that the Parliament can pass an 
amendment, which cannot be brought into operation at all. The 
dissenting judgement observed that by not bringing into force the 
provisions of the 44*** Amendment Act, the Union Government had 
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not performed ' i t s ' constitutional duty and the majority has 
abdicated its power to issue mandatory direction to the 
Government to bring the Amendment into force. Thus, the 
petitioner was denied a very important right, that is, the right to 
have his representation considered by the Board as set up in 
accordance with the provisions of the forty-fourth Amendment 
Act. Tulzapurkar, J. in a brief judgement agreed with the majority 
judgement that an ordinance was "law" and agreed with the 
dissent of Gupta, J. on the question of bringing into force section 
R1 
3 with section 1(2) of the forty-fourth Amendment Act . In the 
dissenting judgement. Justice Gupta observed that: " there is 
another aspect of the matter. Article 21 not only speaks of a 
person's liberty but also of his life. It is difficult to think of a 
situation in normal times, which left no time for the President to 
summon Parliament and required him to promulgate Ordinances to 
take away the life or liberty of persons unless one considered life 
and liberty as matters of no great importance. However, in view 
of the opinion of the majority upholding the validity of the 
Ordinance, it is unnecessary to dilate on this aspect." *^  
Yet another draconian piece of legislation, the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) was passed in 1985. It was 
meant to expire after two years; however, it was regularly 
extended every two years, despite strong opposition to it. It was 
only in May 1995 that it was repealed, more of which in the next 
chapter. 
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THE TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES 
(PREVENTION) ACT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LOK SABHA 
DEBATES 
The Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 
1985* was first introduced as a temporary measure for a period of 
two years to deal with the violence perpetrated by the armed 
secessionist groups in Punjab. According to the statement of 
object and reasons, of the bill, the then Law Minister observed 
that the terrorists have been indulging in wanton killing, arson, 
loot and other heinous crimes mostly in Punjab and Chandigarh. 
Since May, 10 1985 the terrorists have extended their tentacles to 
other parts of the country as were, Delhi, Haryana, U.P and 
Rajasthan, as a result of which several innocent lives were lost 
and many suffered serious injuries . The Prime Minister, Rajiv 
Gandhi rushed to his Cabinet to get approval for the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Bill. A few top officers warned 
him against the misuse of such a measure but he brushed them 
aside. He specially ordered the then Home secretary Sommaia not 
to say anything on the Bill at the cabinet meeting. Sommaia kept 
quit even some pertinent questions were raised. Parliament, which 
made under the shadow of Indira Gandhi's murder and the Delhi 
blasts, was too dazed, too frightened and too overwhelmed. It was 
not in the frame of mind where it could appreciate the dangers 
that Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Bill could 
bring to society, which was already suffering from the rough and 
ready methods of police. Some member of parliaments suspected 
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foul play. But never did they expect its misuse on such a large 
scale. 
A.K.Sen, the Minister of law and justice while introducing 
the bill in the Lok Sabha, said, " the Bill is introduced at a time 
when terrorism from all sides, from the eastern frontier right up 
to western frontier is threatening the very existence of the state. 
We are facing a grave danger and threat; and the last spate of 
bombing in Delhi and in other towns and areas have shown that 
behind these acts of terrorism are organized gangs operating not 
merely with their own resources but we have strong reason to 
believe with great encouragement and help from outside agencies, 
that foreign hand is clearly visible."^ The planting of explosives 
in trains, buses and public places, to create fear, terror and panic 
among people has completely disrupted peace, security and 
tranquility. It was this scenario that warranted a strong law to 
deal with terrorism. The alarming increase in disruptive activities 
was also a matter of serious concern.'* A.K.Sen also observed that 
the Government has been every lenient to these people; and it 
was thought that the ordinary law is suffice to deal with these 
elements. But that was not to be, hence the need for a more 
stringent law. The new legislation seeks inter alia to,^ provide for 
deterrent punishment for terrorist acts and disruptive activities, 
confer on the Union Government adequate powers to make such 
rules as may be necessary or expedient for the prevention of, and 
for coping with, terrorist acts and disruptive activities; provide 
for the constitution of designated courts for the speedy trial of 
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offences under the TADA. the Act also provides that whoever 
commit a terrorist act shall, if such act has resulted in the death 
of any person, be punishable with death or any other case, be 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less 
than five years but which may extended to term of life and shall 
also be liable to fine. Further, whoever conspire and attempts to 
commit, or advocates, abets, advices or incites or knowingly 
facilities the communication of, a terrorist act or any act 
prepatory to a terrorist act shall be punishable with imprisonment 
for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may 
extended to term of life and shall also be liable to fine. 
Supporting the Bill, A.K. Sen argued," we want this kind of 
Bill for the simple reason that we want to root out terrorism. Let 
there be no faltering voices in this House on this issue, and if 
there is one, I shall be reluctantly compelled to say that it might 
give indirect encouragement to those who are indulging in acts of 
terrorism. He further said that the present Bill was by no means 
directed against the Sikhs. It had been brought against terrorist 
whether in NEFA, Nagaland and Mizoram in the northeastern 
region or in Punjab and elsewhere in the northwest area. That is 
the rationale behind the purposed legislation. He also assured the 
House that it would not be misused either by the Central or by 
the State Governments. "We have only the terrorist in view." No 
other objective was even remotely contemplated, declared the 
Minister.^ C.V Chavan, (Minister of Home Affairs), also joined 
the debate and supported the Bill by adding that hundreds of 
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people have lost their lives, a large number of people have been 
injured or maimed and a kind of situation was created to foster 
permanent cleavage between different communities. The 
Minister congratulated the people for not reacting violently to the 
recent bomb' blast incident in Delhi. "We anticipated some kind 
of reaction. Fortunately this has not happened."'° Chavan also 
conceded that harsh punishment has been provided in the Bill so 
that it can act as a deterrent. The Home Minister agreed with 
Zainul Basheer (cong.) that the anti terrorist law is necessary 
under the prevailing circumstances. He concluded by saying that 
the proposed Act has bestowed sufficient powers on the law 
enforcing agencies to flush out terrorism and that there is no 
excuse for them to say they have no power.'' Both A.K.Sen and 
S.B.Chavan, assured the Rajya Sabha on 21'* May 1985, that "the 
new law would be used only to curb genuine terrorist acts and 
would not be directed against any particular community. They 
also allayed the misgivings that the provisions of the Bill would 
not be used to curb political activities and trade , union 
movement. 
GENERAL OPINION ABOUT THE BILL \ V A S : "^  ' 
The death of innocent men, women and chrtdren in -iJelhi 
caused by the transistor bombs'^ brought terrorism to Delhi's 
doorstep creating a sense of insecurity among people And when 
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (prevention) Bill, 1985 
was passed by both the Houses, it met with a volley of criticism 
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from different sections of society social scientists, Human 
Rights forums etc. the general feeling was that there was no need 
of this kind of Bill as there are ample provisions to deal with the 
terrorists. There is the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act 1983, the 
National Security (Amendment) Act 1984, the Armed Forces 
(Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Power Act 1983, the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1983 and the 
Terrorist Affected Areas (special court) act 1984. In addition, 
there is the Arms Act, which has recently been amended, 
providing for more stringent punishment. There are also 
provisions in the Indian Penal Code, under sections 121 to no'"* 
and 503 to 508'^to take care of such activities. 
Mukhoty Gobinda, senior advocate of the Supreme Court 
and the President of the People's Union For Democratic Rights 
criticised the Bill on two grounds. First, the government is vested 
with enough extraordinary power "provided there is a political 
will". Secondly, had legislation curbed terrorism, it would have 
been wiped out by now given the plethora of laws we have. 
Instead it is on the increase." I fear these type of legislation are 
only alienating a large number of people, for whenever specific 
draconian powers have been given to the executive, it has always 
been misused." He also voiced his apprehensions that the Act may 
jeopardize the freedom of the press, for section 5'^ of the Act 
empowers the Government to frame rules necessary to curb 
disruptive activities. And under this provision, a district 
magistrate can prohibit the "use of photographic apparatus" or 
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any means of recording of information and also ensure "the 
accuracy of any report or declaration legally required of a 
person." This would amount to Para censorship." Fears were 
also raised that the Government is assuming more and more 
arbitrary powers under the garb of combating terrorism. 
N.D.Pancholi, General Secretary of The Citizen For Democracy 
observed that the law Minister's assurance that the new law 
against terrorism was not aimed at the Sikh Community was " 
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only an eyewash." Madhu Dandvate, Janta Party, M.P., also 
voiced his suspicions that with all the safety valves that can be 
built into any Act of the Government of India which deals with 
law and order, disruption and terrorism, "the main source of 
mischief remains. As far as the Government's assurances are 
concerned both the late Prime Minister ,Indira Gandhi and the 
then Home Minister, Uma Shankar Dixit, had assured the fifth 
Lok Sabha that Maintenance of Internal Security Act would not 
be used against political workers. These assurances were swept 
under the carpet by arresting Jaya Prakash (JP) and dissident 
congressmen Chandra Shekhar and Ram Dhan under MISA. The 
trade unionists were also not spared. The biggest beneficiary of 
such laws was the Government which acquired more and more 
powers to silence the opposition.'^ 
General J.S Arora, hero of Bangladesh war, also shared 
M.Dandavate's apprehension and said that, " though terrorism is 
'most reprehensible' and is to be condemned, the Bill is likely to 
be misused by the administration and police, which is far from 
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honest and efficient. It will give the police additional powers and 
freedom to harass people." The weakness lay not in law but in 
poor intelligence and it is exactly this that needs to be rectified so 
that the guilty can be brought to book. Khushwant Singh writer 
and member of Rajya Sabha points out "The failure of the 
intelligence agencies is monumental. The only way to combat 
terrorism is for the intelligence agents to infiltrate the ranks of 
the terrorist as was done with the Boader Meinhoff group in 
Germany.^" He further stated, "that terrorism and civilization 
could not go together. But he was afraid that the legislation 
would not help the Government to curb terrorism. If any thing, 
the steps would only widen the gulf between the Sikhs and the 
rest of the society."^' He alleged, in the Rajya Sabha, that the 
fake encounters, police brutality on innocent people in Amritsar 
and Delhi last year and their failure to get justice had swelled the 
ranks of extremists.^^ Dipin Ghosh (CPI-M) regretted that the 
opposition was not consulted about the Bill. He said that mere 
legislation would not help and called for a political solution of 
the problem.^^ Indradeet Singh (CPI) expressed the fear that the 
measures might be misused against trade union activities and the 
working class movement.^'' Geeta Mukherjee (CPI) observed that 
the Bill gave sweeping powers to the executive, which is bound 
to, be misused despite the Government's assurances to the 
contrary. C.Janga Reddy (BJP) wondered whether any amount of 
law would check terrorism so long as the Government did not 
have the will to root it out.^^ Amal Datta (CPI-M) expressed his 
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fears that the provisions of the Bill might be used suppress the 
genuine political activities of the opposition. Opposition ruled 
states, he said, had particularly to fear as their party workers 
might be hauled up by the Center on the pretext of " disrupting" 
the functions of the Central Government. He confirmed that there 
were enough laws already to deal with the criminals. There was 
no necessity of bringing the present anti-terrorist Bill. The 
purpose of the Bill was to suppress the rising political dissent in 
the country. And that the definition of 'disruptionist' is too vague 
to be interpreted to the convenience of the Government.^^ 
Charan Singh, the Lok Dal Preident described as 
"shocking" the way the Government has thought of implementing 
the Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (prevention) Bill 1985. In 
a statement, published in The Statesman, Mr. Charan Singh 
observed " the wide powers assumed by Government under this 
legislation are liable of being misused to curb legitimate political 
activity. Authority given to the police to keep a suspected under 
remand for 90 days (incase of murder) and 60 days (in other 
cases) without furnishing charge sheets for full one year is wholly 
uncalled for. This provision is meant to cover up the inefficiency 
of the police to trace the culprit and will enables it to keep under 
arrest any person on mere suspicion there by encroaching upon 
the civil liberties of the people."^^ The general feeling in the 
country was that the proposed Bill was unwarranted and uncalled 
and the present laws are sufficient to tackle the problem of 
terrorism. Prakash Singh Badal, Akali leader and former Chief 
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Minister of Punjab went to the extent of making an appeal to the 
President not to accord his assent to the Bill as the Bill aimed at 
sealing the fate of Sikhs as free citizen of India and that the 
challenge before us demands statesmanship of a very high order 
and not gradual handing over of the state to authoritarianism and 
dictatorship. He further lamented that the declaration of Punjab 
and Chandigarh as terrorist affected areas has not been applied to 
the anti Sikhs forces " indulging in all sorts of violent activities 
against Sikhs which only confirms the fears and apprehensions of 
the people specially the Sikhs."^* The West Bengal ruling Left 
Front also did not lag behind in opposing the measures. 
The Act unfortunately bestows unlimited power^*' on the 
executive in the name of security of the state. W. Shakespeare 
would have said: "security, what crimes are committed in thy 
name!" In the name of security, people were put placed behind 
bars, weaker sections and members of minority community have 
been detained. Infact, the detainees include old women and young 
children. From 1987 onwards, we have various exahiples, the first 
is the case of Gujarat where thousands of people detained at one 
stroke. Roughly about 2,000 peoples^' were put behind the bars at 
one go, including women and children. The case of Rajasthan 
was no different where more than 250 persons were languishing 
behind the bars for the last two years and more; and the Home 
Minister of the State is on record as having admitted on the floor 
of the Assembly that at least 178 of them have no charges against 
them.^^ Such examples are not difficult to find in the State of 
83 
TADA.AnAnalvsl.nfink ^bhaDebates 
Punjab and Jammu &Kashmir. In Jammu & Kashmir, even the 
designated court is not functioning. People were arrested in the 
valley and they were required to go to Jammu if they wanted to 
move the court for review. It was only later that a designated 
court was proposed,^^ in Srinagar which is yet to be established. 
The fire goes on raging and the purpose for which the 
legislation was framed were hardly met on the contrary, it proved 
counter productive. It helped in adding fuel to the fire. It is true 
that terrorism has to be condemned; it has no place in democratic 
society. But the state which is committed to rule of law cannot 
venture to enact a lawless law. State terrorism is no answer to 
terrorist violence. The state should examine the causes that has 
led to the growth of terrorism and try to remove those irritants 
which has caused havoc to the country. Man cannot be made 
moral by an act of legislature. A multi-dimensional approach, 
politico-social and economic is an imperative. State generates 
hate, it can only be eradicated by creating conditions conducive 
to peace. A healing touch will go a long way in ventilating the 
grievances of the people, real or imaginary, rather than resorting 
to, legislations contrary to the ethos of the Constitution. 
Speaking in the Lok Sabha, S.B.Chavan pleaded that the 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (amendment) Bill was 
introduced on 24"' May 1987 when terrorist and violent activities 
were at their peak and it was not possible to contain them through 
prevailing laws. When the situation became abnormal, the Bill 
84 
TADA: An Analysis nfl^k ^bha Debates 
was introduced with the hope that normalcy would be brought 
within two years. But it could not be possible. Then, on May 23" , 
1989, the Act was amended extending its validity for a period of 
two years. Now when the country is once again witnessing intense 
terrorist activities and violence it seems difficult to contain it 
through prevailing laws. Therefore, there is a need to extend it for 
a further period of two years and that is why this Bill has been 
brought forward. 
The Government justified its extension in the view of the 
threat posed to the very security, law and order and economy by 
the terrorists. This bring an extra ordinary situation, having both 
national and international ramifications, calls for extra ordinary 
legislation. This is more true of the border studies of the country, 
especially Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir, where reports of 
frequent infiltration from outside of the border are not the 
common. The present laws are too humane to deal with these 
inhuman activities. Inflicted upon the people by the militants. The 
whole needs to be seen in the national perspective. But 
unfortunately, as the subsequent events have proved, the law was 
not very successful in eradicating terrorism. On the contrary, it 
brought disrepute to democracy and democratic institution, led to 
indiscriminate arrests and detentions, posing a threat to human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
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The 1993 AMNEDMENT: -
In May 1993 when TADA was extended for two more years, 
with certain amendments relating to property. Previously 
forfeiture of property of the accused or convicted alone was 
permissible. Now it has been made to wide, whoever holds 
property 'derived or obtained from commission of any terrorist 
act or has been acquired through the terrorist funds' is also made 
liable and such property can also be sized [Section 2(l)(gg); 
Section 3(6); and Section 7 A]. Some members in Lok Sabha 
strongly protested pointing out the enormous scope it gives to 
police to lay their hands on anybody's property. The Home 
Minister justified it on the ground that the new provision is 
required to tackle the havala transactions. Another amendment 
relates to persons who may not themselves be involved in any 
terrorist acts but are members of 'a terrorist gang or a terrorist 
organization'. They shall be punishable for a term which 'shall 
not be less than five years and may extend to imprisonment for 
life' [Section 3 (5)]. Another amendment permits confessions 
made to police even by co-accused or co-conspirators admissible 
as evidence[Section 15 (1)]. Along with these amendments some 
changes in the right direction have also been initiated. The burden 
of proof is on the accused in some cases even if the accusation is 
made in the confessions of a co-accused before a police officer or 
before any other person. These sections relating to confessions by 
co-accused are now deleted [the deleted sections are Section 
21(1 )(c) and (d)]. Previously, in camera trials were mandatory 
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unless otherwise desired by the public prosecutor. Now they can 
be held only if the 'Designated Court so desires' [Section 16(1)]. 
Previously the maximum remand period during the course of 
investigation was one year. Now it is reduced to 180 days 
[Section 20(4)(b)]. Thereafter remand can be extended only when 
prosecution gives specific reasons for the delay in investigation. 
Reducing the period to six months will be of some relief to 
thousands detained in false cases. They can atleast hope to get 
bail after six months. The power of local policemen to book 
TADA cases is also taken away. Now it is mandatory to have the 
prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police [Section 
20 A(l)] . And the prosecution in all such cases can be launched 
only after the 'previous sanction of the Inspector General of 
Police, or the Commissioner of Police' [Section 20 A(2)]. These 
changes, marginal in nature, have all been introduced on earlier 
occasions in the Parliament by the opposition member, but were 
rejected by Government. The Government extends the Act without 
analyzing the causes of these activities which are growing. Unless 
the Government takes the whole thing in totality, it will not be 
able to check terrorism. Scholars suggests that the Socio-
economic deprivation is the cause of terrorism. Apart from the 
Socio-economic causes, there are few other reasons of growing 
terrorism. First, terrorism has become an international factor 
because of certain developments in the international arena. Now 
there is no question of war. The war merchants boost terrorism, 
so that they will be able to save their industry and make profit. 
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Second, our police force never use this power for the purpose for 
which it is being given to them. The police use this power not 
against the terrorists but more against the innocent people and the 
people who fight for the just causes. The growing terrorism has 
kept the Administration under control. Third, the ideological 
question is the main question and unless people are ideologically 
educated, they will not be able to face terrorism and enacting this 
kind of legislation will not serve the purpose. To deal with the 
terrorists, secessionists and the persons with whose activities the 
country's unity and integrity are affected. Government can enact 
the stringent law or the existing law should be utilized for that 
purpose and if necessary, suitable amendments should be made in 
the Acts (Criminal Procedure Code and Indian Penal Code). But 
before enacting or amending any law, the Government must try to 
educate the people and make them conscious ideologically so that 
they oppose terrorism in every sphere. An effort is made 
ideologically to remove the discontentment of the people. 
Many of its provisions contravene important international 
Human Rights standards, especially, the right to freedom of 
expression; and the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. These rights are 
provided in the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights as well as other standards provided in the United Nations 
Declaration on Torture. India being party to the Covenant is 
bound to respect and guarantee these rights. Thousands of people 
were arbitrarily held without the basic legal safeguards to which 
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they entitled under both International Human Rights Standards as 
well as the Constitution of India. The Act's application in many 
Indian states meets the standard of 'strict necessity' required for 
emergency measures under International Human Rights Standards. 
Not only this, in some cases arguably, it failed to meet the 
National Human Rights standards and, fall short of fundamental 
rights guaranteed in India's own constitution. 
The Right to Freedom of Expression: -
The Act prohibit not only the "terrorist acts" (Section 3) 
but also the "disruptive activities" (Section 4). Disruptive 
activities are too vague and can be interpreted in more than one 
way. It all depends on the way one looks at it. It can include 
freedom of speech, press, Public meetings, trade union and a 
whole lot of other activities. Even ordinary political debate can 
be brought under its ambit. Such a provision can make people to 
toe to the official line. Section 4 of the Act not only undermines 
Article 19 '^' of the Constitution of India but also Article 19^^  of 
ICCPR. It makes easier the possibility of its abuse and misuse. 
The Right to Liberty and Security of the person: -
Article 9 of ICCPR provides that no one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary arrest or detention,^^ that all arrested persons shall be 
promptly informed of the charges against them," and that any one 
arrested or detained on a criminal charges shall be brought 
promptly before a judge or other officer legally authorized to 
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exercise judicial power, and shall be entitled either to trial within 
a reasonable time or release.^* Article 22 of the Constitution of 
India also provides for procedural safeguards in matters of arrests 
and detentions. The TADA is a negation of these provisions. 
The power to arrest and detain under section 4 of the Act 
are so broadly defined that they permit people to be detained for 
peacefully expressing their political views: Such powers are 
arbitrary. The United Nation working group on Arbitrary 
Detention has in its reports, expressed concern about offences 
which are described in vague terms. According to the working 
group; "Criminal law requires precision, so that the conduct 
which is wrongful can be clearly understood by the person held to 
be liable. Vague description are sources of abuse and encourage 
arbitrariness.""^ It also pointed out, such vaguely defined offences 
violated articles 15 ICCPR (which prohibits retroactive 
punishment for an act that did not constitute a criminal offence at 
the time it was committed) and " seriously affects some thing that 
is essential to the right to justice."'*" 
The right to be brought before a judge ' promptly': -
The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 
permits Executive Magistrates to authorize detention, instead of 
Judicial Magistrates, who are independent judicial officers, as per 
the guidelines laid down in Section 167'" of the Criminal 
Procedure Code to authorized demand. The authorization of 
detention under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) 
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Act by such Executive officials may lack impartiality and 
independence and the compulsions of natural Justice. It is exactly 
for this reason that Article 9(1)'*^ of ICCPR speak of judicial 
supervision of detentions. International human rights standards 
and mechanisms require supervision of detention by an 
independent, preferably judicial body and every form of detention 
or imprisonment shall be ordered by or be subject to effective 
control of, judicial authorities."'*^ In 1988, United Nation Special 
Rapporteur on Torture observed each arrested person should be 
handed over without delay to the competent judge, who should 
decide on the legality of his arrest immediately and allow him to 
see lawyers." No such provisions exist under the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act. None of the former 
detainees released from detention under the Act, had been brought 
before a magistrate nor they were informed of grounds for their 
arrest despite the fact that they had spent several days in custody 
under the Act. 
Right to be released if not tried within a reasonable time: -
All arrested persons are entitled to " trial within time or 
release."'*'* The Act on the contrary makes release on bail 
considerably more difficult. Under the Act bail can be refused 
simply if opposed by the public prosecutor unless the detenu 
provides evidence that he is not guilty or the Court is satisfied 
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not 
guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any 
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offence while on bail/^ Prisoners held under the Act are rarely 
tried (according to the Home minister in November 1993 as 
reported in the Indian press, that over 50,000 humans were 
tormented by TADA detention, while the conviction rate under 
the Act is 0.81%).^ Consequently many people held under 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (prevention)act spend long 
period awaiting trial. The misused of the Act by the police to 
keep any person whom the police wished to detain in custody was 
also highlighted by the chairman of the National Human Rights 
Commission. Describing the police attitude in September 1984 in 
an interview with the Pioneer the Chairman of the Commission 
observe, if an accused is released on bail, keep him in under 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act.'*^ 
The Right To Fair Trial: -
The ICCPR lays down important safe guards for fair trial. 
Which include the right to fair trial and public hearing by an 
impartial tribunal, the accuser's right to examine witnesses and to 
defense, witnesses against them (the principles of "equality of 
arms"), the presumption that all are innocent unless proved 
otherwise, and the right to appeal.'** Further more, the Declaration 
On The Protection Of All Persons from being Subjected to 
Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman And Degrading Treatment Or 
Punishment requires that evidence obtained from torture or other 
cruel, in human or degrading treatment may not be invoked as 
evidence against the person on trial.'^^ 
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The provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act 
contravene these essential legal safe guards for a fair trial. 
Firstly, the doctrine of Presumption Of Innocence is wholly 
ignored. On the contrary the Act obliges Designated Courts 
trying these cases to presume that such an offence has been 
committed.^" The provision strikes at the root of Article 14 (2)^' 
of ICCPR, moreover, the exceptions to the Law of Evidence are 
so broadly defined that the innocent person can easily be 
convicted under these provisions. Secondly, the Act is based on 
the Presumption Of A 'Terrorist' Motive. A person found in 
unauthorized possession of arms in a 'notified area' amounts to 
him being associated with 'terrorist' or 'disruptive' activities.^^ 
Consequently the offence, which is normally punishable under the 
Arms Act, becomes triable under Terrorist and Disruptive 
Activities (Prevention) Act. Section 5 of the Act is often used by 
the police as it contain very few legal safeguards for the detenu. 
A report of the Home Ministry made public in October 1993, 
reveals that most of convictions are for offences under Section 
5.^'' It would not be one of context to quote Justice Suresh, who 
observed that " Adivasis (member of India's tribal population) be 
they in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh or the 
northeast, by their very nature carry weapons. But that has been 
enough reason for Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 
(Prevention) Act to be applied to them. True, carrying the arms 
(unlicensed) is illegal. But the way of dealing with that is through 
the Arms Act, not Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) 
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Act." The general comment of Human Rights Committee, on 
Article 14" of ICCPR, says, " The presumption of innocence is 
fundamental to the protection of human rights. By reason of the 
presumption of innocence, the burden of proof of the charges is 
on the prosecution and the accused has the benefit of doubt. No 
guilty can be presumed until the charges has been proved beyond 
reasonable doubt."^^ 
The right to be informed promptly of charges and to be tried 
without undue delay: -
Thirdly, there were no provision under the Act, requiring 
the detainee to be promptly informed the reasons for their arrest 
or the charges against them. To add fuel to the fire, the Act 
allows up to 180 days detention in police custody for purpose of 
investigation, a period which can be extended to one year on an 
application by the public prosecutor. And it is only at the end of 
investigation that the police is obliged to identify, in its report to 
Magistrate, the offences that appear to have been committed. In 
July 1994, the Supreme Court ruled that, if this did not happen, 
the accused had an 'indefeasible and absolute right', to be 
released on bail. Formal charges have to be subsequently framed 
by the court. The Act is silent on the period within which this has 
to be done.^^ The periods of 180 days and one year were 
considerably longer than envisaged by the international human 
rights standards. The ICCPR requires that charges should be 
communicated to an accused "promptly". Such an arbitrary can 
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lead to its misuse as it is evident from the Report of the Ministry 
of Home Affairs that 30,000 out of 53,000 cases under the Act 
C O 
were pending before the Courts for more than five years. 
Fourthly, the Act provides that the identity and address of any 
witnesses can be kept secret^' which is bound to affect cross-
examination of witnesses by the defense jeopardizing fair trial 
and constitutes a grave violation of Article 14(3)(e)^ of ICCPR. 
The Chairman of National Human Right Commission has pleaded 
for the deletion of Section 16(2)^' from the Act.^^ 
The right to have evidence extracted by force or compulsion 
excluded from the trial: -
Fifthly, the Act provides that the " confession made to a 
police officer of the rank of the superintendent of police and 
above is admissible evidence in court proceeding."^^ This is 
contrary to the Law of Evidence which excludes all confessions 
made to police officers from being used as evidence.^ It is 
common knowledge that Police often resort to third degree 
methods and compels the accused to confess the crime. Resort to 
torture and inhuman treatment is prohibited under the ICCPR 
even during emergencies. 
Sixthly, the Act provides for trial in camera. It is very 
well recognized that open and public trial is the sine qua non of 
fair play and natural justice for justice should not only be done 
but should also seems to have been done. It is only in exceptional 
cases, where there is threat of security to the accused or the 
95 
TADA: An An3lv^l5ofLokS3bh9 Debates 
witnesses that trial is conducted in close doors as has happened in 
the trial of the accused in the case of Indira Gandhi's 
assassination. The ICCPR also provides for public trial under 
Article 14(1)^' to guarantee justice. The supreme court has 
however, declared this provision as ultravries of the Constitution 
in the case of Kartar Singh and accordingly the provision was 
deleted. 
Another astonishing feature of the Act is that it excludes 
appeals to the High Court, allowing appeals only to the Supreme 
Court, and that also not latter than thirty days of sentence being 
passed. The provision clearly violates the International Human 
Rights standards, which guarantees every convicted person the 
right to appeal to a higher tribunal.^ 
The Human Rights Committee^^ has also held that the right 
to appeal in Article 14 of ICCPR implies that, "if domestic law 
provides for more than one instance to appeal, the convicted 
person must have access to each of them."^* The limitation of 
appeals under Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (Prevention) 
Act to one stage only could also violate the right to equality 
before the courts provided in Article 14 of ICCPR. 
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SUMMARY TABLE OF TADA: DEVIATIONS AND 
VIOLATIONS 
ISSUE 
Freedom of 
Expression 
In camera trial 
Identity of witness 
Bail and remand 
provisions 
Reversing the 
burden of proof 
Role of executive 
Magistrates 
Admissibility of 
confession made 
before police 
Abrogation of 
powers of State 
Governments 
Role and Power of 
High Courts 
TADA 
4(1)(3) 
16(1) 
16(2) 
20 
(4)(7)(8) 
21 
20(3)(4) 
15. 
20(3) 
7 
9 (2)(3). 
19. 
20(6) 
CrP.C. 
-
327 
-
436. 
437. 
438 
-
164. 
167 
164 and 
26 of 
lEA 
-
374. 
482. 
483 
COI 
19 
14.19. 21 
21 
21.22,50 
21 
50 
20 (3). 50 
Ust II; 
Schedule 
VII 
214. 226, 
227. 235. 
236. Part V 
UDHR 
19 
10 
-
9 
11 
9.10 
9, 11 
-
-
ICCPR 
1(1). 19 
14(1) 
14(3) 
(e) 
-
14(2) 
9(4) 
14(3)(g) 
-
-
Note : In case of TADA, Cr.P.C. and lEA the numbers refer to sections of the Acts. 
In case of others refer to Articles. 
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TADA : Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. 
Cr.P.C.: Criminal Procedure Code. 
UDHR : Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
ICCPR : International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
lEA Indian Evidence Act. 
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THE TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES 
ACT AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
Introduction: 
In a democracy. Judiciary has an independent role to play. 
It ensures that the Basic Law—the Constitution—is followed by 
both the legislation and executive. Law is not justice. Law, which 
is abstract, is interpreted by the judges in a humane manner to 
provide justice to the people. An upright, conscientious and 
creative judiciary enables the citizens to enjoy the Human Rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Judges interpret law, keeping in 
mind the social needs and requirements. The judiciary has to be 
ever alert to the protection of Human Rights of citizens as the all 
powerful executive may like to whittle them down. Judiciary 
stands as the Defender of Human Rights and as a bulwark against 
State's authoritarianisms and arbitrariness. 
In India, Supreme Court, which is strong, independent and 
creative. Through judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court has 
inverted suo motu, whenever violations of Human Rights have 
taken place and had come to rescue of the right of the citizen. An 
important focus of the Supreme Court of India has been on human 
rights jurisprudence centered around Article 21 . Personal liberty 
under Article 21 has been constructed as covering a wide array of 
rights that go to constitute a life lived in freedom and with 
dignity. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union 
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Territory of Delhi, ' the Court observed that the life and personal 
liberty were held to cover not just bare existence but a life with 
dignity. In Asian worker case, it was observed by the Court, 
the poor too have civil and political rights and the Rule of Law is 
meant for them also, though today it exists only on paper and not 
in reality. It has been rightly observed that there are quite a few 
human rights which touch the people at grass root level but which 
have unfortunately not received sufficient attention from human 
rights activists in developing countries. In Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha v. Union of India, the Court ordered the release of 
bonded labour. The expanding the concept of the life and liberty 
have embraced by the Supreme Court through some unusual rights 
including: the right to receive instant medical aid in case of 
injury'*; the right to receive free education up to the age of 14 
years^; or the right of workers in the asbestos industry to receive 
health care^ free legal service to poor was held to be an essential 
element of a reasonable, just and fair procedure^; the right to a 
speedy trail was spelt out from Article 21*; the handcuffing and 
parading of undertrial prisoners was held to violative of Article 
21 . Article 21 was held as prohibiting any form of physical 
mutilation or deliberate inflicting of pain or suffering.'° 
Supreme Court also develop a method of enforcing Human 
Right through the "Public Interest Litigation". It has been 
fashioned by the Indian courts in the context of the violation of 
the human rights of those people who are unable, for various 
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reasons, to move the courts for a redressal of their wrongs. The 
requirement of 'procedure established by law' under Article 21 , 
has also been transformed by judicial interpretation. In A.K. 
Gopalan v. state of Madras,^^ the Court upheld the detention 
without trial holding that 'procedure established by law' meant 
law as enacted by Parliament or the State Legislature. The court 
declined to examine the righteousness of the procedure and 
whether it accorded with principles of natural justice. But three 
decade later, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, the Court 
rejected this interpretation and held that the procedure which can 
deprive a person of his life or liberty under Article 21 must be a 
right, just and a fair procedure, and not an arbitrary or oppressive 
procedure. This is a welcome step since judiciary is only a hope 
to correct the present day system which is decaying due to 
political or other reasons. 
The Role of Judiciary in TADA cases: 
The supreme court in a controversial judgment of March 
1994 upheld the constitutional validity of the Terrorist And 
Disruptive Activities Act inspite of wide range of public protest 
and criticism about the Act from different section of the society 
but at the same it confirmed police abuse of the Act in order to 
circumvent ordinary legal provisions. In Kartar Singh v. State of 
Punjab,^^ a galaxy of senior lawyers, namely, M/s. V.M.Tarkunde, 
Ram Jethmalani, M.S.Gurjal, Rajinder Sachhar, Hardev Singh, 
M.R.Sharma, A.K.Sen, Balwant Singh all appearing for the 
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petitioners pleaded strongly against the Constitutional validity of 
the Act in general and the various provisions of those Acts in 
particular mainly on the grounds that; 
(1) That the Central Legislature has no legislative 
competence to enact the legislations and 
(2) The provisions of the Act is in contravention of or 
ostensibly in violation of any of the fundamental rights specified 
in Part III of the Indian Constitution. 
According to them, the Act and the provisions thereto, 
which are in utter disregard and breach of humanitarian law and 
universal human rights, not only lack impartiality but also fail the 
basic test of justice and fairness which are well established and 
recognized principles of law. 
After critically analyzing a number of penal and procedural 
provisions relating to issue of arrest, investigation, bail, mode 
and methodology of trial, right of the accused etc., the learned 
counsels have argued that the Act with which we are confronted, 
are draconian, ugly, vicious and highly reprehensive, the brutality 
of which cannot and should not be minimized or ignored though 
this Court is not called upon to condone the penalized conduct of 
the real terrorist and destructionists. Then they made a scathing 
attack on the police for abusing and misusing their power under 
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the impugned Act is doing a 'witch-hunt ' against the innocent 
people and suspects stigmatizing them as potential criminals and 
hunt them all the time and over react and thereby unleash a reign 
of terror as an institutionalized terror perpetrated by Nazis to 
Jews. But unfortunately the majority judgement of the Supreme 
Court held that; "it is true that on many occasions, we have come 
across cases wherein the prosecution unjustifiably invokes the 
provisions of the Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Act with an 
oblique motive of depriving the accused persons from getting bail 
and in some occasions when the Courts are inclined to grant bail 
in cases registered under ordinary criminal law, the investigating 
officers in order to circumvent the authority of the courts invoke 
the provisions of Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Act. This 
kind of invocation of the provisions of the Terrorist And 
Disruptive Activities Act in cases, the facts of which do not 
warrant (it), is nothing but sheer misuse and abuse of the Act by 
the police."''* Further more, the definition of 'abett ing' 'terrorist 
acts ' or 'disruptive activities' in Section 2 of the Act was so 
broad and vague that invites innocent people to be arbitrarily 
arrested under its provisions. The Supreme Court, in its majority 
judgment of Kartar Singh case^^ reviewing the constitutionality of 
Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Act, found; "it is the basic 
principle of legal jurisprudence that an enactment is void for 
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws 
offend several important values... vague laws may trap the 
innocent by not providing fair warning. Such a law impermissibly 
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delegates basic policy matters to police men and also judges for 
resolution on an ad-hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant 
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application...let us 
examine Clause (i) of Section 2(1 )(a) [which define the terms 
'abet ' as to be read in the Act]. This Section is shown to be 
blissfully and impermissibly vague and imprecise...even an 
innocent person who ingenuously and undefiled communicates or 
associates without any knowledge or having no reason to believe 
or suspect that the person or class of persons with whom he has 
communicated or associated is engaged in assisting in any manner 
terrorist or disruptionists, can be arrested and prosecuted by 
abusing or misusing or misapplying this definition." Despite these 
strong reservations, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 
Section 2 of the Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Act. 
However, in order to prevent abuse as described above, the court 
ruled that 'abet ' in Section 2(l)(a)(i) should be read as including 
a "guilty mind", i.e. actual knowledge or reason to believe that 
the person with whom one communicated was involved in those 
activities as prohibited by Terrorist And Disruptive Activities 
Act. 
Dissenting from the minority Judgment, one of the Judge 
observed that the definition of 'abet ' in Terrorist And Disruptive 
Activities Act should be amended "to avoid the ambiguity and 
make it immune from arbitrariness." 
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The defense counsel has also argued that the word 
"communication" in Section 2 is so loosely phrased that giving 
professional legal advice to a detainee held under the Terrorist 
And Disruptive Activities Act can be enough to invite 
prosecution. Similarly, the wide definition of "terrorist acts" in 
Section 3 of the Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Act includes 
similar loose wording, which provide sub-section (3): "Whoever 
conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, 
advises...the commission of a terrorist act..."'^ 
Under Section 15 of Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Act, 
the Court will have to admit unreliable evidence in the form of 
'confessions' , which, in many cases, were allegedly extracted, by 
the police officers through illegal methods. Recognizing these 
danger the Supreme Court observed "whatever may be said for or 
against the submission with regard to admissibility of a 
confession before a police officer, we cannot avoid but saying 
that we...have frequently dealt with cases of atrocities and 
brutalities practiced by some over zealous police officers 
restoring to inhumane, barbaric, archaic and drastic methods of 
treating the suspect in their anxiety to collect evidence by hook or 
crook and wrenching a decision in their favor. We remorsefully 
like to state on few occasions even custodial deaths caused during 
interrogation are brought to our notice. . . ," 
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Section 15 considering "the gravity of 
terrorism unleashed by the terrorists and disruptionists" and the 
fact that the legislature was competent to make a law prescribing 
different rules of proof, even "though we at first impression 
thought of sharing the view of the learned counsel that it would 
be dangerous to make a statement given to a police officers 
admissible,... '^ Reacting the provisions of the Section 15 of 
TADA, two out of five Judges castigated this provision as unfair. 
Justice K. Ramaswamy observed that such a provision offends the 
principles of fair justice, shocks the conscience and violates 
fundamental fairness. He warned that if people lose their respect 
for the courts, their respect for law and order will vanish to the 
greater detriment of society. He therefore, held that Section 15 
was unfair, unjust and unconstitutional. Similar was the view 
expressed by the other Judge R.M. Sahai, who said the basic 
philosophy of a Sub-Inspector and a Superintendent of Police 
remains the same as both are interested in securing a confession 
from the accused. One Supreme Court Judge, however, dissented. 
He found that Section 15(1) is "unfair' unjust and 
unconscionable," offending Article 14 and 21 of the Indian 
constitution (guaranteeing, respectively, the right to equality 
before the law and the right to life and personal liberty). He 
found that from the Human Rights perspective, the history of the 
working of the provisions in the Evidence Act and the wisdom 
behind the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Section demonstrate 
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"inherent invalidity". He stressed that built fin procedural 
safeguards had to be scrupulously adhered to in recording 
confessions. "It is, therefore, concludes the Judge obnoxious to 
confer power on [a] police officer to record confessions under 
Section 15(1)."'* 
Justice K. Ramaswamy in his dissenting voice stressed that 
under Article 20(3) of the Indian constitution, "no person, 
accused of any offence, shall be compelled to be a witness against 
him self." Article 21 assures of right to life and personal liberty. 
It would be deprived only according to procedure validity 
established by law. Article 20 is not confined to individual or 
common law offences. It extends to statutory offences as well 
offences under the Act are statutory offences. As soon as a formal 
accusation constituting an offence under the Act has been made 
before S.H.O. or in a private complaint the person is entitled to 
the protection under Article 20(3) and 21 . Their violation, except 
in accordance with valid procedure established by law, are in 
violation of right to life assured by Article 21 of the Constitution 
of India. The standards of fairness in recording confessions under 
SectionlS (1) of the Act must be within constitutionally 
sustainable parameters. It is, therefore, obnoxious to confer 
power on police officer to record confession under Section 15(1). 
If he were entrusted with the solemn power to record a 
confession, the appearance of objectivity in the discharge of the 
statutory duty would be seemingly suspect and inspire no public 
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confidence. If the exercise of the power is allowed to be done 
once, may be conferred with judicial powers in a lesser crisis and 
to normalized in grave crisis, such an erosion is an anathema to 
rule of law, spirit of judicial review and a clear negation of 
Article 50 of the Constitution and the Constitutional creases. It is, 
therefore, unfair, unjust and unconscionable.'^ 
Justice R.M.Sahai, in a dissenting judgment, said that "A 
law entitles a police officer to record confession and makes it 
admissible is violative of both Article 20(3) and 21 of the Indian 
Constitution. Section 15 cannot be valid merely because it is the 
result of law made by a body which has been found entitled to 
make law. The law must still be fair and just ." He further said 
that a confession made to a police officer for an offence 
committed irrespective of its nature in non-notified area is 
admissible. But the same police officer is beyond reproach when 
it comes to notified area. An offence under Terrorist And 
Disruptive Activities Act is considered to be more serious as 
compared to the ones under Indian Penal Code or any other Act. 
Normally, graver the offence more strict the procedural 
interpretation. But here it is just otherwise. What is inadmissible 
for a murder under Section 302 is admissible even against the 
person who abet or is in possession of arms under Section5 of the 
Act. The method applied by police in extracting confession has 
been deprecated by the supreme court in series of decisions. But 
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all that changes overnight when Terrorist And Disruptive 
Activities Act was enacted. 
On the appointment of judges of Designated courts Section 
9(7) the Supreme Court in majority view held that the 
continuance of appointment of judges of Designated Court even 
after attainment of age of superannuating is not valid. However, 
supreme court suggested that the Government should appoint 
those judge in the Designated Court who have a sufficient tenure 
of service. 
Justice K.Ramaswami in a dissenting opinion on Section 
9(7) observed that a conjoint reading of Sections 9, 11 and 12 of 
the Act does not indicate to preserve the control or supervisions 
of the High Court over the Designated Courts or Judges holding 
the posts, though they were appointed initially with concurrence 
of chief justice of the concerned High Court. Section 19 of the 
Act provides an appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment, 
sentence or order of a Designated Court both on facts and under 
law. Control of the High Court over the judicial work of the judge 
or additional judge of the Designated Court was taken out. Thus it 
would be clear that appointment of Sessions or Additional 
Sessions Judge as Judge of the Designated Court under Section 
9(1) are outside of the scheme of the constitution and the Code 
but a creature of the Act. Sub-section 7 of Section 9 of the Act 
postulates its fulcrum without mincing any words that despite the 
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judge of a Designated Court attained the age of superannuation 
under rules applicable to him in the State judicial service, he 
shall be entitled to continue. In other words, the legislative 
intention is clear that though Designated Judge attained 
superannuation under the relevant rules applicable to him in his 
normal judicial service, he shall remain in service during the 
pleasure of Central or the appropriate State Government. It would 
foster the "pleasure doctrine" laying the seeds to bear fruits of 
poisoned tree to destroy independence and impartiality of justice 
which the Constitution of India consciously avoided. It is, 
therefore, unconstitutional. 
The operation of the judgment was postponed for a year to 
carry out the amendments relating to Sections 15(1) and 9(7) of 
the Act. The Court further ordered that if no amendments are 
effected within the stipulated period. Section 15(l)and Section 
9(7) would thereafter become void. The appointments made 
earlier were saved.^^ 
In other words, the legislative intention is clear that though 
Designated Judge attained superannuation under the relevant rules 
applicable to him in his normal judicial service as a Sessions or 
Additional Sessions Judge, he shall remain in service during the 
pleasure of the Central or the appropriate State Government. It 
would foster the "pleasure doctrine" laying the seeds to bear 
fruits of poisoned tree to destroy independence and impartiality 
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of justice which the Constitution of India consciously avoided, it 
is, therefore, unconstitutional. 
On the question of the validity of the Section 16(2), (3) of 
the Act, the Court held it as valid. It observed "generally 
speaking, when the accused persons are of bad character, the 
witnesses are unwilling to come forward to depose against such 
persons fearing harassment at the hands of those accused. The 
persons who are put for trail under the Act are terrorists and 
disruptionists. Therefore, the witnesses will be all the more 
reluctant and unwilling to depose at the risk of life. The 
Parliament having regard to such extraordinary circumstances has 
thought it fit that the identity and addresses of the witnesses shall 
not be disclosed." The court further added that, in order to 
ensure the purpose and object of cross-examination, the identity, 
names and address of the witnesses may be disclosed before the 
trial commences; but it should be subject to an exception that the 
Court, for weighty reasons in its wisdom, may decide not to 
disclose the identity and addresses of the witnesses especially of 
the potential witnesses whose lives may be in danger.^^ 
This would imply that the right of the accused to prove his 
innocence through cross examination of the witnesses was denied 
by the supreme court in the name of security of the life of the 
witness, which in effect amounts to denial of fair trail. All 
International covenants on Human Rights recognize the right of 
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fair trial of the accused. One of the serious objections against 
anonymous witness is that if the defense is unaware of the 
identity of the person it seeks to question, it may be deprived of 
the particulars to demonstrate that the witness is prejudiced, 
hostile and unreliable. Furthermore, a trail court cannot observe a 
witness demeanour under questioning and it thus becomes more 
difficult to form its own opinion of the reliability of the witness. 
The European court of Human Rights has affirmed that the use of 
the evidence of anonymous witness denies an accused person the 
right to a fair trial. The Australian Government was found to have 
violated the convention. The European Court held that a domestic 
Court may not rely on the evidence obtained from anonymous 
sources whom the defendant has not had the opportunity to 
challenge. 
On the issue of recording of confession under Section 20(3) 
Supreme Court held that "merely because the Executive 
Magistrate and Special Executive Magistrates are included along 
with the other Judicial Magistrates in Section 164(1)^^ of the 
Criminal Procedure Code and empowered them with the authority 
of recording confessions in relation to the case under TADA, it 
cannot be said that it is contrary to the accepted principles of 
criminal jurisprudence and that the Executive Magistrates and 
Special Magistrates are persons outside the ambit of the 
machinery for adjudication of criminal cases.""^ The court further 
said "the Executive Magistrates while exercising their judicial or 
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quasi-judicial functions though in a limited way within the frame 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which judicial functions are 
normally performed by Judicial Magistrates can be held to be 
holding the judicial office. Therefore, the plea that the 
conferment of judicial functions on the Executive Magistrates and 
Special Executive Magistrates is opposed to the fundamental 
principles of governance contained in Article 50 of the Indian 
Constitution cannot be countenanced. Resultantly, that sub-
section (3) of Section 20 of the TADA does not offend either 
Article 14 or 21 and hence this subsection does not suffer from 
any constitutional invalidity."^* The Court further observed that it 
was desirable that the Government follow certain guidelines in its 
application;^^ 
1. The confession should be recorded in a free atmosphere 
and in the same language in which the person is 
examined, and as narrated by him; 
2. The person making the confession should be produced 
before the Magistrate to whom the confession is required 
to be sent, along with the confessional statement without 
unreasonable delay; 
3. The said Magistrate should record any statement that 
such person may wish to make, get him top sign it, and 
where he complains of torture, direct him to be produced 
before a medical officer; 
4. No police officer below the rank of Assistant 
Commissioner of Police in the metropolitan areas or 
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Deputy Superintendent of Police elsewhere should be 
allowed to investigate any offence under the TADA; 
5. Where a person being interrogated asserts his right to 
remain silent, he should not be compelled to make a 
statement. 
The court further said "the sub section (8) of section 20 of 
TADA Act imposing the ban on temporary release of a person 
accused of any offence punishable under the Act or any rule made 
there under, but diluting the ban only on the fulfillment of the 
two conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of that sub 
section cannot be said to be infringing the principle adumbrated 
in Article 21 of the Constitution," 
Undoubtedly, liberty of a person must be zealously 
safeguarded by the Courts, nonetheless the Courts while 
dispensing justice in cases like the one under the TADA, should 
keep in mind not only the liberty of the accused but also the 
interests of the victims and their near and dear ones and the 
collective interests of the community and the safety of the nation 
so that the public may not lose faith in the system of judicial 
administration and indulge in private retribution.^' 
Furthermore, Section 5 of TADA raises an irrefutable 
presumption that if a person is found in unauthorized possession 
of arms in a "notified area" automatically connected with 
"terrorist" and "disruptive" activities. One supreme Court Judge, 
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R.M. Sahai, in his dissenting opinion on the above Section in the 
Kartar Singh case, described the arbitrary effect that inherently 
results from the departure from the ordinary rules of evidence 
which is made under Section 5, "mere possession of 
[unauthorized] arms and ammunitions specified in the Section has 
been made substantive offence it is much serious in nature and 
graver in impact as it results in prosecution of a man irrespective 
of his association or connection with terrorist activity The 
harshness of the provisions is apparent as all those provisions of 
the Act for prosecuting a person including forfeiture of property, 
denial of bail, etc. , are applicable to a person accused of 
possessing arms and ammunition as the one who is charged for an 
offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act [describing the Act 's 
main objective: "terrorist" and "disruptive" activities]. There can 
be no justification for possessing illegal arms but mere 
possession does not make a person a terrorist or disruptionist. It 
is necessary, that this Section, if it has to be immune from attack 
of arbitrariness, may be invoked only if there is some material to 
show that the person who was in possession of the arms and 
ammunition is really intended to use them for terrorist or 
disruptionist activities or that it was really used."^^ 
On the provision of the right to appeal, the Supreme Court 
in the Kartar Singh indeed recognized that "the indisputable 
reality is that the Supreme Court is beyond the reach of an 
average man/person considering the fact of distance, expenses 
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e t c . " " Inspite of the absence of an effective appeals machinery, 
the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Section 19^ *^ of the 
TADA, which facilitates police abuses. The majority view was 
that, "the practical difficulties faced by the aggrieved persons 
under the appeal provisions can be removed by the Parliament by 
devising a suitable mode of redress by making the necessary 
amendments in the appeal provisions. This does not, however, 
mean that the existing appeal provisions are constitutionally 
invalid."^^ One supreme court judge, in his dissenting opinion, 
held the right to appeal as restricted under TADA very often to be 
"illusory". This, he felt, could amount to a breach of 
constitutional guarantees. He further held that "today the 1987 
Act has been extended even to far off states. The effect of such 
extension is that for every sentence, one has to approach this 
court. In many cases, the remedy of appeal may be illusory. He 
[the convict] may not be able to approach this court because of 
enormous expenditure and exorbitant legal expenses involved in 
approaching this court, it should not be forgotten that our is a 
vast country with majority on the poor side. The knowledge of 
economic inability of sizable section of the society to approach 
this court by way of appeal may result in arbitrary exercise of 
power and excesses by the police, Inability to file appeal sue suits 
for financial reasons may amount to breach of guarantee under 
Article 14 an Article 21 of the Indian constitution. It may in many 
cases be denial of justice."^^ 
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In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others v. State of 
Maharashtra and others,^^ three meaningful questions, were 
raised before the Court. First, When can the provisions of the 
section 3(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act, 1987, 
(hereinafter referred to as the TADA) be attracted? Second, Is the 
1993 Amendment, amending section 167(2) of the code of 
Criminal Procedure by modifying section 20(4)(b) and adding a 
new provision as 20(4)(bb) , applicable to the pending cases i.e. 
is it retrospective in operation? And thirdly. What is the true 
ambit and scope of section 20(4) and section 20(8) of TADA in 
the matter of grant of bail to an accused brought before the 
Designated Court and the factors which the Designated Court has 
to keep in view while dealing with an application for grant of 
extension of time to the prosecution for further investigation 
under clause (bb) of section 20(4) and incidentally whether the 
conditions contained in section 20(8) of TADA control the grant 
of bail under section 20(4) of the Act also? 
The Constitution Bench noticed that the offences arising out 
of a terrorist or disruptive activity might overlap the offences 
covered by the ordinary penal law and dealing with the situation 
under which the provisions of TADA would be attracted observed, 
"as the Act tends to be very harsh and drastic containing the 
stringent provisions and provides minimum punishment^' and to 
some other offences enhanced penalties also. The provisions 
prescribing special procedures aiming at speedy disposal of cases. 
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departing from the procedures prescribed under the ordinary 
procedural law are evidently for the reasons that the prevalent 
ordinary procedural law was found to be inadequate and not 
sufficiently effective to deal with the offenders indulging in 
terrorist and disruptive activities, secondly that the incensed 
offences are arising out of the activities of the terrorist and 
disruptionists which disrupt or are intended to disrupt even the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or which may bring 
about or support any claim for the cession of any part of India 
from the union, and which create terror and a sense of insecurity 
in the minds of the people. Further, the Legislature being aware 
of the aggravated nature of the offences have brought this drastic 
change in the procedure under this law so that the object of the 
legislation may not be defeated and nullified." 
The court further observed that, this case involved, inter 
alia, the interpretation of the expression "terrorist act" as defined 
in section 2(1 )(h) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 
(prevention) Act 1987 and the circumstances under which a 
person can be charged with such an offence. The court expressed 
the view that, although it was not possible to give a precise 
definition of "terrorism", there were certain characteristics of 
terrorism, which were clearly identifiable. "There may be death, 
injury or destruction of property of even deprivation of individual 
liberties in the process but the extent and reach of the intended 
terrorist activities travels beyond the effect of an ordinary crime 
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capable of being punished under the ordinary penal law of the 
land, and its main objective is to overawe the Government or 
disturb harmony of the society or "terrorize" people and the 
society and only those directly assaulted, with a view to disturb 
[the] even tempo, peace and tranquility of the society and create a 
sense of fear and insecurity. A 'terrorist ' activity dose not merely 
arises by causing disturbance of law and order or of public order. 
The fallout of intended activity must be such that it travels 
beyond the capacity of the ordinary law enforcement agency to 
tackle it under the ordinary penal law." The court went on to hold 
that, "even though the crime committed by the ' terrorist ' and an 
ordinary criminal would be overlapping to an extent, it is not the 
intention of the legislature that every criminal should be tried 
under TADA, where the fallout of its activity dose not extend 
beyond the normal frontiers of the ordinary criminal activity. 
Every ' terrorist ' may be a criminal but every criminal cannot be 
given the label of a ' terrorist ' only to set in motion the more 
stringent provisions of the TADA. The criminal activity in order 
to invoke TADA must be committed with the requisite intention 
as contemplated by section 3(1) and which cause[s] or [is] likely 
to result in the offences as [sic] mention in the said section." The 
court stressed that the investigation agency had a duty to satisfy 
the Designated court that the entire requirement in the section 
3(1) had been satisfied in a given case for it to be pursued under 
TADA. "The true ambit and scope of section 3(1)," said the court, 
" is that no conviction ....can be recorded unless the evidence led 
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by the prosecution establishes that the offence was committed 
with the intention...envisaged by section 3(1), by means of 
weapons etc...enumerated in the section and was committed with 
the motive...postulated by the said section." 
The Designated Court finds, after taking cognizance of the 
offence, that the offence does not fall under TADA, it was 
obliged to transfer the case for trail to an ordinary court having 
jurisdiction over it. The court also examined the scope of the 
1993 amendment to the section 20(4)(b) of TADA which allowed 
the release of accused persons on bail if the investigations in 
their case had not been completed within 180 days. Noting that " 
the law enjoins upon the investigating agency to carry out the 
investigation... with utmost urgency and completed the 
investigation with great promptitude [within] the prescribed 
period," the court ruled that if this requirement was not compiled 
with, then the amended section 20(4)(b) created and indefeasible 
right in an accused person to seek an order for his release on bail, 
irrespective of the nature of the offence he is charged with. The 
section cast an obligation on the court to decline any request from 
the prosecution for a further remand of the accused in custody. 
The court was also obliged to inform the accused, on the expiry 
of the 180 days period, of his right to seek such release, but there 
was no obligation on the part of the court to order his release on 
its own. The only circumstances under which the court could 
continue an accused detention was where the prosecution was able 
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too show unequivocally that the investigation agency could not 
complete its investigations for the reason stated in section 
20(4)(bb). The court also read into Section 20(4) and held that, if 
an accused person applied to be released on bail at the end of the 
180 days period, the court would give notice to the public 
prosecutor of such application who may then show cause why it 
should not be granted. Similarly, if the public prosecutor applied 
for an extension of the detention of the accused under section 
20(4)(bb), the court would give notice of such application to the 
accused to enable him to make representation against it. Any 
application for grant of bail under section 20(4), said the court, 
had to be judged on its own merits uninfluenced by the merits or 
the gravity of the case." The court has no power to remand an 
accused to custody beyond the period prescribed by [section 
20(4)(b)]...only the ground that the accusation against the 
accused is of a serious nature of the offence is very grave." ^ ^ 
In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others*^ the Supreme Court 
concluded the issue with the conclusion, that an accused person 
seeking bail under section 20(4) has to make an application to the 
court for grant of bail on grounds of the 'default ' of the 
prosecution and the court shall release the accused on bail after 
notice to the public prosecutor uninfluenced by the gravity of the 
offence or the merits of the prosecution case since section 20(8) 
dose not control the grant of bail under section 20(4) of TADA 
and both the provisions operate in separate and independent 
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fields. It is, however, permissible for the public prosecutor to 
resist the grant of bail by seeking an extension under clause (bb) 
by filling a report for the purpose before the court. However, no 
extension shall be granted by the court without notice to an 
accused to have his say regarding the prayer for grant of 
extension under clause (bb). In view of this, it is immaterial 
whether the application for bail on the ground of 'default ' under 
section 20(4) is filed first or the report as envisaged by clause 
(bb) is filed by the public prosecutor first so long as both are 
considered while granting or refusing bail. If the period 
prescribed by clause (b) of section 20(4) has expired and the 
court does not grant an extension on the report of the public 
prosecutor made under clause (bb), the court shall release the 
accused on bail as it would be an indefeasible right of the accused 
to be so released. Even where the court grants an extension under 
the clause (bb) but the charge sheet is not filed within the 
extended period, the court shall have no option but to release the 
accused on bail, if he seeks it and is prepared to furnish the bail 
as directed by the court. Moreover, no extension can be granted 
by the Designated Court under the clause (bb), except on a report 
of the public prosecutor nor can extension be granted for reasons 
other than those specifically contained in clause (bb), which must 
be in construed."'*^ The Court further said that the Designated 
Court would have "no jurisdiction to deny to an accused his 
indefeasible right to be released on bail on account of the default 
of the prosecution to file the challan within the prescribed time if 
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an accused seeks and is prepared to furnish the bail bond as 
directed by the court"; and that a *notice' to the accused is 
required to be given by the Designated Court before it grants any 
extension under the further proviso beyond the prescribed period 
of 180 days for completing the investigation. 
In Sanjay Dutt,'^^ the charges against the petitioner were 
many including those under the TADA Act, of which section 5 
thereof is one. The prosecution on the testimony of certain 
witnesses, incriminating circumstances and an un-retracted 
confession places reliance on the petitioner himself. In the said 
confession, which has remained un-retracted, the petitioner 
admitted receiving three AK-56 rifles along with ammunition 
from the persons adding that two days later he returned two of 
them but retained only one for the purpose of self-defense. The 
petitioner further stated that in view of the tense communal 
situation as a result of the incident at Ayodhya and the serious 
threats given to petitioner's father, for his active role in steps 
taken to restore communal harmony and serious -threat to the 
petitioner's family. The petitioner agreed to obtain and keep one 
AK-56 rifle with ammunition for protection of his family. In 
short, the petitioner's statement is that his possession of the rifle 
with ammunition was necessitated by self defense and nothing to 
do with terrorist activity and, therefore, mere unauthorized 
possession of weapons and ammunition by him in these 
circumstances cannot constitute an offence under section 5 of the 
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TADA Act, and has to be dealt with only under the Arms Act, 
1959. The petitioner prayed for release on bail. The Designated 
Court, however, refused to grant bail to the petitioner. The 
special leave petitions are against the order of the Designated 
Court, in substance, for the grant of bail to the petitioner. 
The supreme court observed that; the ingredient off the 
offence punishable under section 5 of the TADA Act are; 
Possession of any of the specified arms and ammunition etc., 
unauthorizedly, and in a "notified area". 
If these ingredients of the offence are proved, then the 
accused shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other 
law for the time being in force, be punishable with imprisonment 
for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may 
extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.'^ 
In the context the word 'possession' must mean possession 
with the requisite mental element, that is, conscious possession 
and not mere custody without the awareness of the nature of such 
possession. There is a mental element in the concept of 
possession. Accordingly, the ingredient of possession' in section 
5 of the TADA Act means conscious possession. This is how the 
ingredient of possession in similar context of a statutory offence 
importing strict liability on account of mere possession of an 
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unauthorized substance has been understood. The unauthorized 
possession in the context means without the authority of law.*^ 
The court relied on the unauthorized possession in a notified 
area of "any arms and ammunition" specified in columns 2 and 3 
of Category I or Category III (a) of the Scheduled "or bombs or 
dynamite or other explosive substances" is forbidden, the word 
'and ' instead of 'or ' is used in the expression "any arms and 
ammunition specified..." because reference to both is made as 
specified in the schedule. For this reason, the words "arms and 
ammunition" are not to be read conjunctively. This is further 
evident from the fact that the disjunctive 'or ' is used while 
describing other forbidden substances like bombs etc. it means 
the forbidden substances, the unauthorized possession of any of 
which in a notified area is an offence under section 5, are any of 
the specified arms or its ammunition or bombs or dynamite or 
other explosive substances. Unless these words are read 
disjunctive instead of conjunctively in this manner, the object of 
prohibiting unauthorized possession of the forbidden arms and 
ammunition would be easily frustrated by the simple device of 
one person carrying the forbidden arms and his accomplice 
carrying its ammunition so that neither is covered by section 5 
when any one of them carrying both would be so liable.'*^ 
The court also said that the section 2(l)(f) defines "notified 
area" to mean such area as the state Government may, by 
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notification in the official gazette, specify. The state 
Government's power to notify an area under section 2(1 )(f) must 
have relation to curbing terrorist and disruptive activities in the 
notified area, otherwise the state Government's power would be 
unfettered and unguided which would render section 5 vulnerable. 
A specified area is declared to be a notified area by the state 
Government under section 2(1 )(f) of the TADA Act with 
reference to the fact that a notified area is treated to be more 
prone to the commission and escalation of terrorist and disruptive 
activities. This is the basis for classification of 'a notified area' 
differently from the non-notified areas and it has a reasonable 
nexus with the object of classification. Such activities must, 
therefore have a bearing on the constitution of any special 
offence confined to the area. Declaration of a specified area as a 
notified area by the state government is based on its satisfaction, 
subjective in nature that the area is prone to terrorist and 
disruptive activities and its escalation. This opinion of the state 
government has to be formed necessarily with reference to 
facts relating to incidents of terrorist and disruptive activities, for 
the prevention of which check on the influx of the specified arms 
and ammunition etc. in that area, is the object of enacting section 
5 for otherwise it would be put to proof in every case. This is the 
true significance of the third ingredient of the offence under 
section S.'*^  
135 
TAPA ^rxi Jucjici^l Response 
However, the supreme court did not wish to go quite that 
far, judgment of 9'** September 1994, it was not necessary for the 
prosecution to produce such evidence of intended use, once 
conscious possession of unauthorized arms in a notified area had 
been established. The supreme court held that the accused, 
despite the wording of Section 5 of the Act which raises an 
irrebuttable presumption, has a right to prove his innocence by 
providing evidence that, although he possessed unauthorized 
arms, these were in fact not used or meant to be used for 
"terrorist" or "disruptive" activities. The court reportedly rejected 
the State's argument that mere conscious possession of 
unauthorized arms in a notified area was sufficient for conviction 
under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act and 
that no further defence by the accused was required. However, the 
Supreme Court did not question that it was the accused who had 
the burden of proving his innocence of intended use under 
Sections, contrary to what ordinary legal procedures require. 
Once "conscious possession unauthorisedly in a notified area" of 
any arms and ammunition had been established by the 
prosecution, in view of the statutory presumption, "No further 
nexus of his [the accused's] unauthorized possession of the same 
with any specific terrorist or disruptive activities is required to be 
proved by the prosecution for providing the offence under Section 
5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act.""** 
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Section 20 (4)(bb) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 
(Prevention) Act only requires production of the accused before 
the court in accordance with section 167 (1) of the code of 
criminal procedure and this is how the requirement of notice to 
the accused before granting extension beyond the prescribed 
period of 180 days in accordance with the further provision of 
clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of section 20 of the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act has to be understood in the 
light of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Supreme Court 
in Hitendra Vishnu ThakurJ^^ The requirement of such notice to 
the accused before granting the extension for completing the 
investigation is not a written notice to the accused giving reasons 
therein. Production of the accused at that time in the court 
informing him that the question of extension of the period for 
completing the investigation is being considered, is alone 
sufficient for the purpose/^ 
Conclusion: 
In the prosecution for an offence punishable under section 5 
of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, the 
prosecution is required to prove that the accused was in conscious 
'possession' , 'unauthorisedly', in a 'notified area' of any arms 
and ammunition specified in columns 2 and 3 of the category I or 
Category III (a) of Schedule I of the Arms Rules, 1962 or bombs, 
dynamite or other explosive substances. No further nexus with 
any terrorist or disruptive activity is required to be proved by the 
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prosecution in view of the statutory presumption indicated earlier. 
The accused in his defense is entitled to prove the non-existence 
of a fact constituting any of these ingredients. As a part of his 
defense, he can prove by adducing evidence, the non-existence of 
the fact constituting the third ingredient as indicated earlier to 
rebut the statutory presumption. The accused is entitled to prove 
by adducing evidence that the purpose of his unauthorized 
possession of any such arms and ammunition etc. was wholly 
unrelated to any terrorist or disruptive activity. If the accused 
succeeds in proving the absence of the said third ingredient, then 
his mere unauthorized possession of any such arms and 
ammunition etc. is punishable only under the general law by 
virtue of the Section 12 of the*Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 
(Prevention) Act and not under Section 5. 
The "indefeasible right" of the accused to be released on the 
bail in accordance with Section 20(4)(bb) of the Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act read with Section 167(2) 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of completion of the 
investigation and filing of the challan within the time allowed, as 
held in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur^^ is a right which ensure to, and 
is enforceable by the accused only from the time of default till 
the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain 
enforceable on the challan being filed. If the accused applies for 
bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or 
the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be 
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released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may 
be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The right of the accused to be 
released on bail after filling of the challan, notwithstanding the 
default in filing it within the time allowed, is governed from the 
time of filing of the challan only by the provisions relating to the 
grant of bail applicable at that stage. 
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TADA: USE, MISUSE AND ABUSE 
The Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (Prevention Act) 
1985 enacted to deal with the terrorists and disruptive activities, 
has done more harm than good. It not only contravenes the 
international human rights standards (as we have already 
discussed in the previous Chapter) but also much more draconian 
than the pre-independence preventive detention Act and the 
Rowlett Act. Apparently, the situation in Punjab, Assam and 
Kashmir promoted the Government of India to enact this Act, in 
the interest of the nation, but instead of improving the situation, 
it got further deteriorated in States like Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, 
West Bengal, Rajasthan and Maharashtra. The disease aggravated 
with each dose of medicine. The infamous Rowlett Act was no 
liberal document, but it seems so today compared to the laws 
enacted, ostensibly to deal with terrorism. The Rowlett Report 
frowned on preventive detention and said, "If in the supreme 
interests of the community, the liberty of individuals is taken 
away, an asylum must be provided of a different order from a 
ja i l ." ' The hated Rowlett Act 1919 was more liberal than TADA. 
The Rowlett Act can be divided in three parts, first, trial by 
special Courts for specified offences; second, power to direct 
execution of bond for good behaviour, internment within the city, 
reporting at police station, and abstention from specified acts; 
and lastly, power of arrest without warrants, preventive detention 
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and search of places. An analysis of the Rowlett Act would bring 
to surface that it has more concern for the human rights even 
during the Colonial rule than the present legislation in a 
democratic set up. 
(1) The provincial Government, which desire to setup 
special courts to try an accused, had first ' to prefer a written 
communication to the Chief Justice (of the High Court) against 
such person' . It had to set out 'all particulars within the 
knowledge of prosecution of what is intended to be proved 
against the accused.' The Chief Justice could ask for "further 
particulars" and direct a copy of the information to be served on 
the accused. This initial judicial check (Section 4) is altogether 
absent in the Act of 1985. 
(2) The Rowlett Act enjoined the Chief Justice to nominate 
three High Court judges for trial. The Act of 1985 is content with 
a Sessions Judge appointed by the Government with the 
concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court (Section 7). 
(3) The Act of 1919 and 1985 did away with the committal 
proceedings before a magistrate as preliminary to the trial. But 
the Rowlett Act of 1919 requires the prosecutor to open the case 
setting out the evidence, which he expected to adduce. The 
procedure had to be as in a warrant case (Section 8). The Act of 
1985 permit trial by summary procedure (Section 12) where an 
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offence is punishable for a term not exceeding three years or with 
fine or both. 
(4) The 1985 Act enjoins secret trials except if the public 
prosecutor deigns to opt otherwise. The court has no discretion 
(section 13). The Act of 1919 left the normal discretion of the 
court untouched and empowered it only to prohibit or restrict 
publication of reports of the proceedings (Section 11). 
(5) Under the Rowlett Act, a sentence of death could be 
imposed only if all the three judges of High Court so ordered 
(Section 16) but the 1985 Act enables a Session Judge to impose 
death sentence. 
(6) The present Act permits an appeal directly to the 
Supreme Court on the facts and the law (Section 16), by-passing 
the High Courts. The Act of 1919 however, barred appeals; hence 
the popular discontent against the Act expressed in the slogan " 
No vakil, no dalil (argument), no appeal.'" 
(7) The Rowlett Act empowered the Chief justice to make 
rules regarding bail etc. (Section 20), but the 1985 Act forbid bail 
as a rule [Section 17(5)] unless 'the Court is satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not 
guilty' and is not 'likely to commit any offence while on bail. ' 
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(8) The Rowlett Act empowered the local Government to 
order a person to execute a bond for good behaviour; notify his 
residence; confine him to a particular area; report himself to a 
police station at intervals; and to 'abstain himself from any act so 
specified (in the order) v^hich, in the opinion of the local 
Government, is calculated to disturb the public peace' etc. but 
these orders could be made only after 'a judicial officer who is 
qualified for appointment to a High Court' had given his opinion. 
No such safeguards exist in the Act of 1985 (Section 5). 
(9) It is extremely important to note that even in regard to 
preventive detention, the Rowlett Act provided an initial judicial 
curb, which was never provided in any of the detention law of 
free India. The Act directed the Government//>*/ to 'place all the 
materials in its possession relating to the detenu's case before a 
judicial officer who is qualified for appointment to a High Court 
and to take his opinion -thereon' (Section 34). 
(10) After detention, it provided the same remedies as those 
available to persons against whom the directives had been issued; 
namely, a concise statement of the grounds together with 'all 
material facts and circumstances' be given to the person, plus a 
right to appear before a three member body (two of them had to 
be former district or sessions judges, and the third, a private 
individual) and offer his defense. The Act of 1985 had no such 
safeguards. 
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INDISCRIMINATE USE OF TADA: -
A dispassionate review of the working of TADA reveals that 
far from checking terrorism, it has led to police excesses and also 
targeted political opponents. Judicial review is deliberately kept 
aside. The People Union for Democratic Rights and other Human 
rights organizations have, time and again, attempted to chronicle 
the immense human suffering that the TADA inflicted on 
hundreds of ordinary men and women. This suffering was not an 
outcome of 'stray cases of abuse' , but built into the very 
structure of the law. The very fact that there were wide spread 
protests, all over India, which no other law has attracted, is a 
pointer to its arbitrariness, ultimately leading to its termination in 
1995. Like Banquo's ghost, it is still haunting those, who are 
languishing in jails under this 'dead' Act. It has failed on all 
fronts, be it the investigation process, police excesses, terrorism 
or easy convictions. It has the most abysmal record of 
convictions. Over the years, the indiscriminate use of TADA Act 
has only succeeded in making the suspicion of the people stronger 
about the bonafides of the justice system so much so that the 
Home Minister, S. B. Chavan admitted in the Rajya Sabha that his 
ministry had written to all Chief Ministers to review all TADA 
cases. "This law was meant only to curb terrorist activities. 
Unfortunately, number of Chief Ministers misused it in-spite of 
the direction issued by his ministry. Ultimately, action is to be 
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taken by the State Governments. We can only request them. After 
all, we have a federal structure."^ An official admission of gross 
abuse is also evident from the 27'*" July 1994 letter, in which S. B. 
Chavan reportedly stressed that the Act should not be invoked 
against political dissenters, trade union leaders, journalists, 
former judges and civil servants, as it had been in the past. 
Speaking in the Rajya Sabha, Meen Afzal of Janta Dal criticize 
the Act as "TADA had become a form of 'TA/DA' (Traveling 
Allowance/Dearness Allowance) for the police. It was alleged that 
the Bombay police resorted to pressurizing people to name 
accomplices in the Bombay blast case. The minorities were the 
worst sufferer." The, then Minister of State for Internal Security, 
Rajesh Pilot, admitted in Bombay that States were misusing 
TADA, that the Centre had declared them to monitor the cases 
because it had been brought to its notice that the Act was misused 
mainly to harass the minorities. Its purpose was to curb anti-
national activities, but unfortunately it had been misused 
extensively against Muslims."* In September 1994, the Home 
Minister said that the Act 'meant for terrorists ' had been used on 
wide scale to detain thousands of people, including common 
criminals. He reportedly conceded that despite his earlier letters 
and instructions to the Chief Ministers, the law continued to be 
misused.^ The Act was misused even in the States affected by 
insurgency. Some indirect evidence of this can be had from the 
fact that, at the end of 1991, in Punjab, where only a small 
fraction of the population indulged in militancy, there were 6,206 
150 
TAPA: Use, Misuse ^ nciAbuse 
detenus, while in Assam, where the involvement of people is even 
much smaller, there were 7,130 detenus. In Delhi alone 838 
persons were arrested under this Act ironically, in Kashmir there 
were only 688 TADA detenus.^ 
The Act extended gradually to 22 out of the 25 states 
besides two (Chandigarh and Delhi) Union territories out of 
seven. It covers 93 per cent of the country's population. It was 
Central Legislation but implemented by the States. It was 
frequently invoked to curb political activists,^ leaders of farmer's 
movements,* students,^ lawyers,'^ journal is ts ," and creative 
writers and even a former judge involved in human rights 
issues. It has been invoked where normal laws sufficed. 
The number of arrests under this law itself has become a 
subject matter of controversy, while various civil liberty 
organizations put the figure at 53000 ever since the TADA was 
enforced but the Minister of State for Home Affairs, Rajesh Pilot, 
claimed the figure was only 10,504 up to June 1994.''' Whatever 
be the truth as regards the number of arrests, nearly 30 to 60 per 
cent charged under TADA belonged to 'non-problem' States and 
had hardly anything to do with terrorism or disruptive activities. 
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Table: - 1 
State/Union Territory 
Andhra Pradesh 
Aninachal Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Chandigaiii 
Delhi 
Goa 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Janimu and Kashmir 
Kamataka 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Manipur 
Maghalaya 
Mizoram 
Nagaland 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Tripura 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
Grand Total 
Noc 
10-9-89 
2143 
24 
1270 
NF 
400 
160 
NF 
4491 
275 
19 
669 
10 
110 
379 
654 
NG 
NG 
NG 
7969 
59 
NF 
NF 
130 
524 
192S6 
tf detentions 
31-3-90 
2389 
29 
4593 
15 
NG 
NG 
NF 
6449 
366 
21 
983 
NG 
NG 
426 
766 
NG 
NG 
NG 
9552 
90 
NF 
NF 
157 
525 
26261 
under TADA as on 
31-3-91 
2931 
38 
7098 
32 
NG 
NG 
NF 
12526 
525 
41 
1213 
NG 
NG 
593 
857 
NG 
NG 
NG 
12180 
300 
NF 
NF 
230 
525 
39089 
15-
2-93 
5614 
88 
10779 
190 
NG 
NG 
NG 
14094 
916 
55 
1826 
26 
103 
1125 
1003 
NG 
NG 
NG 
14457 
422 
147 
47 
851 
525 
5226«| 
S*«rc«: ParliameDt Replies; relevant volumes 
Note: NG: — The Act is in force but the figures were not 
given. 
NF:—The Act was not in force till date (mentioned) 
152 
TAPA: Use, Misuse 3n4 Abuse 
The table given here is based on the data provide by the Union Home 
Ministry in various Parliamentary Debates. At best they indicate the 
minimum number of the detentions under the Act. The following factors 
have to be kept in mind while making use of the data. 
(1) Data cent by the State Governments to the Centre is not always 
complete. Nor does it refer to the same time period always. Some 
Governments simply did not send the data. 
(2) Data does not make it clear whether the figures include people, who 
were released on bail, or against whom cases are withdrawn, or against 
whom cases are not being pursued. It is also not clear whether those 
acquitted subsequently are being counted as those arrested under the Act 
initially. More complicated is the case of those who are convicted on other 
charges but are acquitted of TADA charges. In other words we do not know 
whether these figures are gross or net. 
(3) A more reliable source, to gather the data is that of the National 
Crime Records Bureau, but it began monitoring TADA cases only since 
1990, therefore, it does not give the complete picture. 
(4) To have a clear and complete picture of the implementation of the 
Act, one should have the total number of arrests actually made at one time 
or other, whatever be the aftermath of arrest. These figures would certainly 
be more than what this table gives here. The lack of reliable information is 
perhaps part of the scheme of misinformation campaign on TADA. 
Signif icantly, States that do not figure in the Government 
specified list of "problem Sta tes" have widely used the Act. The 
most notable example is Gujarat, which ranks first in de ta in ing 
people under TADA inspite of Union Home Minis te r But ta 
S ingh ' s assurance that TADA will not be misused . The Cen te r ' s 
assurances about the jud ic ious use of TADA have been honored 
only in the breach. The next Union Minis te r for Home, P. 
Chidambaram also observed in categor ical te rms " th i s law is very 
unusual and must be invoked rarely and only in the very special 
c i rcumstances to avoid abuse." '^ But contrary to all a ssurances , 
the State has used it to crush fa rmer ' s movemen t s , labour 
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problems and protests over price hike. The anti-terrorist act was 
first used widely against BJP workers in Baroda after Communal 
violence. Then it was the turn of agitating Bharatiya Kisan Sangh 
activists, 240 of whom were booked under TADA during their 
'rasta roko' agitation. Of them, 204 were from Junagadh district 
alone. The reason of their arrest was that the Superintendent of 
Police was injured in stone throwing.*^ Till October 1987, as 
many as 2,230 people, including 50 children and women, have 
been arrested under this Act as the State Government has 
ruthlessly used it to crush dissent. M. M. Singh (Director General 
of Police), a no nonsense IPS officer reputed for his integrity, has 
been held responsible for the Act 's misuse. In May 1987, he has 
been directing his officers to use it. "But," says an officer, "even 
instances of communal violence, other laws, if implemented 
seriously, are adequate to deal with the situation." It is an 
exhibition of police arrogance that TADA was also used to arrest 
a blind man, a mentally retarded man, and two others above 75 
years old, during farmer's agitation.'^ But for the judiciary, the 
situation could have gone worse, of the 2,230 persons charged 
under the Act till the third week of October, the Court released 
1800 on bail; which only indicates the extent of the Act 's misuse. 
While releasing people charged under the TADA protesting 
against the transfer of the local municipal Commissioner, S. 
Jagdishan, Special Judge of Rajkot, Justice B. K. Shah observed 
that "if such indiscriminate use of TADA continues, the 
impression created among the masses that the State is heading 
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towards a police raj cannot be said to be totally baseless." If this 
is carried on, "democracy will be in great danger." He directed 
that 'a procedure be adopted by which the police obtain the 
opinion of the Chief Public Prosecutor before resorting to 
TADA.'^* 
According to Raoof ValiuUah, Chairman, Gujarat State 
Minorities Board, the State Government is using TADA in 
"flagrant violation of the existing Constitutional safeguards given 
to minorities" under the pretext of maintaining law and order. 
Twenty-three Muslims were arrested under TADA only ten days 
before the Ghodhara by-election for their alleged involvement in 
the Veerpur Balasinur riots, which broke out a year ago. The local 
police sub-inspector had instruction from the Government to 
oppose their bail application in the Court. In the Bharuch 
constituency of the PCC (I) president, Ahmed Patel, nineteen 
people belonging to the minorities were arrested under the TADA 
on the eve of the elections. It is reliably learnt that the Sessions 
judge, Surat, while throwing out the TADA application moved 
against them by the police severely indicted the Government as, 
there was "no evidence of subversive or disruptive activities 
against them." ' ' During the communal violence several innocent 
persons fell victims to this very Act. One such case was, the 
arrest of Siayad, who lived in the Khanpur area of the city, when 
he went out to bring his brother home following a stone throwing 
incident between Hindu and Muslims. The police charged him 
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under TADA.^^ He was, however, not alone, seventy others, (vast 
majority of Muslims), were booked under the law. The ordeal of 
the men picked up in Khanpur has been particularly traumatic. 
They were brutally beaten up by the police after being 
incarcerated. Even age was no bar to the police. Fifteen years old, 
Anwarkhan Pathan, says the scars will remain forever: "we will 
never forget the time in jail . It still gives us night-mares."^' 
There was another instance, in which 47 people were 
charged under the TADA in Ansarnagar, a predominantly 
Muslim locality. The charges against them includes the use of 
"bombs and the spreading of terror." But investigation revealed 
that what the police described as bombs were, in fact, simple 
crackers. People of this locality fixed these crackers inside a 
small tin box, which exploded creating noise. Muslims residents 
in Ansarnagar say they resorted to using these "mechanism" to 
scare away their attackers during communal riots. In other 
instance, TADA was allegedly applied against a 12-year-old boy 
in Baroda, who was actually trapped in a mosque during the 
communal riots,^^ Even prostitutes were detained under this Act.^ "* 
Harpal Singh Jhala, a criminal lawyer, says, "What the police are 
doing in Gujarat is unconstitutional. Even worse, is that TADA is 
being invoked mostly against Muslims, who are already the 
victims of the communal violence." But the State Director 
General of Pol ice, B.S.Nirula, is adamant; "TADA is the prime 
factor behind the peace currently prevailing in the State after 
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some horrific riots." There could have been two possibilities of 
the use of TADA in Gujarat, either the police are pursuing their 
own communal agenda by booking the particular section of the 
society under the pretext of combating communalism or they 
genuinely believed that TADA is the best way to contain 
communal violence, which was not true. The Chief Minister 
admitted, "We are compelled to apply this Act in case of persons 
arrested in Gujarat." It was this action that has brought 
disrepute to Constitutionalism, democracy and the Rule of Law. 
In 1993, Ashok Tondon (DGP), 'attributes the high usage of 
TADA to the communal riots. It was pointed out that more than 
1600 people were booked under TADA in the two months during 
which communal disturbances rocked the city following the 
demolition of the Babri Mosque on 6 December 1992. The law 
was used more to deal with situations arising out of 'communal 
conflicts', rather than terrorism, which could have been dealt with 
under the ordinary laws. It only helped the police to use of the 
wide range of discriminatory powers under the Act. Statistics 
reveal that since the introduction of TADA in 1985, as many as 
2,990 cases were registered under the Act and 13,152 people 
booked. [The number of those booked is 14,094 as per the records 
of the Union Home Ministry]. Out of these, 12,816 had been 
either released on bail or have been acquitted by the Special 
Courts or let off by the Home department after a review of the 
cases till February 1993. kccordimg Xo the DGP office of Gujarat, 
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till 1993, 410 prisoners booked under TADA are languishing in 
various jails in the State awaiting trial. Most of them are those 
arrested during the last bout of communal riots. 
The situation of the other States was not different. TADA, 
which was initially meant to curb terrorist activities in some parts 
of Punjab, was utilized in almost all States. It was used in 
Maharashtra "to curb gang feuds and terrorism." The Chief 
Minister, Sharad Power, in the Legislative Assembly, justified its 
use on account of increased criminal activities in Bombay and 
Thane due to free availability of illegal weapons and prompt legal 
respite available to criminals. Datta Samant, trade union leader 
and ex-member of Parliament said "when the Act was introduced 
in the Parliament, it aimed at the Punjab situation as the 
Government was finding it difficult to prosecute terrorists, no one 
would give evidence against the terrorists. The Government 
assured that it would never be used elsewhere as TADA is not 
needed in other States (except, may be, Kashmir)." Thangappan, 
Bombay trade unionist and working president of the Kamani 
Employees Union, reiterates Samant's stand, stating that the Act 
is being used against workers. He cites the examples of Paithan, 
where in April 1990, forty-five workers of Universal Luggage 
Company were detained under TADA. One of them, Vishwas 
Bhagwan Lotange was tortured for 15 days and when he was 
taken to a private hospital, he was declared dead. According to 
the doctor 's report, his body was full of wells and marks of 
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cigarette burns.^^ The police and the administration agree that till 
now they were fighting criminals with their hands tied behind 
their backs, but the new legislation will arm them to deal directly 
with the criminals and to curb the criminal activities. Police says 
some time ago the Act was used in Ahmedabad against the 
workers of Reliance Industries when they went on strike 
demanding the implementation of the Industrial Tribunal Award. 
The police justify the law by blaming the Courts for bailing out 
people under other preventive detention laws, like the NSA. 
All Governments, irrespective of political complexion, at 
one time or the other, inspite of the availability of various 
preventive detention laws in the State, had used the Act. The fact 
is, that if the administration wants to use them against the 
criminals the already available preventive detention laws were 
sufficient. Even without such laws people are beaten up in 
custody, as was the case of Raju Mohitya. And with TADA the 
situation turned worse. The more severe the law, the more likely 
it is to be misused and the police are armed with powers without 
proper checks, they will take the shortest route possible to show 
their effectiveness, by hook or crook. This was exactly the case 
with TADA. 
The press had reported that after the Bombay bombing in 
March 1993 over 150 people were detained under TADA, who 
could have been tried under the ordinary law.^^ There is a report 
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that prior to 15 July 1993, 121 people described as "gangsters" 
had been booked under TADA.^^ The Indian Express reported that, 
there were 189 accused for their alleged involvement in the 
Bombay bombings, but that 45 of them absconding, including the 
alleged ringleaders and planners, 121 were in custody and 23 
were out on bail.^' The accused had often made complaints in the 
Court and many of the detainees had subsequently retracted 
confessions allegedly extracted by police. It was also alleged that 
a number of the accused had been threatened by the police not to 
contact lawyers. One was said to have been told; "if you contact a 
lawyer or complaint about your treatment, we will take your 
relatives in custody, or we will arrange a confrontation with one 
of your relatives and they will be killed." Consequently, the 
Court admits unreliable evidence, which in many cases, allegedly 
consists of confessions extracted under torture or ill treatment. 
On 7 May 1993, Justice J.N.Patil, of the Designated Court sitting 
under TADA, ordered the medical examination of Shaikh Aziz, 
son of Mohammed, after he had told the judge "that he was hit by 
a belt in the night and has been warned not to disclose it to the 
Court otherwise he will be shot and that he should also say that 
he does not want to engage any advocate."^^ In an other report, 
charges against 198 in the blast case were dismissed (as published 
in the Times of India, April 11, 1995) by the Designated Court 
(Justice J.N.Patil) on the ground that "sufficient material was not 
there to proceed against those involved in the transportation, 
loading, and unloading of arms and explosives consignment that 
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landed at Dighi and Shikhadi (Bombay in January and February 
1993), justice Patil stated that dropping of proposed charges by 
the prosecution under Sections 121 and 121-A of the Indian Penal 
Code is justified. However, it is expressed that, better late than 
never the innocent persons are discharged. As on June 30, 1994, 
the total number of persons arrested under TADA had crossed 
76,000. Of these, the police dropped 25 per cent without framing 
any charges. Trials were completed in about 35 per cent of cases 
that were actually brought to trial. Ninety five per cent of these 
trials ended in acquittals, and only about 1 per cent of the 
arrested ended up being convicted. 
The situation in Kashmir was no different. The Government 
itself has admitted in a reply on I January 1991 that the total 
number of persons arrested was 4593 of which 2044 under TADA. 
It means nearly 55 per cent were detained under other laws. But 
in reply to another question, to how many terrorists had been 
arrested in Kashmir, the answer was 124. It means that out of 
2044 arrested under TADA, only 124 were terrorists. The record 
of Jammu & Kashmir was pathetic. A written reply by the 
ministry of Home Affairs to the Parliament on 21 February shows 
that although 20,000 TADA cases were filed no one has been 
convicted. A newspaper write-up concerning those detained under 
TADA in Jammu & Kashmir record how, "the Deputy 
Commissioner and Superintendent of Police had... deposed before 
the Court that they were made to sign on the dotted line by the 
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agencies detaining militants."^"* Out of 20,000 cases 11,000 cases 
were dropped after preliminary investigation; 2,000 cases were 
dropped under Section 169 of Criminal Procedure Code due to 
lack of evidence, 1,400 persons were freed on parole and 1,500 
were granted bail, 778 cases involving 1,504 alleged militants are 
pending.^^ The rate of conviction is too low under the TADA 
inspite of large-scale arrests. The low conviction rate testifies to 
its misuse and abuse. The actual rate of conviction under this Act 
(according to available figure) is given below. 
TADA: DETENTIONS AND CONVICTIONS 
Table-2 
Period 
1990 
1985-March 1991 
1985- March 1993 
1985-Dec. 1990 
1985-March 1992 
1985-June 1994 
Area 
India 
India 
India 
Gujarat 
Punjab 
India 
Arrested 
5685 
35538 
52998 
11957 
14007 
76000 
Convicted 
. 
318 
434 
99 
52 
760 
%Age 
0.75 
0.89 
0.81 
0.82 
0.37 
1 
Source: 
1. Rajya Sabha Debate; 6 Augl991 
2. Lok Sabha Debate; 9 Aug 1991 
3. Lok Sabha Debate; 12 Aug 1991 
4. Lok Sabha Debate; 14 Aug 1993 
5. Crime in India, 1990, National Crime Record Bureau, 
Ministry of Home, Government of India. 
6. Home Department; Gujarat and Punjab, 
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TADA And the Police: -
The image of the police in the public eye, by and large, is 
depressing. Independence brought very little change in the 
mindset of the police, especially the rank and file. The colonial 
legacy still haunts the police. T|ie political leaders are equally 
responsible for sustaining this colonial attitude. The political 
interference in the administration, more so in the police 
functioning, have made the police thoroughly inefficient and 
partisan. This becomes evidence during several human rights 
groups and civil liberties organizations have focused the blatant 
misuse of TADA, by the police at the behest of the powers that 
be. 
The case of Shahid Siddiqui,^^ an Urdu Journalists is one 
such instance. Siddiqui was arrested for publishing an interview 
with Jagjit Singh Chauhan, the self-styled president of 
'Khalistan' . After his arrest, he was taken to the local police 
station where the Station House Officer interrogated him and later 
shifted to the Red Fort for further interrogation and then to the 
Tihar Jail. According to Rakesh Luthra, one of the Siddiqui 's 
lawyers, "what is dangerous about the Act is that it seeks to break 
down the basic tenets of criminal procedure and the rule of 
evidence that exist to protect the accused. Also the definition of 
terrorism and disruptive activities is so vague that anyone can be 
trapped."^^ 
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In other instances, two members of the Shrimoni Gurdwara 
Prabandhak Committee were arrested under the Act of 1985 in 
Delhi.^* They belonged to the Prakash Singh Badal faction of the 
Akali Dal and were arrested on the eve of the election of the 
Shrimoni Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee President. After the 
midnight arrests, the police tried to persuade them to talk to 
Barnala, and when they refused they were locked up for three 
months. Both men over the age of sixty have not ever been 
associated in any way with the terrorist groups and yet the police 
booked them as hard-core members of Jinda's Group. If this can 
happen in Delhi under the nose of the country's most vocal civil 
rights groups, then one can imagine the fate of the people in the 
remote parts of the country. This is not an isolated case. There 
are several such cases of police excesses. Another glaring case 
was that of sixty-five years old Banubibi Shermhammed Sirahi,^^ 
cattle grain seller on the street of Ahmedabad, hit by a police 
bullet accidentally when police opened fire to disperse a mob in 
Jamalpur area during a communal flare-up. The police booked her 
under TADA to hide its indiscriminate firing and to prevent the 
person from launching prosecution proceedings. But due to outcry 
in the city about her arrest, the administration had to drop the 
charges. It is common knowledge that Victims of police's 
arbitrary use of TADA refused to talk to investigation agency for 
fear of police reprisals. 
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Similar veins, four men accused of gang rape, in Chembur, 
were detained under TADA. The Bombay Police Commissioner 
was honest enough to admit that, he had, indeed, authorized the 
detention under the TADA of the suspects in gang rape case, to 
check the increasing violence against women, and that the 
ordinary law of the land is often gets defeated by the meticulous 
application of the law of evidence, and that evidence in such 
cases, is difficult to procure with the result, the accused go scout 
free. However convincing the argument might sound, recourse 
cannot be taken to TADA cases, which are amply covered by the 
Indian Penal Code. The problem with the ordinary law should be 
overcome by suitably amending the law of Evidence and 
simplifying the procedures. TADA is no remedy, in fact, it is 
worse than the malady. The damage that TADA has caused is 
unimaginable. For example, in a marriage dispute where, bride's 
father lodged a case against the groom's family, TADA was 
invoked against groom's brother.'*' Similarly, even persons 
carrying cartridges were detained under TADA. The police and 
the administration are looking for newer ways of inflicting 
punishment on people under the pretext of combating terrorism. 
One that has come more and more frequently into use is trial by 
the public through the press: in short a lynching. "Whether it is a 
Sanjay Singh, a V.N.Kirloskar, a Rajinder Sethia, and a Kirti 
Ambani to V. Krishnamurty, the police destroy them by releasing 
juicy allegations to the press while they are under interrogation, 
long before they frame a charge, and therefore when, technically 
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the case is not sub-judice. After this is done it no longer matters 
whether a sufficiently plausible case is made that can even be 
admitted for trial. Those whom the police or their political 
masters deem guilty have been punished." 
Under the TADA, the confession made before the police is 
admissible in the Court of Law. This was the most hated and very 
crucial Section of the Act and very often it was misused. For 
example, in New Delhi the police picked up Karam Singh, Harnik 
Singh,Baldev Singh, Ujjagar Singh and others in 1987 and 
charged them under the Sections 3^^ and 4 ^ of the TADA. The 
Deputy Commissioner of Police apparently recorded confessions 
of three of them, Baldev Singh, Ujaggar Singh, and Karam Singh 
in September 1987. More than twelve years later, the additional 
Sessions Judge, R.C.Yaduvanshi observed that these confessional 
statements were 'untrust worthy' and 'unrel iable ' . He observed, 
"The DCP is not aware about the place where the statements were 
recorded, by whom they were recorded, and the fact that there is 
nothing on record to show that sufficient time was given to the 
accused." In short, nothing to dispel doubts that the accused had 
made the statement voluntarily. The DCP concerned claimed that 
somebody else at his instance recorded the statement. But 
somehow he could not name the scribe even on seeing the 
confessional statements. And so after languishing in jail for 12 
years the ten alleged ' terrorist ' were finally acquitted."*^ 
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It is rather curious that persons were, first, detained under 
TADA but when the charges could not be proved in the 
Designated Courts, they were tried under the ordinary law,'*^ The 
case of Sukhdev Singh alias Sukha and Harijinder Singh alias 
Jinda the assassins of General Vaidya, fall in this category. 
Similarly, in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case,' ' ' the CBI 
arrested 27 persons under different Sections of TADA. They were 
kept in alleged illegal custody between six to sixteen days before 
being produced before a court, which granted police remand for 
60 days. The out come of custody were 17 confessions. One 
accused died in custody. All confessions were later withdrawn. 
Complaints of torture were made. However these confessions 
become the basis of conviction. All the 27 accused were 
sentenced to death. But on an appeal to the Supreme Court, the 
Court acquitted all 27 of charges under TADA. Nineteen were 
acquitted of murder charges. Four of the convicted face death 
sentence, the basis of the conviction is the same 17 confessions 
extracted by the police. 
A scrutiny of various judgements in TADA cases brings to 
surface the police highhandedness of misleading or false 
statement. A typical case of Virar Police Station in which the 
Virar police changed the order after judgement was partly 
delivered by Justice Sujata Manohar and Justice B.N. Srikirshna. 
When it had become clear that the Section 5 (possession of arms) 
of the TADA Act was not applicable to the cases, the police 
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issued an order to apply Section 3 (committing a terrorist act) and 
field an affidavit to justify it, even though lawyer conceded that 
the facts did not justify applying Section 3."^ In Uttam Ramaji 
Hulavale'*^ justice M.L.Pendse and A.D.Mane, found that a man 
detained under the act as a 'known' criminal involved in seven 
cases (according to the Lonavale Police Inspector who arrested 
him), had only one case pending against him. The Judges found 
that the detenu had been acquitted in four cases. He had been 
convicted in one case in which he had gone in appeal and which 
was still pending, while the sixth case was awaiting trial. The 
seventh case was the one for which he had come before the 
judges. The judges concluded that there was no 'meri t ' in the 
police claim that he was a 'known criminal ' . The judges also 
accepted the petitioner's contention that the offence, with which 
he was charged, threatening and chasing a driver with knife, was 
not of so serious a nature as to merit the application of the 
TADA. They agreed that the police had applied the Act because 
they felt aggrieved when he was granted bail. 
There are several such instances in which police failed to 
provide evidence against the detainees, and complete 
investigations within the stipulated time.^^ Few examples are 
available to show the inefficiency of the police. Maulana Massod 
Azhar, a leader of Harkat-ul Ansar, was first arrested in February 
1994 under TADA and the challan was not produced in the courts 
even after six years. The designated court, for want of evidence. 
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finally dismissed the case under TADA. The case for which he is 
actually facing trial is one of attempted jailbreak. Mushtaq 
Ahmad Zargar, Known to be a leader of Al Omar-Mujahadeen, 
has been facing trial in a TADA case since 1992 and challan is 
yet to be produced. Ahmad Umar Syed Sheikh, was arrested under 
different Sections of TADA in 1994 and the charge sheet was not 
filed even after five years. Despite Section 17 of TADA, which 
gives precedence to TADA cases over other cases, these cases are 
not being disposed off for many years. 
According to the estimates provided by the Peoples Union 
for Democratic Rights (PUDR), which conducted, a survey of 
TADA detenus, over 50,000 persons had been detained under this 
provision so far. As against this, hardly 500 were convicted. 
There were as many as 15,000 bail applications still pending in 
various Courts.^^ Yet another sensitive point on which the 
Government is on the dock is the allegation made by the 
Minorities Commission that the TADA provisions were mostly 
being used as a weapon against members of the minority 
community and has argued upon the Government to consider its 
immediate repeal.^^ The Chairman, National Human Rights 
Commission, Justice Ranganath Mishra, said that it would be 
sensible not to renew the TADA in view of its gross misuse in 
various parts of the country. He pointed out that though about 
78000 arrests were made under TADA during the last ten years, 
the rate of conviction was just 1%.^* Mishra has been of the view 
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that the Act, under which most of the cases have so far been 
registered, should be repealed in toto because it is invoked even 
in States not touched by terrorism at all. He said time and again 
that if the repeal of the Act is not possible at least its "obnoxious 
provisions" should be removed. At the Madras convention, Mishra 
threatened to sue the Government in Court on TADA, if the 
Government will not take appropriate action immediately to save 
the rights of the people.^^ The threat caused lot of embarrassment 
to the Ministry, which services the NHRC in terms of looking 
after its various administrative requirements. Due to strong 
protest against the Act and demand of its removal from the statute 
book, the Supreme Court said that TADA detenu had "absolute 
right" for bail if no charge sheet was filed within 180 days of the 
arrest. The judgement pressurized the Government to set up a 
review panel. But unfortunately there is no central Government 
review panel so far but some States did set up such panels. 
The Delhi Government had set up a review panel for TADA 
detenus. The panel found that three in every four cases of arrest 
under this measure was unnecessary. The Delhi Government has, 
consequently, ordered its director of prosecution to withdraw all 
TADA charges in 145 of the 200 cases reviewed by the panel.^* 
This is the first batch of TADA cases pending trail in various 
courts to be reviewed. The other 750 old TADA cases pending 
trail are also similarly reviewed. The Government of Andhra 
Pradesh has withdrawn operation of the TADA provisions against 
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145 of 153 TADA cases registered in the c i ty ." The 145 cases of 
the city pertain to communal violence during 1990, 1991 and 
1992. The Government has also dropped TADA provisions in 
respect to the cases against Progressive Organization of Women 
leader K. Sandhya and 56 others during the electioneering of 
CO 
Prime Minister at Nandyal in November 1991. In Rajasthan, the 
Government withdrew all cases registered under the now-defunct 
TADA act against 41 people in Jaipur, Kota and Bikaner 
districts.^^ The majority of these cases pertained to communal 
violence in the State in 1989 and early nineties. Official sources 
said while the cases against some of the accused would be 
withdrawn completely, the case booked against those found in 
possession of incriminating material are likely to be tried under 
other laws as suggested by the review panel .^ A review 
committee in the State (Uttar Pradesh) ordered the release of 240 
out of 1,146 people detained under the Act in the State.^' The 
Government declared that TADA would be revoked in all cases in 
which the accused were held for giving "shelter to terrorists" as; 
experience has shown that most often people are forced to shelter 
terrorists.^"^ 
TADA after its dropout: -
Two years after the lapse of TADA in 1997, the number of 
persons under arrest was 4,528. Charges were dropped in 6 
percent of these cases. At the end of the year, challans had been 
filed only in 5 per cent of these cases and 90 per cent are still 
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under investigation. There were, 6,709 TADA under trials in the 
same year. Trials were completed only in about 6 per cent of 
these cases, 65 per cent of these resuhed in acquittals. That 
amounts to conviction of barely 2.5 per cent. 
DISPOSAL OF TADA CASES BY THE COURTS 
Table-3 
YEAR 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
TOTAL 
NUMBER OF 
CASES FOR 
TRIAL 
(including 
pending cases) 
6688 
2459 
6979 
6709 
NA 
2661 
NUMBER OF CASES 
Compounded/ 
Withdrawn 
241 
10 
27 
NA 
NA 
6 
In which trial were completed 
Convicted 
359 
40 
48 
14 
NA 
36 
Acquitted/Discharg 
ed 
422 
92 
465 
261 
NA 
157 
5666 
2317 
6439 
NA 
NA 
2462 
Source: National Crime Bureau Records. 
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DISPOSAL OF TADA CASES BY THE POLICE 
Table >4 
3 
> 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
TOTAL 
NUMBER OF 
CASES FOR 
INVEATIGAT 
ION(iBchMlteg 
pending cases) 
8408 
6120 
5805 
4528 
NA 
1130 
NUMBER OF CASES IN WHICH 
Investigatio 
n was 
refused 
NA 
06 
NA 
272 
NA 
NA 
lBvestig«tioa was 
conplcted 
1 
NA 
63 
NA 
NA 
NA 
08 
2 ^ 
II 
NA 
2027 
NA 
NA 
NA 
91 
t 
Is 
V 
at s 
1140 
391 
674 
226 
NA 
198 
NUNBE 
R O F 
PENDIN 
G 
CASES 
6218 
3633 
NA 
NA 
NA 
833 
PERSON 
RELEASE 
D 
BEFORE 
TRIAL 
1050 
NA 
672 
NA 
NA 
NA 
PERSON 
UNDER 
INVESTI 
CATION 
AT THE 
END OF 
YEAR 
NA 
NA 
4459 
4030 
NA 
NA 
Scarce: Nalional Crime Bureau Records 
The poor conviction rate is largely Ane to the failure on the 
part oi the police to file the charge sheets. More than five years 
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after the repeal of the TADA, trials have yet to be completed in 
4,958 TADA cases. Of these cases, 1,384 are still being 
investigated.^^ There are about 13,345^ cases to 14,446^^ cases are 
still awaiting trail. 
A survey of 10-years experience of TADA presents the most 
sordid picture as far as human rights and fundamental freedoms 
are concerned. The Act was enacted to meet the challenges posed 
by militancy in Punjab but it failed miserably in controlling the 
menace referred to as terrorism. The damage done by the misuse 
of TADA is irreparable. Every extension of TADA has 
emboldened the authorities to rope in more people. The National 
Human Rights Commission, Human Rights activists and minority 
groups came down heavily on the Act for the gross violation of 
lives and liberties under the pretext of national interest and 
security perceptions. It was often invoked to settle political 
scores. Even cases, which could have been tried under the 
ordinary law, were booked under TADA to keep people on tanter-
hooks. In Pune some college going boys accused of eve teasing 
found themselves charged under TADA.^ In Haryana, a jobless 
youth of impeccable character languishing in the jail for some 
years until Supreme Court relieved him of TADA and ordered his 
trail under the bailable arms Act.^^ 
Under the Anglo-Saxon Jurisprudence, which India follows, 
everyone is innocent unless, proved guilty. The Act reversed the 
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dictum that everyone is a terrorist unless proved contrary to it. 
The Act has been largely counterproductive. Not more than that 
mere 1% of the cases under TADA has ended up in conviction. 
There is some element of truth in the assertion of the eminent 
lawyer, Soli Sorabji, that for every terrorist arrested under TADA 
then are 100 innocent citizens arrested under the same Act and 
languishing in jails. The most obnoxious part of the Act was that 
a confession before police officer is admissible as evidence. 
Section 15, ° which is violative of the Indian Evidence Act. The 
Act had also made bail extremely difficult. Mere possession of 
unauthorized weapon in a notified area becomes punishable with 
jail term of not less than five years. 
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CONCLUSION 
"Restrictive legislation is almost always a signal of 
repressive institutional change, but is, of course, not the cause of 
it ... the major focus of the defense of the citizen as a person can 
only be on procedure, or, as we call it in our society, due 
process." 
Stanley Diamond. 
The concept of Rule of Law and Constitutionalism was 
evolved with a view to establish supremacy of law and to 
strengthen democracy, which in the course of time, have defied 
both. Their implications were grossly misinterpreted and misused. 
During the freedom struggle, the Rowlett Act was enacted to 
suppress the activities of the revolutionaries, which was rightly 
condemned as anti-people and anti-freedom. But curiously in a 
different form, the law finds a convenient place in the 
Constitution in the name of Preventive Detention. Its 
incorporation was justified in the Constituent Assembly by the 
post-partition scenario in the country. So far so good. But its 
continuation even after decades of partition is difficult to 
comprehend. What was thought to be a temporary provision 
became a permanent part of the Constitution. Its unsuccessful 
challenge in A. K. Gopalan gave the much-needed judicial fillip 
to its continuation. There can, however, be no two opinions on the 
need of such a law in exceptional circumstances, where the very 
existence of the State is in danger and resort to such extra-
ordinary measures become indispensable, but even in those 
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conditions the compulsions of democracy demand effective 
safeguards against its possible misuse. But that was not to be. 
What was the more surprising was that after lapse of the 
Preventive detention Act on December 31 , 1969, even more harsh 
laws were enacted like National Security Act and the Terrorist 
And Disruptive Activities Act under the grab of curbing anti-
national activities, black marketing, smuggling and terrorism. All 
democratic norms in the process, were swept under the carpet. 
The nation, benumbed by the shock over Indira Gandhi's 
assassination and its aftermath and the unending terrorism in 
Punjab, necessitated positive and concrete steps and laws to cope 
with violence and disruption. In May 1985, a series of bomb 
blasts were witnessed by the nation in Delhi and other places. A 
large number of innocent people in buses and public places were 
killed, generating widespread revulsion. These incidents 
obviously demanded immediate action to nip the mischief in the 
bud and the result was the enactment of the TADA. The sharp rise 
in the terrorist activities in the country also motivated the 
Government to frame an extra-ordinary law. The Act received 
more or less unanimous approval of the Parliament in 1985 as it 
was convinced about the lofty objectives with which the Act was 
proposed. In 1987, it was reintroduced along with a Bill relating 
to President's Rule in Punjab. In 1989, it was introduced along 
with the Chandigarh Disturbed Areas (Amendment) Bill. And 
lastly in 1993, it was introduced along with the Bill amending the 
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Indian Penal Code (IPC) to enhance the punishment for 
kidnapping. In all these extensions, the reasons cited were 
different. Specific events or problems (transistor bombs, 
Naxalites, LTTE, bomb blast in Bombay and Calcutta) and 
specific problem States like Punjab, later Kashmir and Assam 
were stated as reasons for the continuation of the Act. On all 
occasions, the Bill for extending TADA was introduced along 
with some other Bill, which helped in diluting the debate in 
Parliament. But the context chosen by the Government and the 
timing seem to have had some effect on the quality of the 
discussions in the House. On all occasions, the Act was 
introduced along with a statement of objects and reasons and was 
accompanied by a detailed defence of the Act by the Ministers (A. 
K. Sen in 1985, Butta Singh and P. Chidambaram in 1987 and 
1989 respectively, S. B. Chavan in 1991 and 1993). Surprisingly, 
States, which did not figure in the Government's specified list of 
'problem states ' , have extensively used the Act. The most notable 
example was Gujarat, which tops in detaining persons under the 
Act. The Punjab DGP, K. P. S. Gill 's , claim that it has brought 
tranquility to the State and that it was no longer needed' went 
unheeded. Moreover, the number of States that have used the Act 
has increased. In 1985, the Government cited 2 Union Territories 
and 2 States. Two years later 2 more States were added. In 1991 it 
was 17. And at the time of its repeal, the Act was in force in 22 
out of 25 States and 2 out of 7 Union Territories. The exceptions 
were Kerala, Orrisa, Sikim, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Dadra 
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and Nagar Haveli, Daman & Diu, Lakshadweep and Pondicherry. 
A close scrutiny of the figures reveals that 30-60% of the people 
booked under the Act belonged to those States that did not figure 
in the Government's list of 'problem States' at the specified time. 
These States took recourse to TADA under the pretext of 
protecting the unity and integrity of the country. 
The Act has brought drastic changes in the bail provisions 
and trail procedures. Some of those changes were unheard of in 
the annals of Indian jurisprudence as well as in the International 
standards set by the United Nations. The well-established 
criminal justice standards were thrown in the dustbin. The Act 
had to be given more longevity and wider operation on account of 
the increasing terrorist and disruptive activities, very soon, the 
Act degenerated into worst form of tyranny by the police, who 
utilized its provisions to keep persons in custody for longer 
periods, even those who were not even remotely connected with 
terrorist and disruptive activities. The TADA mantra paid rich 
dividends to police. The long and cumbersome trial, poor rate of 
convictions, have made a mockery of human rights. The attitude 
of judiciary was not very encouraging. The Judges in Kartar 
Singh (1994) put their seal of approval on the law, that the 
exigencies of the situation demanded an extra-ordinary law. The 
Court 's attitude reminds one of Lord Atkin who held that "some 
of his brothers on the Bench were more executive-minded than 
the executive."^ A number of human rights organizations 
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including the National Human Right Commission have 
highlighted, time and again, the misuse of the TADA by 
organizing meetings and campaigns and by volunteering to help 
people who are falsely implicated under the Act. 
So indiscriminate have been the arrests that 92 per cent of 
the 80,000 detainees has been let off in the last ten years.^ 
Doubtlessly, terrorism is neither legally justified nor ethically 
acceptable. It is a crime against humanity and a challenge to the 
credentials of the State. The killing of thousands of people by the 
terrorists can never be justified. It is true that the state has to 
equip with stringent laws to deal with such acts, but it is all the 
more necessary to guard against hauling up of innocents on mere 
suspicion or settling political scores or searing the opposition. To 
cite one example, the State of Gujarat, which has no history of 
terrorism, has detained some seventeen hundred people under 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act. It is this 
misuse that has made the bonafides of the Government suspect 
inviting criticism from every section of society. At the meeting of 
Chief Ministers in New Delhi on May 5, 1995, majority of State 
demanded its immediate repeal.'* 
Infact, the entire exercise that the Home Ministry has been 
conducting for renewing Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 
(Prevention) Act is futile because the law itself is counter 
productive. It smacks of Bonapartism that has become the 
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distinguishing feature of the Congress since its authoritarian rule 
during the emergency approximately 27 years ago. In a note to the 
Prime Minister, the Home Ministry has rationalized the 
opposition to Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 
as a natural resistance to any 'special act ' . But during the course 
of the operation of TADA in the country, the Court did succeed in 
extending some control over the administrative action. In Sunjay 
Dutt case (1994), the Supreme Court held that mere possession of 
an unauthorized weapon in a notified area does not link one to 
Section 5 of the TADA. The investigation agency or the State 
must prove that there was "conscious" possession of unauthorized 
arms and ammunition with the intention to disturb the public 
order. The Court recognized the value of personal liberty and 
freedom in a free and democratic society and thus sought to 
mitigate the rigours of the law to the extent they could within the 
limits of its limited jurisdiction. 
It is a fairly settled principle that an order of preventive 
detention is liable to be struck down if it has been made for the 
purpose other than those indicated in the law. In TADA, the 
objective was to curb the terrorists and disruptive activities but it 
was used for other purposes, often with political overtones, with 
greater impunity. Thus, the Court has been required to consider 
whether the use of preventive detention in particular cases is for 
the purpose indicated in the Statute and the most frequent 
question is, whether the grounds indicated show that the order of 
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detention has been made for the same offence as mentioned in the 
objectives of the Act. The wall of separation created by the 
Supreme Court between Article 19 and 22 of the Constitution had 
made it difficult to discern the limit, which the civil right 
imposes on the exercise of the power of detention.^ It is submitted 
that in the absence of such realization it has not been possible to 
evolved adequate criterion to control the exercise of the power of 
detention. 
In preventive detention cases, the inquiry is limited to letter 
of the order or the grounds supplied or the returns filed in the 
Habeas Corpus petitions. The scope of judicial scrutiny is thus, 
limited. It is seen that there is no uniform pattern in detention 
orders. The only uniformity is that the detaining authority (in 
general) has been meticulous in preparing the grounds of 
detention in strict conformity with the phraseology of the Statute 
thereby reducing the courts to a helpless position. The total 
ab sence of substantive restraint in the implementation procedure 
of preventive detention laws often creates problems. The 
judiciary must not shirk from its responsibilities to strike a 
balance between a citizen's right to personal liberty and the 
national interests. The Court should evolve effective restraints 
through which it can control and monitor the action of the 
executive from unwarranted transgression. The apprehension of 
violation of rights and victimization always haunts people under 
special laws, be it the Preventive Detention Act, the Defence of 
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India Act, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, the National 
Security Act, the Terrorist and Disruptive Act or the latest 
Prevention of Terrorism Act. The wide powers that these Acts 
confer on the executive are the main concern. The searches and 
seizures, undertaken under these laws, have caused avoidable 
harassment to citizens, very often, to innocent citizens. These 
detention laws negate the ideals enshrined in the Human Rights 
Documents, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
International covenant of Civil and Political Rights and 
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
to which India is a signatory. As far as possible the penal laws of 
the country, which provide remedy for every malady, should be 
used to deal with disruptive forces; it is only when the situation 
becomes extremely grave, resort can be taken to such extra-
ordinary laws, for in such a situation the need to protect national 
sovereignty becomes paramount. 
The following improvements may, perhaps, help in putting 
some premium on the misuse of powers by the detaining authority 
under such special laws. First, a provision may be incorporated to 
empower the Designated Courts and the Supreme Court to award 
damages or compensation in case of victimization of persons 
under preventive detention laws. The present safeguards are 
awfully inadequate to protect the rights of citizens. Second, 
terrorism is a complex problem. It has socio-economic and 
political dimensions. Lack of definition of terrorism and terrorists 
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have further added to the complications. In such a situation, men 
cannot be made moral and law abiding by legislation alone. The 
root of terrorism has to be addressed in all sincerity with a view 
to uproot the causes and the circumstances leading to such 
activities. Detention laws have failed to act as deterrents to check 
the menace of terrorism such laws at best can possible cosmetic 
remedies. Therefore, what is needed is collective and concerted 
action on the part of the Government, non-governmental 
organizations, bar and bench, human rights organizations, to 
tackle the problem from a human point of view rather than 
resorting to such laws. Third, frequent review by a high-powered 
committee, of the laws of detention in the fast changing 
circumstances is a desideratum. Fourth, the Government should 
set up special benches for preventive detention cases in the 
Supreme Court and High Courts instead of referring these cases to 
the specially constituted Designated Courts. The idea of special 
courts tends to create a wrong impression on the detainees that 
they may not get justice at these specially constituted courts. The 
impression may be quite unfounded yet the State has a 
responsibility to clear such misgivings. Fifth, the scientific 
developments and inventions like wallet cameras, microphones, 
lie detectors, computers, should be used with a view to expedite 
the investigation process. Prolong detentions, on one pretext or 
the other, strikes at Rule of Law and democratic principles. It is 
for this reason that the apex court recognized right to speedy trial 
as implicit in Article 21 in Hussain Ara Khatoon v. State of 
191 
Conclusion 
Bihar. The in ordinate delays on the part of prosecution in putting 
up the challans adding to the miseries of the detainees also care 
for serious consideration. Sixth, the Confessions made by an 
accused to the police should not be admissible as evidence under 
any law— ordinary or emergency. The police methods for 
extracting evidence are, too well known for any comment. One 
remedy to check the police menace is to be incorporate a 
provision in the detention laws making the police liable to action 
if they act malafide or influenced by frivolous grounds. There is a 
need to limit the doctrine of sovereign immunity even in such 
special laws. Seventh, under normal circumstances detention 
laws should be confined to only the disturbed areas and should be 
revoked as soon as normalcy is restored. It is not necessary to 
extend these laws to the entire country keeping the entire 
population on tenterhooks. Finally, to bring in greater 
transparency and to clear the clouds surrounding the detention 
laws, a list of detainees be published providing information about 
them. That may, perhaps, act as a deterrent to the possible 
offenders in future. 
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APPENDIX 
ITHEJ MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, 1971 
(ACT NO. 26 OF 1971)* 
[2"** July, 1971.] 
An Act to provide for detention in certain case for the purpose of maintenance of internal 
security and matters coimected therewith. 
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Twenty-second Year of Republic of India as follows :-
[*] For statement of Objects and Reasons, see Gaz. of India, 3-6-1971, pt II, sec. 2, Extra., 
p. 276. 
1. Short title and extent. - (1) This Act may be called the Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act, 1971. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
2. Definitions. - In this Act, imless the context of otherwise requires, 
(a) "Appropriate Government" means, as respect a detention order made by the 
Central Government or a person detained under such order, the Central Govenmient, and 
as respect a detention order made by a State Government or by an officer subordinate to 
a State Government or as respect a person detained under such order, the State 
Government; 
(b) "detention order" means an order made under section 3; 
(c) "foreigner" has the same meaning as in the Foreigner Act, 1946; 
(d) "State Government", in relation to a Union territory, means the administrator 
thereof 
3. Power to make order detaining under certain persons. - (1) The Central 
Goverrmient or the State Govenmient may, -
(a) if satisfied with respect to any person (including a foreigner) that with a view to 
preventing him from acting in any maimer prejudicial to-
(i) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of 
India, or 
(ii) the security ofthe State or the maintenance of public order, or 
(i) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, or 
(b) if satisfied with respect to any foreigner that with a view to regulating his 
continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion 
from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. 
(2) Any ofthe following officers, namely: -
(a) District Magistrates, 
!mmmmimm 
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(b) Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the 
State Government, 
(c) Commission of Police, wherever they have been appointed, may, if 
satisfied as provided in sub-clause (ii) and (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1), 
exercise the power conferred by the said sub-section. 
(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he 
is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and 
such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter, and no such 
order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof 
unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government: 
Provided that where under section 8 the groimds of detention are communicated by the 
authority making the order after five days but not later than fifteen days fi"om the date of 
detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words 
"twelve days", the words " twenty two days" shall be substituted. 
(4) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this 
section, the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the 
central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made 
and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have a bearing 
on the necessity for the order. 
4. Execution of detention orders. — A detention order may be executed at any place 
in India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1898. 
5. Power to regulate place and conditions of detention. - Every person in resp>ect 
of whom a detention order has been made shall be liable-
(a) to be detained in such place and under such conditions, including conditions as to 
maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline, as the appropriate 
Government may, by general or special order, specify; and 
(b) to be removed from one place of detention to another place of detention, whether 
within the same State or in another State, by order of the appropriate Government: 
Provided that no order shall be made by a State Government imder clause (b) for the 
removal of a person from one State to another State except with the consent of the 
Government of that State. 
6. Detention orders not to be invalid or inoperative on certain grounds. — No 
detention order shall be invalid or inoperative merely by reason-
(a) that the person to be detained thereunder is outside the limits of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Government or Officer making the order, or 
(b) that the place of detention of such person is outside the said limits. 
7. Powers in relation to absconding persons. - (1) If the Central Government or the 
State Government or an officer specified in sub-section (2) of section 3, as the case may 
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be, has reason to believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made 
has absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, that 
Government or officer may 
(a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of 
the first class having jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resides; 
and thereupon the provisions of sections 87, 88 and 89 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1898, shall ^ply in respect of the said person and his property as if the order 
directing that he be detained were a warrant issued by the Magistrate; 
(b) by order notified in the Official Gazette direct the said person to appear before 
such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified in the order; and if 
the said person fails to comply with such direction he shall, unless he proves that it was 
not possible for him to comply therewith and that he had, within the period specified in 
the order, informed the officer mentioned in the order of the reason which rendered 
compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, be punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine or with both. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, every 
offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be cognizable. 
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order. 
- (1) when a person is detained in pursuance of detention order, the authority making the 
order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional 
circumstances and for reason to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days from the 
date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and 
shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the 
appropriate Government. 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it 
considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 
9. Constitution of Advisory Board. - (1) The Central Government and each State 
Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute one or more Advisory Boards for the 
purpose of this Act. 
(2) Every such board shall consist of three person who are or have been or are qualified 
to be appointed as. Judges of High Court, and such person shall be appointed by the 
Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. 
(3) the appropriate Government shall appoint one of the members of the Advisory Board 
who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court to be its chairman, and in the case of a 
Union territory the appointment of Advisory Board, of any person who is Judge of the 
High Court of a State shall be with the previous approval of the State Government 
concerned. 
10. Reference to Advisory Board. - Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, 
in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate 
Government shall, within thirty days fi-om the date of detention under the order, place 
before the Advisory Board constituted by it under section 9 the grounds in which the order 
has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order. 
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and in case vs^ere the order has been made by an ofiRcer, also the report by such officer 
under sub-section (3) of section 3. 
11. Procedure of Advisory Boards. - (1) The Advisory Board shall, after 
considering the material placed before it and, after calling for such further information as 
it may deem necessary from the appropriate Government or from any person called for the 
purpose through the appropriate Government or fix)m the person concerned, and if, any 
particular case, it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be 
heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the appropriate Government within 
ten weeks from the date of detention. 
(2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the opinion 
of the Advisory board as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of 
the persoi^ncemed. 
(3) Where there is a difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory 
Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the opinion of 
the Board. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention order has 
been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the reference 
to the Advisory Board, and the proceeding of the Advisory Board and its report, 
excepting that part of the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, 
shall be confidential. 
12. Action upon the report of Advisory Board. - (1) In any case where the Advisory 
Board has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, 
the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of 
the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. 
(2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion no 
sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the q>propriate Government 
shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. 
13. Maximum period of detention. — The maximimi period for which any person may be 
detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under section 12 
shall be twelve months from the date of detention. 
Provide that nothing contained in this section shall affect the power of the appropriate 
Government to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time. 
14. Revocation of detention orders. - (1) without prejudice to the provisions of 
section 21 of the General Clause Act, 1897, a detention order may, at anytime, be revoked 
or modified. 
(a) Notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-
section (2) of section 3, by the State Government to which that officer is subordinate or 
by the Central Government. 
(b) Notwithstanding that the order has been made by a State Government, by the 
Central Government. 
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(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar the making of a fresh 
detention order under section 3 against the same person in any case where fresh facts 
have arisen after the date of revocation or expiry on which the Central Government or a 
State Government or an officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that such an order should 
be made. 
15. Temporary release of person detained. - (1) The appropriate Government may, 
at any time, direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order may be 
released for any specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions 
specified in the direction as that person accepts, and may, at any time, cancel his release. 
(2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section (1), the appropriate 
Government may require him to enter into a bond with or without sureties for the due 
observance of the conditions specified in the direction. 
(3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time and 
place, and to the authority, specified in the order directing his release on canceling his 
release, as the case may be. 
(4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner 
specified in sub-section (3), he shall be pimishable with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to two years, or with fine or with both. 
(5) If any person released imder sub-section (1) fails to fulfill any of the conditions 
imposed upon him under the said sub-section or in the bond enter into by him, the bond 
shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable to pay the 
penalty thereof 
16. Protection of action taken in good faith. - No suit or other legal proceeding shall 
lie against the Central Government or a State Government, and no suit, prosecution or 
other legal proceedings shiill lie against any person, for anything in good faith done or 
intended to be done in pursuance of this Act. 
17. Duration of detention in certain cases of foreigners. - (1) Notwithstanding 
anything contained in this Act, any foreigner in respect of whom an order of detention has 
been made, this Act may be detained without obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board 
for a longer than three months, but not exceeding two years from the date of detention, in 
any of the following classes of cases or under any of the following circumstances, namely: 
(a) where such foreigners enter or attempts to enter the territory of India or is foimd 
therein with arms, ammunition or explosives, or 
(b) where such foreigners enter or attempts to enter a notified area or is found therein 
in contravention of section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1961, or 
(c) where such foreigners enters or attempts to enter the local limits or is found within 
the local limits of such area adjoining the border of India as may be specified in an order 
made under section 139 of the Border Security Force Act, 1968, without a valid travel 
documents, or 
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(d) where the Central Government has reason to believe that such foreigner commits 
or is likely to commit any offence under the Official Secrets Act, 1923. 
(2) In the case of any foreigner to whom sub-section (1) ^ plies section 10 to 13 shall have 
effect subject to the following modifications, namely: -
(a) In section 10, for the words " shall with thirty days" the words " may, at any time 
prior to but in no case later than three months before the expiration of two years" shall 
be substituted; 
(b) In section 11,-
(i) in sub-section (1), for the words " from the date of detention", the words " from the 
date on which reference is made to it" shall be substituted; 
(ii) in sub-section (2), for the words " the detention of the person concerned", the 
words " the continued detention of the person concerned" shall be substituted; 
(c) in section 12, for the words " for the detention" in both the places where they 
occur, the words "for the continued detention" shall be substituted; 
(d) in section 13, for the words " twelve months", the words "three years" shall be 
substituted. 
18. Repeal and savings. - (1) The Maintenance of Internal Security Ordinance, 1971, 
is hereby repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said 
Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken imder the corresponding 
provisions of this Act as if this Act had come into force on the 7* day of May 971. 
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THE TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT, 1987 
(ACT NO. 28 OF 1987)* 
IS''^ September, 1987.] 
An Act to make special provisions for the prevention of, and for coping with, terrorist and 
disruptive activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Thirty- eighth Year of the Republic of hidia as follows: 
PART 1 (PRELIMINARY) 
1. Short title, extent, application, commencement, duration and savings. -
(1) This Act may be called the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 
1987. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India, and it applies also-
(a) to citizen of India outside India; 
(b) to person in the service of the Government, wherever they may be; and 
(c) to person on ships and aircraft registered in India, wherever they may be. 
(1) Section 5,15,21 and 22 shall come into force at once and the remaining provisions 
of this Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 24* day of May 1987. 
(2) It shall remain in force for a period of two years from the 24* day of May 1987, 
but its expiry under the operation of this sub-section shall not affect-
(a) the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered under, this Act 
or any rule made thereimder or any order made imder any such rule, or 
(b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred 
under this Act or any rule made thereunder or any order made under any such rule, 
or 
(c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in present of any offence 
under this Actor any contravention of any rule made under this Act or of any order 
made under any such rule, or 
(d) any investigation, or legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such 
right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, 
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or 
enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had 
not expired. 
Received the assent of the President on 3-9-1987. Act published in Gazette of India; 3-9-1987 Part II-S.I, 
Ext. P.I (No. 38). 
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2. Deflnition. - (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -
(a) "abet" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, includes-
(i) the communication or association with any person or class of person who is 
engaged in assisting in any manner terrorists or disruptionist; 
(ii) the passing on, or publication of, without any lawHil authority, any information 
likely to assist the terrorists or disruptionist, and the passing on, or publication of, 
or distribution of, any document or matter obtained from terrorist or disruptionist; 
(iii) the rendering of any assistance, whether financial or otherwise, to terrorist or 
disruptionist; 
(b) " Code" means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; 
(c) "Designated Court" means a Designated Court constituted under section 9; 
(d) "disruptive activity" has the meaning assigned to it in section 4, and the 
expression "disruptionist" shall be construed accordingly; 
(e) "High Court" means the High Court of the State in which a judge or 
additional judge of a Designated Court was working immediately before his 
appointment as such judge or additional judge; 
(f) "notified area" means such area as the State Government may, by 
notification in the Official Gazette, specify; 
(g) "Public Prosecutor" means a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public 
Prosecutor or a Special Public Prosecutor appointed under section 13, and 
includes any person acting under the direction of the Public Prosecutor; 
(h) "terrorist" has the meaning assigned to it in sub-section (1 )of section 3, and 
the expression "terrorist" shall be construed accordingly; 
(i) words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the 
Code shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Code. 
(2) Any reference in this Act to any enactment or any provisions thereof shall, in relation 
to an area in which enactment or such provision is not in force, be construed as a reference 
to the corresponding law or the relevant provision of the corresponding law, if any, in 
force in that area. 
PART II 
PUNISHMENT FOR, AND MEASURES FOR COPING WITH, TERRORIST AND 
DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES 
3. Punishment for terrorist acts. - (1) whoever with intent to overawe the Government 
as by law established to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to 
alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different 
sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive 
substances or inflammable substance or fire-arms or other lethal weapons or poisons or 
noxious gases or other chemical or by another substances (whether biological or 
otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause, 
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death of, injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, 
property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community., or 
detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the 
Government or any other person to do or abstain fix)m doing any act, commits a terrorist 
Act 
(2) Whoever commits a terrorist act, shall, -
(i) if such act has resulted in the death of any person, be punishable with death or 
imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine; 
(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less 
than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to 
fine; 
(3) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites or 
knowingly facilitate the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to a terrorist 
act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five 
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. 
(4) Whoever harbours of conceals, or attempts to harbour or conceal, any terrorist shall be 
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which 
may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also liable to fine. 
4. Punishment for disruptive activities. - (1) Whoever commits or conspires or attempts 
to commit or abets, advocates, advices, or knowingly facilitates the commission of, any 
disruptive activity or any act preparatory to a disruptive activity shall be punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which shall not be les than five years but wiiich may extend to 
imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. 
(2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), "disruptive activity" means any action taken, 
whether by act or by speech or through any other media in any other manner whatsoever,-
(i) which questions, disrupt or is intended to disrupt, whether directly or indirectly, the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of hidia; or 
(ii) which is intended to bring about or support any claim, whether directly or indirectly, 
for the cession of any part of India or the secession of any part of India fix)m the Union. 
Explanation. - For the purpose of this sub-section, -
(a) "cession" includes the admission of any claim of any foreign country to any 
part of India, and 
(b) "secession" includes the assertion of any claim to determine whether a part 
of India will remain within the Union. 
(3) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (2), it is hereby 
declared that any action taken whether by act or by speech or through any other media 
or in any other manner whatsoever, which -
(a) advocates, advises, suggests or incites; or 
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(b) predicts, prophesies or pronounces or otherwise expresses, in such manner 
as to incite, advise, suggest or prompt, 
the killing or the destruction of any person bound by oath under the Constitution to 
uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India or any public servant shall be deemed to 
be disruptive activity within the meaning of this section. 
(4) Whoever harbours or conceals, or attempts to harbour or conceal, any disruptionist 
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years 
but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. 
5. Possession of certain unauthorized arms, etc, in specified areas. - Where any 
person is in possession of any arms and ammunition specified in columns 2 and 3 of 
category I or category III (a) of schedule I to the Arms Rules, 1962, or bombs, dynamite or 
other explosive substances unauthorisedly in a notified area, he shall, notwithstanding 
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, be punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to 
imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. 
6. Enhanced penalties. -<1) If any person with intent to aid any terrorist or disruptionist, 
contravenes any provision of, or any rule made imder, the Arms Act, 1959, the Explosive 
Act, 1884, The Explosive Substances Act, 1908 or The Inflammable Substances Act, 
1952, he shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any of the aforesaid Acts or the 
rules made thereunder, be pimishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less 
than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to 
fine. 
(2) For the purpose of this section, any person who attempts to contravene or abet, or does 
any act preparatory to the contravention of any provision of any law, rule or order, shall be 
deemed to have contravened the provision, and the provisions of sub-section (1) shall, in 
relation to such person, have effect subject to the modification that the reference to 
"imprisonment for life" shall be constructed as a reference to "imprisonment for ten 
years." 
7. Confermentof powers. -(1) Notwithstanding any thing contained in the Code or 
in any other provision of this Act, the Central Government may, if it considers it necessary 
or expedient so to do, -
(a) for the prevention of, and for coping with, any offence under section 3 or 
the Section 4; or 
(b) for any case or class or group of cases under Section 3 or 4, 
in any. State or part thereof, confer, by notification in the Ofificial Gazette, on any officer 
of the Central Government, powers exercisable by a police officer under the Code in such 
State or part thereof or, as the case or group of cases in particular, the powers of arrest, 
investigation and prosecution of persons before any Court. 
(2) All officers of police and all officers of Government are hereby required and 
empowered to assist the officer of the Central Government, referred to in sub-section (1), 
in the execution of the provisions of this Act or any rule or order made hereafter. 
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(3) The provisions of the Code shall, so far as may be and subject to such modifications 
made in this Act, apply to the exercise of the powers by an officer under sub-section (1). 
8. Forfeiture of property of certain persons. - (1) Where a person has been convicted of 
an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder, the Designated Court 
may, in addition to awarding any punishment, by order in writing, declare that nay 
property, moveable or immovable or both, belong to the accused and specified in the 
order, shall stand forfeited to the Government fi:ee fi^om all encumbrances. 
(2) Where any person is accused of any offence imder this Act or any rule made 
thereunder, it shall open to the Designated Court trying him to pass an order that all or any 
properties, movable and immovable or both belonging to him, during the period of such 
trail, be attached, and where such trial ends in conviction, the properties so attached shall 
stand forfeited to the Government fi«e fi^om all encumbrances. 
(3Xa) If upon a report in writing made by a police officer or an officer referred to in sub-
section (1) of Section 7, any Designate Court has reason to believe that any person, who 
has committed an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder, has 
absconded or is concealing himself so that he may not be apprehended, such Court may, 
notwithstanding any thing contained in Section82 of the Code, punish a written 
proclamation requiring him to appear at a specific place or at a specific time not less than 
fifteen days but not more than thirty days fiwm the date of publication of such 
proclamation. 
(b) The Designate Court issuing a proclamation under clause (a) may, at any time, 
order the attachment of any property, movable or immovable or both, belonging too the 
proclaimed person, and thereupon the provisions of Section 83 to 85 of the Code shall 
apply to such attachment as of such attachment were mad under that Code. 
(c) If, within six months from the date of the attachment, any person, whose property 
is, or has been, at the disposal of the Government under sub-section (2) of Section 85 of 
the Code, appears voluntarily or is apprehended and brought before the Designate Court 
by whose order the property was attached, or the Court to which such Court is subordinate, 
and the powers to the satisfaction of such Court that he did not abscond or conceal himself 
for the purpose of avoiding apprehension and that he had not received such notice of the 
proclamation as to enable him to attend within the time specified therein, such property or 
, if the same has been sold, the net proceeds of the sale and the residue of the property, 
shall, after satisfying there fi-om all costs incurred in consequence of the attachment, be 
delivered to him. 
(4) Where any shares in a company stand forfeited to the Government under this 
section, then, the company shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies 
Act, 1956, or the articles of association the company, forthwith register the Government as 
the transferee of such shares. 
PART III (DESIGNATED COURTS) 
9. Designated Courts.-(1) The Central Government or a State Government may, by 
notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Designated Courts for such area 
or areas, or for such case or class or group of cases as may be specified in the notification. 
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(2) Where a notification constituting a Designate Court for any area or areas or for any 
case or class or group of cases is issued by the Central Government under sub section (1), 
and a notification constituting a Designated Court for the same area or areas or for the 
same case or class or group of cases has also been issued by a State Government under 
that sub section, the Designated Court constituted by the Central Government whether the 
notification constituting such courts is issued before or after the issue of the notification 
constituting the Designated Court by the State Government, shall have, and the Designated 
Court constituted by the State Government shall not have, jurisdiction to try any offence 
committed in that area or areas or, as the case may be, the case or classes or group of 
cases, and all cases pending before any Designated Court constituted by the State 
Government shall stand transferred to the Designated Court constituted by the Central 
Government. 
(3) Where any question arises as to the jurisdiction of any Designated Court, it shall be 
referred to the Central Government whose decision thereon shall be final. 
(4) A Designated Court shall be presided over by a judge to be appointed by the 
Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government, with the concurrence of 
the Chief Justice of the High Court. 
(5) The Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government may also 
appoint, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, additional judges to 
exercise jurisdiction in a Designated Court. 
(6) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge or an additional judge of 
a Designated Court unless he is, immediately before such appointment, a sessions judge or 
an additional sessions judge in any State. 
(7) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby provided that the attainment by a person 
appointed as a judge or an additional judge of a Designated Court of the age of 
superannuation under the rules applicable to him in the service to which he belongs, shall 
not effect his continuance as such judge or additional judge. 
(8) Where any additional judge or additional judges is or are appointed in a Designated 
Court, the judge of the Designated Court may, fi-om time to time, by general or specific 
order, in writing, provide for the distribution of business of the Designated Court among 
himself and the additional judge or additional judges and also for the disposal of urgent 
business IN the event of his absence or the absence of any additional judge. 
10. Place of Sitting. - A Designated Court may, on its own motion or on an application 
made by the Public Prosecutor, and if it considers it expedient or desirable so to do. Sit for 
any of its proceedings at any place other than its ordinary place of sitting. 
Provide that nothing in this section shall be constructed to change the place of 
sitting of a Designated Court constituted by the State Government to any place out side 
that State. 
11. Jurisdiction of Designated Courts.-(]) notwithstanding anything contained in the 
Code, every offence punishable under any provision of his Act or any rule made 
thereunder shall be triable only by the Designated Court v^thin whose local jurisdiction it 
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was committed or, as the case may be, by the Designated Court constituted for trying such 
offence under sub section (1) of Section 
(2) If, having regard to the exigencies of the situation prevailing in a State, the Central, 
Government is of the opinion that— 
(a) the situation prevailing in such State is not conducive to a fair, 
impartial or speedy trial, or 
(b) it is not likely to be feasible without occasioning the breach of 
peace or grave risk to the safety of the accused, the witnesses, the Public 
Prosecutor and the judge of he Designated Court or any of them, or 
(c) it is not otherwise in the interests of justice, 
it may, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India (such concurrence to be obtained 
on a motion moved IN that behalf by the Attorney General), transfer any case pending 
before a Designated Court IN that State to any other Designated Court within the State on 
in any other State. 
(3) Where the whole or any part of the area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a 
Designated Court has been declared to be, or forms part of, any area which has been 
declared to be a disturbed area under any enactment for the time being in force making 
provision for the suppression of disorder and restoration and maintenance of public order, 
and the Central Government is of opinion that the situation prevailing in the State is not 
conducive to fair, impartial or speedy trial within the State, of offence under this Act or 
the rules made thereunder which such Designated Court is competent to try, the Central 
Government may, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India, specify, by 
notification in the Official Gazette, in relation to such Court( hereafter in this sub section 
referred to the local Court) a Designated Court outside the State (hereafter in this sub 
section referred to as the special court) and thereupon— 
(a) it shall not be competent, at any time during the period of operation of such 
notification, for such local court to exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, or try, any 
offence imder this Act or the rules made thereunder:— 
(b) the jurisdiction which would have been, but for the issue of such notification, 
exercisable by such local court in respect of such offences committed during the period of 
operation of such notification shall be exercisable by the specified Court. 
(c) All cases relating to such offences pending immediately before the date of issue of 
such notification before such local court shall stand transferred on that date to the 
specified court. 
(d) All cases taken cognizance of by, or transferred to, the specified Court under 
clause (b) or clause (c) shall be deah with and tried in accordance with the Act (whether 
during the period of operation of such notification of thereafter) as if such offence had 
been committed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the specified Court or, as the 
case may be, transferred for the trial to it xmder sub section (2). 
Explanation /. - a notification issued under this sub section in relation to any local Court 
shall cease to operate on the date on which the whole or, as the case may be, the 
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aforementioned part of eh area within the local limits of its jurisdiction, ceases to be a 
disturbed area. 
Explanation 2. - For the purposes of this section, "Attorney-General" means the Attorney 
General of India or, in his absence, the Solicitor-General of India or, in the absence of 
both, one of the Additional Solicitors-General of India. 
12. Power of Designated Courts with respect to other offences. - (1) when trying any 
offence, a Designated Court may also try any other offence with which the accused may, 
under the Code, be charged at same trial if the offence is connected with such other 
offence. 
(2) If, in the course of any trial under this Act of any offence, it is foimd that the accused 
person has committed any other this Act or any rule made thereunder or under any other 
law, the Designated Court may convict such person of such other offence and pass any 
sentence authorized by this Act or such rule or, as the case may be, such other law, for the 
punishment thereof 
13. Public Prosecutors. - (1) for every Designated Court, the Central Government or, as 
the case may be, the State Government, shall appoint to be the public prosecutor and may 
appoint one or more persons to be the Additional Public Prosecutor or Additional Public 
Prosecutors: 
Provided that the Central Govenunent or, as the case may be, the State 
Govenunent, may also appoint for any case or class or group of cases a Special Public 
Prosecutor. 
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed as a Public Prosecutor or an 
Additional Public Prosecutor or a Special Public Prosecutor under this section unless he 
has been in practice as an Advocate for not les than seven years or has held any post, for a 
period of not less than seven years, under the Union or a State, requiring special 
knowledge of law. 
(3) Every person appointed as a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor 
or a Special Public Prosecutor under this section shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor 
within the meaning of clause (u) of section 2 of the Code, and the provisions of the Code 
shall have effect accordingly. 
14. Procedure and powers of Designated Courts. - (1) a Designated Court may take 
cognizance of any offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon 
receiving a complaint of facts that constitute such offence or upon a police report of such 
facts 
(2) Where an offence triable by a Designated Court is punishable with imprisorunent for a 
term not exceeding three years or with fine or with both, the Designated Court may, 
notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of Section 260 or Section 262 of the 
Code, try the offence in a summary way in accordance with the procedure prescribed in 
the Code and the provisions of Section 263 to 265 of the Code, shall, so far as may be, 
apply to such trial: 
Provided that when, in the course of a summary trial under this section, it appears 
to the Designated Court that the nature of the case is such that it is undesirable to try it in a 
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summary way, the Designated Court shall recall any witnesses who may have been 
examined and proceed to re-hear the case in the manner provided by the provisions of the 
Code for such trial of such offence and the said provisions shall apply to and in relation to 
a Designated Court as they apply to and in relation to a Magistrate: 
Provided further that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this 
section, it shall be lawful for a Designated Court to pass a sentence of imprisorunent for a 
term not exceeding two years. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Designated Court shall, for the purpose of 
trial of any offence, have all the powers a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if 
it were a Court of Session so far as may be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in 
the Code for the trial before a Court of Session. 
(4) Subject to other provisions of this Act, eveiy case transferred to a Designated 
Court under sub-section (2) of Section 11 shall be dealt with as if such case had been 
transferred under Section 406 of the Code to such Designated Court. 
(5) Notwithstanding any thing contained in the Code, a Designated Court may, if it 
thinks fit and for reasons to be recorded by it, proceed with the trial in the absence of the 
accused or his pleader and record the evidence of any witness, subject to the right of the 
accused to recall the witness for cross-examination. 
15. Certain confessions made to police officer to be taken into consideration. - (1) 
notwithstanding anything in the Code or in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, but subject to 
the provisions of this section, a confession made by a person before a police officer not 
lower in rank than Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police officer either in 
writing or on any mechanical device like cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of 
which sounds or images can be reproduced, shall be admissible IN the trial of such person 
for an offence under this act or rules made thereunder. 
(2) The police officer shall, before recording any confession imder sub-section (1), explain 
to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it 
may be used as evidence against him and such officer shall not record any such confession 
unless upon questioning the person making i t he has reason to believe that it is being 
made voluntarily. 
16. Protection of witnesses. - (1) notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, all 
proceedings before a Designated Court shall be conducted in camera: 
Provided that where the Public Prosecutor so applies, any proceedings or part 
thereof may be held in open Court. 
(2) A Designated Court may, on an application made by a witness or on its motion, take 
such witness or on its own motion, take such measures as it deems fit for keeping the 
identity and address of any witness secret. 
(3) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of he provisions of sub-section 
(2), the measures, which a Designated Court ma> take under that sub-section, may include 
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(a) the holding of the proceedings at aplace to be decided by the Designated 
Court; 
(b) the avoiding of the mention of the names and addresses of the witnesses in 
its orders or judgements or in any records of the case accessible to public; 
(c) the issuing of any directions for securing that the identity and addresses of 
the witnesses are not disclosed; 
(d) that it is in the public interest to order that all or any of the proceedings 
pending before such a Court shall not be published in any manner. 
17. Trial by Designated Courts to have precedence. - the trial under this Act of any 
offence by a Designated Court shall have precedence over the trial of any other case 
against the accused in any other Court (not being a Designated Court) and shall be 
concluded in preference to the trial of such other case and accordingly the trial of such 
other case shall remain in abeyance. 
19.Power to transfer cases to regular Courts. - Where, after taking cognizance of any 
offence, a Designated Court is of opinion that the offence is not triable by it, it shall 
notwithstanding that it has no jurisdiction to try such offence, transfer the case for trial of 
such offence to any Court having jurisdiction imder the Code and the Court to which the 
case is transferred may proceed with the trial of the offence as if it had taken cognizance 
of the offence. 
20. Appeal. - (1) notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie as a 
matter of right fi-om any judgement, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of 
a Designated Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on the law. 
(2) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgement, 
sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Designated Court. 
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from 
the date of the judgement, sentence or order appealed from: 
Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the 
said period of thirty days of it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not 
preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days. 
PART IV (MISCELLANEOUS) 
lO.Modified application of certain provisions of the Code. - (1) Notwithstanding 
anything contained in the Code or any other law, every offence punishable under this Act 
or any rule thereunder shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of 
clause (c) of Section 2 of the Code, and "cognizable case" as defined in that clause shall 
be constructed accordingly. 
(2) Section 21 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable 
under this Act or any rule made thereunder, subject to the modification that tiie reference 
to "the state Government" therein shall be constructed as a reference to "the Central 
Government or the State Government". 
•an 
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(3) Section 164 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence 
punishable under the Act or any rule made thereunder, subject to the modification that the 
reference IN sub section (1) thereof to "Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate" 
shall be constructed as a reference to "Metropolitan Magistrate, Judicial Magistrate, 
Executive Magistrate or Special Executive Magistrate." 
(4) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence 
punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder subject to the modifications that— 
(a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof to "Judicial Magistrate" shall be construed 
as a reference to "Judicial Magistrate, Executive Magistrate or Special Executive 
Magistrate": 
(b) the reference IN sub-section (2) thereof to "fifteen days", "ninety days" and "sixty 
days", whether they occur, shall be construed as references to "sixty days", "one year" and 
"one year" respectively; and 
(c) sub-section (2 A) thereof shall be deemed to have been omitted. 
(5) Section 268 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence 
punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder subject to the modifications that— 
(a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof— 
(i) to the "State Government" shall be construed as a reference to the "Central 
Government or the State Government": 
(ii) to "order of the State Govenmient" shall be construed as a reference to "order of the 
Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be"; and 
(b) the reference in sub-section (2) thereof, to "State Government" shall be construed 
as a reference to "Central Govenmient or the State Government, as the case may be." 
(6) Sections 366 to 371 and Section 392 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case 
involving an offence triable by a Designated Court subject to the modifications that the 
references to "Court of Session" and "High Court", wherever occurring therein, shall be 
construed as references to "Designated Court" and "Supreme Court", respectively. 
(7) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the 
arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence punishable under 
this Act or any rule made thereunder. 
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence 
punishable under this Act on any rule made thereunder shall, if in custody, be released on 
bail or on his own bond unless— 
(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportimity to oppose the application for 
such release, and 
(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not 
likely to commit any offence while on bail. 
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(9) The limitation on granting of bail specified in sub-section (8) are in addition to the 
limitations imder the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. 
21. Presumption as to offence under section 3. - (1) in a prosecution for an offence 
under sub-section (1) of the section 3, if it is proved— 
(a) that the arms or explosives or any other substances specified in section 3 
were recovered fiom the possession of the accused and there is reason to believe that 
such arms or explosives or other substances of a similar nature, were used in the 
commission of such offence; or 
(b) that by the evidence of an expert the finger prints of the accused were 
found at the site of the offence or on anything including arms and vehicles used in 
connection with the commission of such offence; or 
(c) that a confession has been made by a co-accused that the accused had 
committed the offence; or 
(d) that the accused had made a confession of the offence to any person other 
than a police officer, 
the Designate Court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the accused had 
committed such offence. 
(2) In a prosecution for an offence under sub-section (3) of Section 3, if it is proved that 
the accused rendered any financial assistance to a person accused of, or reasonably 
suspected of, an offence under that section, the Designated Court shall presume, unless the 
contrary is proved, that the person has committed the offence under that sub-section. 
22. Identification of accused. - Where a person has been declared a proclaimed offender 
in a terrorist case, the evidence regarding his identification by witnesses on the basis of his 
photograph shall have the same value as the evidence of a test identification parade. 
23. Saving. - (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect the jurisprudence exercisable by, or the 
procedure applicable to, any Court or other authority under any law relating to the naval, 
military or air forces or other armed forces of the Union. 
(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that for the purposes of any such law 
as is referred to in sub-section (1), a Designated Court shall be deemed to be a court of 
ordinary criminal justice. 
24. Saving of orders. - Where an order purports to have been made and signed by any 
authority m exercise of any power conferred by or imder this Act, a court shall, within the 
meaning of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, presume tiiat such order was so made by that 
authority. 
25. Overriding effect. - The provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder or any 
order made under any such rule shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent 
therewitii contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument having 
effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act. 
26. Protection of action taken under this Act. - No suit, prosecution or order legal 
proceeding shall lie agamst tiie Central Government or a State Government or any officer 
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or authority of the Central Government or State Government or any other authority on 
whom powers have been conferred under this Act or any rule made thereunder, for 
anything which is in good faith done or purported to be done in pursuance of this Act or 
any rule made thereunder or any order issued under any such rule. 
27. Power of the Supreme Court to make rules. - The Supreme Court may, by 
notification in the Official Gazette, make such rule, if any, as it deem necessary for 
carrying out the provisions of this Act relating to the Designated Courts. 
28. Power to make rules. - (1) without prejudice to the powers of the Supreme Court to 
make rule under section27, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official 
Gazette, make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act. 
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules 
may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: ~ 
(a) regulating the conduct of persons in respect of areas the control of which is 
considered necessary or expedient and the removal of such persons from such areas; 
(b) the enrtry into, and search of, — 
(i) any vehicle, vessel or aircraft; or 
(ii) any place, whatsoever, 
reasonably suspected of being used for committing the offences referred to in section 3 or 
section 4 or for manufacturing or sorting anything for the commission of any such offence; 
(C)conferring powers upon, ~ 
(i) the Central Government; 
(ii) a State Government; 
(iii) an Administrator of a Union territory under article 239 of the Constitution; 
(iv) an officer of the Central Government not lower than that of a Joint Secretary; or 
(v) an officer of a State Government not lower than that of a District Magistrate. lo 
make general or special orders to prevent or cope with terrorist acts or disruptive 
activities: 
(d) The arrest and trial of persons contravening any rules or any order made thereunder; 
(e) The punishment of any person who contravenes or attempts to contravene or abets or 
attempts to abet the contravention of any rule or order made thereunder with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to seven years or for a term which may not be less than six 
months but which may extend to seven years or with fine or with imprisonment as 
iiforesaid and fine; 
(f) Providing for the seizure and detention of any property in respect of which such 
contravention, attempt or abetment as is referred to in clause (e) has been committed and 
for the adjudication of such seizure and detention, whether by any court or by any other 
authority. 
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29. Rules to be laid before Houses of Parliament - Every rules made by the Central 
Government under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each 
House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be 
comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry 
of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both 
Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule 
should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be 
of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment 
shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule. 
30. Repeal and saving. - (1) the Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (Prevention) 
Ordinance, 1987, is hereby repealed. 
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the said 
Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions 
of this Act. 
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